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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE NORTH SEA OIL INDUSTRY
Alix Thorn
ABSTRACT
The thesis is concerned with the means by which labour is
managed in the young, turbulent and high risk industry of North Sea
oil extraction. To explain this, the study had to extend beyond the
more usual focus of research attention, the inmediate relationship
between employer and employee, to examine the wider commercial
relationship between the major oil companies and their contractors
from the perspective of both parties. The response of the trade
unions is assessed in this broader context.
In a relatively short period of time an industrial relations
system of considerable complexity has developed. The spreading of
financial risk by the operating companies (oil majors) is paralleled
in industrial relations by the delegation of responsibility to
contractors. As a result, a two tier workforce has developed. The
study analyses the processes at work, drawing on a range of
interview, observation and archival techniques.
Collective bargaining has been widely used to cope with the
labour problems posed by these extreme financial and environmental
circumstances. It is demonstrated that this has sometimes been
imposed upon the contractors and that it operates at both the
mUlti-employer, industry level, and at that of the individual
company. However, the thesis concludes that this collective
bargaining rests more on loose, informal agreements, and trade union
lobbying, rather than formal agreements and procedures.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY
The relationship between the employer and employees has
conventionally been seen as relatively stable and self-contained.
Hence most industrial relations research has focussed on the
circumstances in individual establishments, firms or industries
without their integrity being in question. Yet no factory or firm
exists in isolation and therefore there are a number of reasons why
studies should be extended beyond the boundaries of the
employer-employee relationship. For example, changes in world
markets and information technologies, and increased interdependence
are, in many industries, resulting in a fluid structure of
sub-contracting and insecure employment for which conventional
conceptions of industrial relations do not offer adequate
explanation.
This study is concerned with the brief, turbulent history of
industrial relations in the North Sea oil industry. In less than a
decade a thriving, massive industry developed around north east
Scotland, established by a combination of nomadic multinational
companies and a host of more-or-less transitory service
sub-contractors. In little more than a decade, the industry was
rocked by economic crisis, the oil price crash illustrating again
the volatile nature of the exploration and production sector. These
circumstances have been made more remarkable by the speed with which
the industry has grown, slid into crisis, and then sought to regain
its balance.
The focus of the study is the problem of managing an unusual
workforce: a workforce which has had to acquire, rapidly, the skills
with which to handle capital equipment of almost unprecedented cost
in a hostile environment requiring highly advanced technology. Even
the most basic catering work has to be done under conditions of
extreme harshness. These circumstances have combined to place
labour in a position of fluctuating vulnerability. Managers have
had to develop adequate ways of managing this workforce within the
legislative, political and cultural systems of the UK.
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This study analyses the solutions which have been devised for
managing a complex workforce in difficult circumstances involving a
high level of risk, and considers the causal influences behind these
solutions. It also describes the equally problematic development of
the trade union response. Of particular interest has been the way
in which employers and unions have come together on a number of
issues to build collective bargaining institutions to help contain
the anxieties and uncertainties which have threatened the stability
of the complex industr ial relations system, and thereby threatened
productivity.
The Present study
The oil exploration and production companies situated in
Aberdeen provided excellent case studies close at hand. More
importantly, the rapid rise of the UK oil industry meant that the
opportunity was available to study the development of industrial
relations policy within very recent memory. The oil price crash of
1986 and the SUbsequent crisis were not anticipated. However, they
offered the valuable chance to assess to what degree industrial
relations policy was affected by economic circumstances.
Having embarked upon the fieldwork, it became clear that the
circumstances of policy formulation could only be appreciated by
developing an understanding of the wider links with contractors.
This became apparent quite early on in the study when the extent of
contracting was revealed. Therefore investigation of the
relationship between client and contractor became a key element in
the research. Furthermore, it was impossible to describe and assess
adequately management's policy in a vacuum; therefore, just as it
was necessary to consider economic circumstances, it was essential
to assess the capacity of the trade unions to organise. Hence
access to the appropriate trade union machinery was gained. Thus an
attempt was made to evaluate the resultant institutions of
collective bargaining in the industry.
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The starting point is the question of how far existing
research literature on the management of industrial relations and on
multinational oil companies casts light on these unusual
circumstances. In the remainder of this introductory chapter the
relevant research literature, which is fairly sparse, is considered,
and the research methodology adopted for this study is explained.
Chapter 2 gives a brief history of the North Sea oil industry and
goes on to describe the processes involved in the development of an
offshore field.
This background information is essential to the understanding
of the power relationships which exist within the industrial
relations system. The pattern of employment in the industry is
described in chapter 3, and again this is central to understanding
industr ial relations. Chapter 4 then provides an overview of the
development of industr ial relations in the North Sea. The
institutions introduced in that chapter are discussed at greater
length in chapter 5; these are key actors in the story which
unfolds. In chapters 6 and 7, the data collected from the operating
companies is summarised and evaluated; chapter 6 considers
industrial relations within the individual companies, and chapter 7,
their relationship with contractors. Chapter 8 examines the
relationship from the perspective of two contract sectors, catering
and construction. In chapter 9, a case study is used to illustrate
the realities of the power relationships within the industrial
relations system. Chapter 10 moves away from consideration of
individual companies to assess the interaction at industry level
between the oil companies and trade unions. The following chapter
picks up this theme and discusses the obstacles which have faced and
are facing the trade union movement in organising the North Sea oil
industry, and the prospects for change. The final chapter, 12,
summarises the main arguments and conclusions of the research.
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Relevant Research
Research in industrial relations has only relatively recently
tackled those aspects of employer behaviour relevant to the issues
to be examined. Although "the characteristics of organisation among
employers and control systems within the firm" had been suggested by
Bain and Clegg as "the major explanatory variable in labour
relations",{l) there had been comparatively little research work
done in this area. The most notable exception was the work of Neil
Chamberlain who stressed the overemphasis of industrial relations
research on trade unions, and highlighted the significance of the
external environment (such as economic conditions, government policy
and public opinion) on industrial relations decisions (2).
One reason for this "neglect" has been the preferences of
students: most labour history students have been more sympathetic to
trade unions and therefore have focussed their studies on them (3).
Business historians, on the other hand, have concentrated on the
entrepreneurial, commercial and administrative aspects of business
in preference to the industrial relations aspects (4). Another
reason is the comparative lack of evidence: company records are
often sparse, and in any case business organisations tend to be more
secretive than unions making access more difficult (an aspect which
was confir@ed by this research). In addition, much of the work done
on specific businesses has tended to be, for reasons of its origin,
laudatory and uncritical.
However, a number of authorities on industrial relations such
as Bain and Clegg (5), Purcell, and Timperley have, in recent years,
made a number of suggestions as to the future direction of
industrial relations research, and the focus of industrial relations
research has indeed been moving steadily away from trade union
membership and institutions, and broadening into the examination of
workplace relations and work processes. For example, in 1983, Brown
stated that the research programme of the Industrial Relations
Re s e a r c h Urii t, (',iac"ick Un i ve r s i t y ) ,?lanneci f o r 1934-88 wou Ld .se t;
industrial relations in a "broader perspective through research that
emphasises the role played by management, intentionally or
otherwise, in shaping the structure of industrial relations".
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In addition, industrial relations scholars have been paying
more attention to multinational organisations, hitherto somewhat
ignored from an industrial relations point of view. Though a wealth
of material exists on business policy and strategic planning within
such organisations very little attention has been paid to the
question of labour relations. In an article pub l i shed in the BJIR,
March 1983, purcell stressed that while it
"is increasingly noted that insufficient attention has been
paid to the policies and practices of management in the
handling of industrial relations ••••••••••. one notable feature
has been the failure to appreciate the distinctive features of
modern business corporations which increasingly dominate both
private sector manufacturing and service industries and
provide a model for management in public sector concerns such
as nationalised industries". (6)
However, so far as this researcher is aware there is little that has
analysed collective bargaining in circumstances of extreme
contractual uncertainty, other than the literature on flexible
workforces to which the thesis will return. Furthermore, the
existing literature on oil multinationals says little about
industr ial relations pol icy. Hence, though the researcher became
aware at an early stage that there was a very large, more peripheral
literature on management and on organisational change, it was
established that this was unlikely to provide any strong purchase on
the main issues of industrial relations in the North Sea oil
industry, and the decision was made to place the emphasis of
research on empirical description and analysis. Before
concentrating attention on the North Sea oil industry, it is useful
to draw out some of the main points to emerge from previous research
on multinational oil corporations.
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MULTINATIONAL OIL CORPORATIONS
Their size and high international profile have long made the
international oil corporations a focus of research interest.
Definitions vary as to what a multinational corporation (MNC)
actually is. Brooke and Remmers offer the simplest criterion; "it
performs its main operations, either manufacture or provision of a
service, in at least two countries"(7). For Channon and Jalland, a
MNC is "a company which seeks to operate strategically on a global
scale"(8). Professor Vernon, Harvard Graduate School of Business
Administration, maintains "that a firm would be called multinational
if it possessed at least six overseas manufacturing
subsidiaries"(9). The precise criteria are unimportant for the
present research, as the companies involved in this study are some
of the biggest in the world, with the number of subsidiaries running
into hundreds as opposed to a handful.
The texts cited above were concerned wi t h strategic decision
making. Strategic decisions are those which are "concerned with the
long-term health of the enterprise .••••• the basic long-term goals
and objectives of the enterprise, and the adoption of courses of
action and the allocation of resources necessary for car rying out
these goals"(lO). Chandler et al look in addition at the structure
of organisations, the accepted wisdom being that the latter "is to
be seen as reflecting the route and the priorities in the
decision-making."(ll)
On a less theoretical level, Ch r i s t oph e r Tugendhat, '..hile he
does not ignore strategy and structure in "The Multinationals", is
more concerned with the conduct and behaviour of MNCs. Tugendhat
claims that MNCs should not be thought of in conventional national
terms since the "overriding aim of each one of them is to pursue its
own corporate interest which is separate and distinct from that of
every government, including the government of its country of
origin"(l2). ,s... clear exar.Jple ::0 311ppOr~ ::his l3 that. of
Argentinian subsidiary of a MNC with its roots in Britain which
supported the Argentinian war effort during the Falklands conflict.
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With regard to the oil exploration and production industry,
opinions differ as to the importance of nationality. Kitchen, in
"Labour Law and Offshore Oil", states that nationality is important
in shaping employment practices and industrial relations attitudes
(as are corporate structure and behaviour) (13). Buchan, on the
other hand, was of the opinion that nationality,
"is of little significance - each establishment was part of a
multinational enterprise, which had evolved a method of
operations ••••• which owed little to national characteristics,
and took little account of variations in custom and practice
of specific host countries."(14)
According to Tugendhat, the key feature of a modern MNC is its
central direction. He likens the head off ice to a brain and nerve
centre, and the subsidiaries to limbs. "Despite frequent assertions
to the contrary," Tugendhat goes on to say, "the subsidiaries are
not run as separate enterprises each of which has to stand on its
own two feet. They must all work within a framework established by
an overall group plan drawn up at headquarters and their activities
are tightly integrated with each other"(lS). Such central direction
only became possible in the 19S0s with the advent of rapid and
reliable air travel, telephone, telex and computer systems, and was
aided by the establishment of GATT which reduced obstacles to
international trade.
While central direction may be normal at a global, strategic
level, there are considerable variations in the degree of autonomy
enjoyed by subsidiaries on a tactical, day-to-day level. In Brooke
and Remmers' study a number of arguments were made for and against
centralization. The arguments in favour of centralization are
largely commercial; for example, there may be a need for
rationalizing production across frontiers; or some subsidiaries may
produce products which are sold to other members in the group.
Indeed, Brooke and Remmers state that "where there is scope for
integration, then close control over the subsidiaries seems an
inevitable development."(16)
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There are a number of arguments against centralization; by
destroying room for initiative the company may lose managers of high
ability (examples of this were found during the research but it was
almost impossible to get any confirmation from the company
concerned) and, furthermore, decentralization may be less expensive
since centralization can result in the growth of officialdom at head
office and requires an expensive monitoring system. In addition, if
a MNC favours decentralization then its subsidiaries may enjoy a
more harmonious relationship with the indigenous government.
Tugendhat claims that subsidiaries of MNCs do their utmost to blend
into their surroundings and take on a local character for just this
end:
ftThey hate to draw attention to their size and influence for
fear that it will provoke the animosity of governments, small
businessmen, and the general public. ft(17)
An interesting example of this was the oil company which had as an
actual policy the integration of its staff in the host community.
Wi th this in mind, the company refrained from building sports and
leisure facilities - at least until it became apparent that Aberdeen
did not have enough to offer.
One management function which might be expected to be
decentralized is personnel, because practices vary from country to
country, as does labour legislation. In addition, trade union
negotiations make central control d i f f i cu Lt; , though that is not to
say that head office does not have any influence or input in local
negotiations. For example, head office may impose budgetary limits,
or it may make r eq u La r visits. There may be vague guidelines in
operation throughout the corporation. One such guideline Which was
ci ted by a number of managers interviewed dur ing this research was
that their company always aimed at being amongst the wage leaders,
but not the leader (who remains anonymous). Brooke and Remmers,
however, point out that more centralized relationships in the
personnel function are emerging. Their study revealed that some
companies '.-Jere c e q i nn i nq to U3e aptitude tests worldwide, others
were looking at promotions on a global level, a feat made possible
by computerising the personnel records of the company's senior staff.
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Indeed, one of the exploration and production companies
studied had developed a global Organisation Development programme.
The programme, which was designed to establish a single, uniform,
worldwide employee information system, has several objectives.
These include improved manpower planning; internal transfer,
promotion and replacement planning; identification of Whigh
potential W individuals; and personnel development. The OD database
has information on all employees above a certain salary grade, and
many below.
RESEARCH METHOD
The oil industry can be described as a tree, with the
exploration and production companies forming the trunk. The
companies ,..hich can be considered as the 'twigs' are numerous and,
although some of them could technically be called MNCs, the decision
was taken to focus on the 'majors' at the heart of the industry to
ensure consistency.
In order to attain the detailed information required, it was
decided to conduct in-depth studies as opposed to a more 'broad
brush' postal survey. When the research began, there were 15
operating companies (or operators) and a sample of between six and
eight of these companies was planned. To some extent, companies
featured in a study such as this are self-selecting, since access to
appropriate personnel and information is granted at their
discretion. However there is no cause for anxiety in this instance
as the sample group is broadly representative in terms of size and
nationality of the total spread of companies.
Initial contact was made with personnel managers of several
exploration and production companies by attendance at meetings of
the Grampian Personnel and Training Officers Group (GPTOG).
Follow-up appointments were chen ~ade with those managers who
thought that their company might be interested in participating in
the study. In addition, attendance at the meeting of the Liaison
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Subcommittee of the UK Offshore Operators' Association's (UKOOA)
Employment Practices Committee (EPC) with the Inter Union Offshore
Oil Committee (IUOOe) resulted in follow-up meetings with managers
of three companies.
Establishing criteria for drawing comparisons of size between
the companies was a little problematic. To look at global rankings
would have been of no help as this study was concerned with North
Sea operations. Furthermore, some of the companies were themselves
subsidiaries of giant corporations which concentrated on other
industries. To use the number of employees, be it offshore or
onshore, Aberdeen or UK, would be misleading for a number of
reasons. Firstly, the labour structure varies from company to
company because various jobs or functions may be subcontracted in or
out. For example, some companies carry out their own drilling,
others bring in specialist companies. Some companies prefer to use
project management companies such as Matthew Hall in the deveJopment
of a field. Many staff (such as clerical workers, draughtsmen,
planning and commissioning engineers) may be contracted in via
employment agencies for temporary work.
Secondly, different fields will be at different stages in
their development and this will affect the number of people
employed. A third factor which makes employee numbers a less than
useful choice is that some oil companies use their London offices as
"c Le ar i.nq hous e s " for their European and African operations. In
addition, London-based personnel may provide support and services
for all the UK subsidiaries of the MNC (eg any refining or chemical
activities). Some companies are maintaining this type of
organisation, while others are dismantling it and moving some
management functions to Aberdeen.
Fourthly, the number of employees will obviously be affected
by the number of production platforms. This number is a function of
the geology of t he field. Fo" e xa r.p I e , t he r e are at the time of
writing
(and a
(988) three steel platforms on Br itoil' s
floating platform under construction) which
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Beatr ice field
has estimated
recoverable reserves (ERR) of 20 million tonnes. Shell's Fulmar
field, with ERR of 60 million tonnes has only two steel platforms.
BP's Forties field, ERR 261 million tonnes, has four steel
platforms. This latter point also renders the number of platforms
useless as a criterion for ranking the companies.
Two possible contenders therefore remained; the number of
fields for which each company is the operator, or the size of oil
reserves held by each company. This information was deduced from
mater ial published by the North East Scotland Development Agency
(NESDA) in the 1985 NESDA Directory (18).
The former can be misleading because fields vary so much in
their size and formation. However, the number of fields is a
reflection of the size of each company I s operations and investment
in the North Sea, because the development of each field is is a
separate project which takes several years to reach completion.
Each field development calls for a complete team to plan the project
and organise its coming to fruition. Hundreds of staff will be
involved all types of engineers, cost controllers, material
controllers, purchasers, project managers, and many more - without
taking into account the people who build the platform, install it,
work on it, and keep it supplied.
On the other hand, the number of fields alone does not reveal
the size of each company's share of the North Sea "cake". A more
useful indicator in this respect is the ERR. Present technology is
not sufficiently advanced to make complete recovery of afield I s
reserves economically feasible. Therefore it is quite possible that
at some future date the ERR of fields will change as technology
advances. At present, there may be as much as 40% of a field's
reserves left in the ground when a well is capped.
Using these criteria, and acknowledging that the information
~sed na~ec ~he operator of the field only, and not :~e other ~elTlbers
of the consortium, nor
ranking was established.
the size of any company's shareholding, a
Many - if not all - of the companies have
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interests in other fields for which they themselves are not the
operator. All these names and figures are unknowns and therefore
the ranking may not be totally accurate. In addition, new
developments in the pipeline may alter the balance slightly.
Production rates can be altered according to demand, price,
conservation interests etc. Hence the largest producer may not be
the company with the largest ERR.
A distinction was drawn between the largest (three companies)
and the smallest companies (five), the remainder falling into the
"medium" category. The final sample comprised one large company,
two medium, and three small.
The nature and depth of information sought suggested that a
series of face to face interviews were the most appropriate means of
collecting data. To ensure consistency, a schedule was used on each
occasion; this appears in the thesis as appendix A. The length and
number of interviews in each company var ied, but on average there
were between six and eight interviews of one to one and a half hours
duration. In four of the six companies the same manager was
interviewed on each occasion, and in the remainder, various managers
according to the topic in question.
A number of minor problems did occur. For example, though six
operating companies agreed to take part, another six approached to
do so refused. Though a representative sample was eventually
constructed, the length of time taken by some companies in the
second group to decide not to participate delayed the beginning of
the field work. One such company took more than two months and
three meetings before making the decision. Secondly, the workload
of interviewees meant that the sequence of interviews tended to
spread out over a longer timespan than originally envisaged.
Indeed, in one participating company, interviews began several
months later than in other companies, as the interviewee was heavily
involved in coorcinating and overseeing a JOD evaluation exercise.
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A third problem, but a welcome one, was the volume of information
obtained, which grew as the participants overcame any initial
reservations they might have had regarding the exercise. Selecting
and summarising the most significant data was fascinating but time
consuming.
Time, resources, and the remit of the project dictated that
any study of the contractor sector had to be selective. The aim of
investigating this area was to gain a better understanding of the
client to contractor relationship which, it was believed, was a
formative influence on the industrial relations system in the
industry. The two most labour intensive sectors were selected:
catering and construction. Again the nature of the information
sought suggested face to face interviewing as being the most
appropriate method for gathering information. The schedule used for
this purpose appears as appendix B.
In the catering sector, four companies out of a possible nine
took part. Efforts were made to vary the sample with regard to COTA
(Catering Offshore Traders' Association) membership and trade union
recognition. In the construction sector, four companies took part.
The group from which they were drawn (seven in total) was restricted
to those companies which listed construction and hook up amongst
their main activities. The contract companies are described in
chapter 8. Only one visit was made to each contractor; each was
approximately one and a half hour's duration.
The data gathered in the scheduled interviews were
supplemented by ad hoc interviews with appropriate trade union
officials (eg the AEU officer, when an offshore ballot wa s being
organised); attendance at IUOOC meetings, and attendance at meetings
of the ruooc and Liaison Panel of UKOOA. As will be shown below,
these were particularly important in the study, not simply as
sources of raw data, but in demonstrating the relationships in the
industrial relacions 0jstem, and the strengtns and ;,eaknesses of che
institutions. In addition, an overnight offshore visit was made,
enabling the working environment and technology to be observed, as
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well as the 'mechanics' of a visit by a trade union officer (there
were two present). This visit enabled the researcher to appreciate
fully the complexity and enormity of an offshore development. For
example, the literature does not explain that the pressure of the
oil is so great that the wellheads are hot to touch. Similarly the
number of processes which the associated gas must undergo before
being fed into the pipeline was a revelation. The trip also offered
some small insight into the general atmosphere on the platform. On
the whole it was very settled, everyone appearing to know their way
around the routine, and the workforce had taken steps to make the
environment more homely. For example, there were tropical fish
tanks in the canteen, and someone had painted pictures for the
television lounge (which, interestingly, was for the use of the
operator's personnel only). Finally, the opportunity arose to
attend and follow the protracted wage talks in COTA which followed
the Griffin affair; these events form the basis of the case stUdy in
chapter 9.
All participating
anonymity and therefore
companies and platforms.
companies and individuals were assured
fictitious names have been used for
Summary
It was established that though the central subjects were the
multinational oil companies, it was necessary to investigate the
contractors and trade unions to fully appreciate the industrial
relations system. The primary source of data was a series of
management interviews in six operating companies, and single
management interviews in eight contractors. Further information
came from attendance at meetings at which both the oil companies and
trade unions were represented; attendance at inter-union meetings;
and from following the protracted wage talks in the catering
sector. This thesis concerns the management of industrial relations
in circ~~stances of high risk.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE BASES OF POWER RELATIONSHIPS IN NORTH SEA OIL EXTRACTION
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE OIL INDUSTRY IN THE NORTH SEA
Exploration proceeded rapidly in the North Sea following the
discovery of the massive gas field, Gronigen, off the Dutch coast.
The fact that the field was very similar to smaller fields off the
east coast of England suggested that the two discoveries could be
part of the same geological trend. A number of magnetic and seismic
surveys were carried out, with encouraging results. The continental
Shelf Act 1964 provided the necessary legal framework to establish
ownership of any finds, allowing exploration to begin. In the
autumn of 1965, BP discovered the West Sole field with its first
well, and in 1966 Shell-Esso discovered Leman Bank, which turned out
to be one of the largest offshore gas fields in the world. By 1968,
the names Indefatigable, Hewett, Viking and Rough could be added to
the list, and the decision had been taken to convert Britain to
natural gas.
Despi te these successes, the prospects for finding oil were
far from clear. Several companies drilled a number of exploratory
wells farther north in the North Sea over several years, finding
only 'sniffs' of oil until in 1969 Amoco found oil off the coast of
Scotland. This was followed by Phillips Petroleum's announcement in
1970 of the discovery of the giant Ekofisk field in the Norwegian
sector.
Spurred on by this news, the industry changed tactics, moving
the centre of activities from Great Yarmouth to Aberdeen, and
bringing in large, deep water drilling rigs from other parts of the
world. BP had discovered the giant Forties field by the end of
1970, and just over a year later Shell-Esso hit success in the Brent
field. (Shell in the North Sea operates under the name Shell
Exp I o r a t i o n and Pr oduc t i on C::o;:-,pany ,"inited usually shortened to
Shell Expro. It is, however, owned jointly with Esso, with Shell as
operators of the partnership's ventures.) It was clear by 1973 that
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"the North Sea had been proved as a major new oil and gas province
of world importance" (1) • The first of Britain's oil was brought
ashore by Hamilton Brothers in 1975.
While "gas had stirred some glimmerings of optimism in the
1960s, oil was now to provoke nothing short of euphoria in the
1970s"(2), and since then successive British governments have looked
to the North Sea oil industry for economic prosperity. Figures
pub Li shed in the "BP Statistical Review of World Energy" for 1985
put the size of the North Sea finds in perspective. The figures for
proved reserves at the end of 1984 reveal that the UK has a share of
1.9% of the world's reserves. Despite its comparatively small
reserves, the North Sea "has two significant advantages over several
of the other 'more prolific' areas, namely:
it is very near one of the world's four main industrial
markets,
The various countries which border and control it are, at
present, politically stable."(3 sic.)
However, the oil industry in the North Sea is subject to the
same problems as the oil industry worldwide, as outlined by Sampson:
for example, alternation of shortage and glut, the hectic
oscillation of prices, and the interdependence of oil and transport,
to name but three.
In many aspects the oil industry in the North Sea is more
vulnerable to such pressures than it is in many other areas, because
the hostile environment makes developing the fields in the North Sea
very costly in comparison to fields elsewhere, particularly
onshore. As a resul t, any drop in pr ice can render a development
unprofitable and the oil will be left in the ground. This is even
more true today, since it is widely accepted that there is little
probabili ty of any more "gusher s " being found, and the remaining
fields are smaller, more inaccessible and therefore mo r e marg inal.
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This vulnerability was particularly apparent when the price of oil
collapsed in 1986, resulting in the postponement of a number of
proposed offshore developments. Furthermore, the considerable time
span involved in the development of a North Sea field (it takes four
to five years, perhaps more, to get the oil ashore after the
decision to develop has been taken) exacerbates planning problems.
Figures published by Phillips Petroleum indicate that in 1980
it cost anything from £2-8 million to drill a single well. When
Phillips Petroleum's plans for Ekofisk are completed, there will be
more than 150 wells in the system, feeding 27 platforms, some of the
latter being fed by as many as 25 wells. Each Ekofisk well cost an
average $4.7 million to drill. In short, the "cost of getting each
barrel of oil out of an offshore field can be ten times that of an
equivalent onshore field."(4)
The oil industry is probably the most capital intensive in the
world and this puts tremendous emphasis on keeping to schedules. In
addition to the financial pressures, the inhospitable environment in
the North Sea creates its own deadlines. There is a fairly short
"wea t he r window", and if this is missed the development can be put
back a whole year at phenomenal cost. As a result, "delays of any
kind are disproportionately expensive and cannot be tolerated under
any circumstances if avoidable" (5). It is therefore "essential for
an oil company to establish a pattern of industrial
relations that will safeguard it from industrial unrest" (6).
This, though applicable to the production phase, is even more true
of the development phase, since the "basic fact of oil industry
economics is that it costs a fortune to find and develop a field,
but once that is done, the production costs are relatively small"(7).
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PHASES OF DEVELOPMENT
For the industrial relations observer, understanding the
importance and implications of the various stages in the development
of an oil field is crucial to grasping the nature of the power
relationships at a given point in time. This became apparent with
the revelation that dur ing certain phases in afield's life trade
union agreements could apply, and at others there was no such
application. As the research progressed, it became clear that this
was only one of a number of changes in the industr ial relat ions
system which could be identified as an offshore field moved into its
productive life. Consequently attention must be paid to the
problems of developing a North Sea field, as only then can the
industrial relations system be understood.
In essence, the processes involved in developing an offshore
field are the same as those involved in developing an onshore find;
the crucial difference is the much more hostile environment
offshore, particularly in the North Sea, which results in a number
of constraints and commercial considerations which do not exist in
an onshore environment. The operating companies have produced a
number of promotional brochures outlining their technological
tr iumphs over the inhospitable North Sea, and indeed, their
engineering achievements are extremely impressive. Technological
developments in the industry have been likened to those in the
"space race".
The sums of money involved in developing a field are vast, and
it is therefore the norm for each individual field development to be
funded by a group of companies, to spread the financial burden. One
company, usually that with the largest shareholding, takes
responsibility for developing and oper~ting the production
facilities - hence they are known as the operating companies or the
operators. This spreading of risk on the financial side was found
to be analogous ~o t~e 3preading of r:sk on ~he employment side, as
will be discussed in later chapters. The
field can be divided into three separate
fabrication and hook up, and produc~ion (8).
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Exploration
Oil and gas are normally found in sedimentary basins, and
therefore the search for such basins is where the search for oil and
gas begins. A detailed seismic survey will be carried out by a
surveyor seismic ship. In some cases, this will have followed an
initial search by an aeroplane, used to survey the magnetic
properties of rock. These ships are sometimes custom built,
sometimes converted small passenger vessels or stern trawlers.
There are two methods used by survey vessels:
a) the ship moves back and forth us ing a gravimeter to measure
accurately the Earth's gravity
b) in this more common method, the ship creates a ser ies of small
explosions sending shockwaves into the sea bed. These are reflected
back and detected by instrumen ts called hydrophones, towed behind
the ship.
From the results of the survey, geologists can build up a fairly
accurate structural picture of the rocks.
The survey and interpretation of the results account for
almost 4% of the cost of drilling an exploration well. As a rule,
the survey vessels are leased or chartered to geophysical
contractors by marine companies, and the geophysical contractors are
hired by the multinational oil companies involved in the exploration
and production of oil. These companies must then compete with each
other for "blocks" in the North Sea, allocated by the government
during a licensing round, of which there had been ten at the time of
writing.
The successful companies may then decide to begin exploratory
drilling. In most cases, this will be carried out by a drilling
company hired by the operator, and though most of the people on the
drilling rig will be employees of the drilling company, the operator
will also have a few people on board to oversee the proceedings. It
is a risky as well as an expensive activity - on average, about six
n o Le s ou r, or seven "dill c e (1::1'.
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There are three types of drilling vessels (see Figure 1):
i) ·jack-up· rigs, which are really only suitable for shallow
water. Their legs point skyward when the rig is being moved into
position, and are then lowered into the water.
ii) semi-submersible rigs, which are the most common choice in the
North Sea. They float on underwater pontoons which link the legs
together, and these pontoons are ballasted with sea water to provide
stability, with the drilling deck remaining above the water. While
drilling is taking place, the ·semi-sub· is held in position either
by anchors or by thruster propellers. Modern semi-submersibles can
drill in water more than 1000 feet deep, all year round.
iii) In very deep water, a drill ship will be used. This is a
ship's hull with a drilling derrick either in the centre of the ship
or over one of the sides. During drilling, the ship is kept in
position by anchors over the bow and stern, and a computer
controlled propeller system. The most up to date drillships can
drill in water 5000 feet deep.
The drilling company will usually own the rig, and will be
responsible for its day to day running. The exploration company
(operator) hires the rig, the crew, and will pay for all consumable
items. While drilling is being carried out, the drilling rig or
dr ill ship will be provided with everything from mud, cement and
drill pipe to food and medical supplies by supply ships.
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Figure 1 - Types of Drilling Vessel
Source: ·UK Offshore Oil and Gas·, UKOOA.
Jack-Up Semi-Submersible
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Drillship
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If oil and/or gas are found, further drilling will be carried
out to estimate the size of the field, and to appraise total
reserves, quality of oil and flow rates, with a view to establishing
the viability of the field. The decision whether or not to develop
a field will be taken following evaluation of the results of the
exploratory drilling.
The decision to begin exploratory drilling is heavily
dependent on the economic climate, in particular the price of crude
oil - this being one of the most significant factors in the decision
to develop the find. When the research began in 1984, the price of
oil was high and consequently a considerable amount of drilling
activity was taking place. In 1986, however, the price of oil fell
dramatically - from about $32 to $8 per barrel. This price collapse
had a considerable impact on the industry since fields which are
economically viable for development at $32 per barrel will appear
considerably less so at $8 - or even $18 - per barrel. Thus as the
recession bit deeper in the industry, some consortia postponed those
development plans which were at a sufficiently early stage to stop.
As a result, the drilling community in the North Sea faced a grave
shortage of work, and there was a string of drilling rigs "stacked"
just off the coast from Dundee to the Moray Firth. Indeed, so
desperate were some of the drilling companies to find work, they
were hiring out drilling rigs at a loss, simply to make some
contribution to costs (see Panorama, November 1986).
Another inhibiting factor in a complex sum is the Petroleum
Revenue Tax (PRT) which the operators must pay the state on each
barrel produced. This is paid in the year following production,
hence the industry was having to pay PRT on oil produced and sold at
around $30 per barrel from income generated a year later '.... hen oil
was sold for between $8 and $18. Not surprisingly, the industry
pressed the Government for concessions (granted in the 1987 Budget),
but in the meantime the industry claimed that funds available for
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Fabrication and Hook Up
If the consortium wishes to develop the field, it must submit
an -Annex B- application to the Secretary of State for Energy. If
the response is positive, proceedings will then enter the
fabrication and hook up phase. The fabrication element concerns the
design and construction of the production facilities; the hook up
element, the assembly of components and preparation for production
at sea. Since each field is unique, each calls for a specific,
custom built platform. The depth of the water, the quantity and
quali ty of the oil (or gas), and the sea bed character are most
important in deciding the type of platform to be installed, and also
in deciding the type of facilities to get the oil ashore; a subsea
pipeline, if economically viable, or a single buoy moor ing (SBH) in
the field for tankers to take on crude oil if a pipeline does not
make commercial sense.
As has already been suggested, the production platform is ~ade
up of a number of different parts which are assembled prior to
product ion at sea. These various parts are the jacket, support
frame, modules and template. A brief discussion of what these parts
are and their construction wi Ll, facilitate the appreciation of the
time and money involved in developing a field, and the pressures on
the parties involved. There are several types of production
facilities, illustrated overleaf in Figure 2. The design and
construction of the platform will be carried out by contractors at
various sites, possibly across the globe, under the supervision and
coordination of the operator.
The production platform is a phenomenally expensive piece of
equipment: Marathon's order for the Brae Alpha platform jacket alone
was 'North £47 million in 1980 ("The Brae Story"). The jacket is
that part of the platform which will stand in the water and support
the production facilities - in other words, the jacket is the legs
of the platform (see Figure 3). Usually the jacket is made of steel
but sometimes ....1e. -:. E co~c~ete, the :Jinian Central
platform. The Brae Alpha jacket referred to above was constructed
at Ardersier, north east of Inverness, and was a two year project.
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Floating Production
Systems
Flca~i~g ~r8duc~ion :ac~lit:es
are in use :n 2 fields, ~he
Argyll and 3uchan. A
spec:ally adap~ed se~i
sub~ersible is ~ethered by ~he
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in ~ater depths of over
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Topside Facilities
(Modules)
So ur ce : " Th e Claymore St ory , "
Oc c i de ntal
To save time, Marathon issued subcontracts for the rolling of
the tubular sections, the nodes and the bottles (bundles of tubes
through which the piles which secure the platform to the seabed are
driven). In total 24 subcontractors were involved in the
construction of the jacket, 12 in Europe, the remainder in Japan.
This example illustrates the complexity and enormity of the
undertaking - the work involved in the construction of Brae was by
no means unusual as far as the North Sea is concerned.
On top of the jacket sits the massive module support frame.
Essentially the support frame is constructed from giant girders,
though not in a grid formation as might be expected. Usually it is
a series of parallel beams; floors and walkways are incorporated
into the topside design. Attached to the underside of the support
frame are a number of peg-like features which will each sit in a
hollow leg to secure the frame.
The cost of carrying out work offshore is in the region of six
times the cost of onshore work, and therefore as much work as
possible is done onshore. Hence the "top-deck" - that part of the
platform which will sit on the support frame is constructed in
modular form while the jacket is being built. There is a variety of
different types of modules, outlined below, which are combined in
the appropr iate permutation for the platform concerned. There can
be 20 or more modules on a large installation.
Drilling modules are used for development as opposed to
exploration drilling. They can be hired or purchased by the
operating company, and may possibly be removed from the platform
when drilling operations are complete. A second type of module is
the well head; this incorporates the well head and valve often known
as a "christmas tree", shut down and production manifolds, and
stores drill pipe. It must be designed to withstand considerable
stresses.
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The process module contains the equipment necessary to process
the oil into the appropriate condition for transportation. Gas and
water will be separated from the crude and disposed of in a variety
of ways. The gas may be used as a power source for the platform, it
may be flared off, or it may be collected and sent ashore by
pipeline or tanker (if the latter, then the gas will be liquified).
It may also be used to enhance recovery from the field by being
injected into the reservoir. If the oil is to be transported by
pipeline, then it is likely that the necessary pumps will form part
of this module. The utilities/power module contains the equipment
necessary for the other modules to function, such as power
generating units and air compressors.
To obtain maximum returns on their substantial investments,
the operators use water and/or gas injection techniques to enhance
recovery from the reservoir. Either water or gas is pumped into the
reservoir at high pressure, forcing the oil out. If water is being
used, then the water/gas injection module will contain lifting pumps
(to raise water from the sea), a filtration plant, and chemical
injection equipment to render the water non-corrosive, and also
sterile, to prevent the growth of bacteria. If gas is being used,
then the module will incorporate gas compression equipment. Whether
water or gas is being used, it is crucial that the medium is cleaned
to prevent the corrosion and clogging of extraction equipment.
The final type of module is that comprising living quarters -
this includes the recreation and catering areas, and communication
equipment. The offshore visit undertaken during the research
revealed the living quarters to be warm, comfortable and very
clean. The platform visited had two berth cabins, each with its own
bathroom. These were arranged on four floors, around a central
stairwell. Recreation facilities included a pool table, table
tennis, a sauna and gym, a cinema and television/video lounge. In
addition, the radio room, helicopter lounge, shop, laundry and
catering facilities were in this block. Accommodation on the
platform had been upgraded during its lifetime; accommodation on its
sister platform was four to a cabin with communal facilities, as was
the norm for first generation platforms.
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The above is a somewhat simplistic description, as is does not
convey the quantity or complexity of plant and equipment which must
be accommodated. For example, the well-head module on the platform
visited contained 36 well-heads, each with oil passing through
them. These are warm to touch as the crude oil leaves the reservoir
at very high temperatures. The drilling derrick is moved about the
drill floor on rails to cover whichever well is to be drilled.
Conventionally, a North Sea platform had its deck sections
assembled offshore, and was equipped with machinery and
accommodation modules before itself being used to drill wells. Such
was the case for the first generation of production platforms. The
development of the North Sea has precipitated the development of
engineering technology, and in some way each field development seems
to be more efficient than the one prior to it. For example, in the
case of Phillips Petroleum I s Maureen platform, the deck units were
assembled onshore at Loch Kishorn on the support frame. The entire
deck structure was then floated into the loch where it was "mated"
with the jacket. The completed platform was then towed to its final
position.
Another development in North Sea technology is that of
template drilling. This allows development drilling to proceed
while the platform is being fabricated, which both speeds up
progress and provides valuable information about the reservoir. The
template is basically a steel gr id with slots for the wells and a
guide system to assist the accurate positioning of the production
platform. Like the platform, the template is secured to the sea bed
by steel piles. A semi-submersible drilling rig can then move over
the location and begin drilling the development wells. This can be
a long task - in the case of the Maureen development, four years.
Wells for enhanced recovery injection tecnniques will also be
drilled.
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Whether or not a template is used, all North Sea developments
call for the use of directional drilling; ie the wells deviate from
the vertical as they are drilled, fanning out to ensure the
reservoir is drained effectively. This is necessary because it
would be impossible economically to place a platform over each
location where a well is wanted, given that a field may have 36
wells. When hook up is completed (usually when Rfirst oil R flows to
the platform) the development then enters the production phase.
Production
During the production phase, the number of people on ~he
platform (POB - Persons on Board) will fall in relation to the hook
up phase, but there will still be a heavy contractor involvement.
Until recently, the proportion of operator to contractor personnel
on board during production was approximately equal. The
contractors I personnel will include caterers and stewards, divers,
welders, technicians, drillers, and others involved in maintenance
work on the platform. During the recent recession in the industry,
companies made efforts to reduce costs, for example by postponing
non-essential maintenance work. Not only is money saved on the work
not done, but also POB figures are reduced, further contributing to
a decrease in costs.
Contract Allocation
Work is allocated to contractors during the production phase
by means of competitive tendering. This takes place on a regular
basis; companies in the two sectors examined, catering and
construction, have to rebid at least every two years. The exact
operation of the competitive tendering process, and its impact on
industrial relations, are discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.
Though contractors have to bid against each other for fabrication
and hook up work, such contracts are on a job and finish basis, ie
the work is of a finite duration.
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Contract costing can be descr ibed as either 'reimbursable' or
'lump sum'. In the case of the former, the client company
(operator) pays the contractor for labour and plant hire, and
consumables. If a contract is 'lump sum' the contract price is
fixed when the contract is awarded and will be the price paid unless
the contract contains an 'escalator clause'. For example, if the
contractor's workforce is covered by a national agreement such as
the Offshore Construction Agreement then the contract may contain a
clause whereby the contract price will be revised upwards to
accommodate arise in rates laid down in the national agreement,
should such a rise occur during the running of the contract. Where
no such escalator clause is included, any increase in cost must be
borne by the contractor.
This distinction has caused problems in the past for COTA
members (the Catering Offshore Traders' Association). One of the
problems with coming to some agreement for catering staff wages in
1986 (see Chapter 9) was that some COTA members held contracts with
escalator clauses and others did not. Hence the latter group had
more difficulty in agreeing to an increase, as they could not pass
the cost on to the client.
The same is true for the construction companies, particularly
if a contractor undertakes a 'lump sum' contract to design and build
a platform as in this sector of the industry additional costs of a
significant order are mainly the result of design changes. Though
too early to claim a trend, there are indications of a move towards
'turnkey contracting'. A 'turnkey contract' is a contract to
design, build, hOOk-up and commission a platform; in other words to
carry out the whole project from drawing board to production. Such
contracts inevitably give rise to joint ventures because of the
requirements placed on the contract holder for facilities, such as a
construction yard and heavy lift barge. The contract holder will
subcontract in a number of spheres.
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Turnkey contracting is attractive to operating companies
because contracts are fixed cost. It represents more risk for the
contractor than reimburseable contracts, and is more cost effective
for the oil companies because design changes are paid for by the
major contractor. This development may cause contractors some
problems because of the length of the contract, as contractors will
have to estimate manhours and pay rates for the later years of the
contract when they prepare their bid, and will have to bear the cost
if they miscalculate.
Another problem which construction companies face is the
performance bond. This is a financial guarantee which the
contractor must be able to provide for the client if called upon to
do so. If anything goes wrong with the contract the client can call
in the bond, which is 100% of the contract value, and possibly
bankrupt the contractor. If a contractor is working for several
different clients a bond must be available for all of them, which
ties up considerable sums of capital.
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The Power Relationship in each Phase
Exploration
Of all the different elements making up this complex
enterprise, the drilling companies are closest in reality to the
tough, pioneering, "macho" image which mention of the oil industry
conjures up for many people. These companies have a reputation for
a "hire and fire" attitude to industrial relations; and for being
staunchly anti-union (though two of the five drilling companies
studied by Buchan recognised and negotiated with trade unions). To
be more accurate, Buchan's work (9) suggests that this opposition to
collective representation is more correctly associated with American
drilling companies. Since the majority of drilling companies are
American it is not hard to understand how their behaviour has
resulted in other companies being associated with the same style and
attitudes.
The idea of trade unionism flies in the face of the tough,
individualistic, pioneering culture which pervades and is
cultivated by - the drilling industry. As one senior manager from
an operating company put it, "no self respecting driller would be
seen to have all his fingers". Furthermore, it is thought that the
presence of trade unions would be a potentially disruptive influence
in an arena where any stoppage of work proves prohibitively
expensive. Of course this attitude was not unrelated to the
perceived "British disease" of constant industrial action, fostered
by media coverage at home and abroad.
Such a management stance on industrial relations was tenable
not least because wages and conditions for workers in the industry
are (or -"ere at the time of Buchan's research) relatively high in
comparison with other sectors. An additional factor during the
l~80s has been the economic recession which has gripped other
industries, severely restricting opportunities to find alternative
employment, particularly in areas of high unemployment such as
Teesside, from which many come.
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With the exception of Buchan's work, there has been little or
no attempt to differentiate between the industrial relations conduct
of the drilling companies and that of the operators. Since both
Carson's (10) and Kitchen's (11) research was carried out during a
time of rapid and extensive exploration and development, it is not
altogether surprising to find this failure to distinguish between
the styles of the operating and drilling companies, though it is
clearly the style of the latter Which dominates their work. This is
partiCUlarly true in Carson's work, in which he rejects the argument
that the challenges posed by working at the frontiers of technology
in a hostile environment have led to unavoidable, albeit
regrettable, fatalities in the offshore industry.
Thus to date the popular image of oil industry industrial
relations is, in essence, that of the drilling industry, prevalent
during exploration. Numerous anecdotes have been circulated about
the anti-union, autocratic if not ruthless philosophies
cultivated by the dominant American companies. One operating
company manager interviewed during the course of this research had
spent some time with a drilling company, and had been horrified by
what he saw regarding industrial relations; "I was getting through a
packet of Rennies a week~". A trade union officer interviewed asked
a drilling company supervisor how the company motivated its
personnel, to be told "if a guy does a good job, he gets to keep it".
During the exploration phase, the balance of power with regard
to industrial relations lies in management's favour for several
reasons. Firstly, comparatively good wages and conditions encourage
compliance in the workforce. A second reason is the recruitment
practices of the companies; at its most basic, one drilling company
manager was publicly reported to have said "the company went through
18,000 British workers to find the right 350"(12). Other companies,
while perhaps a little less thorough, nevertheless showed a
preference for "ex-servicemen and ex-seamen (which militated)
against unionisation "(13). This ~as indeed mentioned by an
offshore employee of an operator. Furthermore, "the labour force is
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not by nature one which is easily persuaded into union activity,
partly because of apparently high wage rates, partly because of its
itinerant nature - ••••• will pack a bag and prepare to move anywhere
and partly too because of the disillusionment with industrial
unrest directly or indirectly experienced onshore R(14).
Thirdly, the dependence of the drilling companies on the
operators for work means Rspeed and efficiency are the bywords of
the offshore drilling industry. The faster a well is drilled the
cheaper it costs, the more profit it provides and the more it
improves the drilling companies reputation with its bosses •••• This
preoccupation with speed and efficiency explains most of the
drillers' extremely conservative behaviour and attitudes. They
oppose anything that might complicate or interfere with their
efforts to drill wells as quickly as pos s i b Le" (15). The somewhat
euphemistic last sentence has been expressed more bluntly by
Kitchen: REvery care is taken •••• to ensure the loyalty and
cooperation of the employees. If this is not forthcoming, they are
dispensed with and replacements sought. •••• Orders are carried out
immediately or dismissal follows. R(16)
A major explanation for such behaviour is the tremendous cost
of hir ing drilling facilities (Kitchen's work, published in 1977,
quoted figures of £100,000 per day as operating costs) which means
unscheduled stoppages cannot and will not be tolerated, by
either the drilling company management or the client company. Hence
efficient handling of industrial relations is an essential
prerequisite if the company is to compete effectively for business
in the exploration industry. This competition has intensified as
the pace of development in the North Sea has slowed down, reducing
the amount of work available. The situation is exacerbated by the
hostile environment which means that pre-production work can only be
carried out offshore at certain times of the year, the so called
Rweather window R•
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As stated earlier, the drilling industry has been the main
focus of attention in previous oil related studies and therefore it
will not receive a great deal more attention here. Instead, this
study will focus on the companies who initiate and sponsor
exploration and development in the North Sea and, to a lesser
degree, on some of the contractors who compete for work handed out
by the operators.
Fabrication and Hook Up
When it enters this phase, the operating company has, by
definition, committed itself to developing the oil field in
question. As was established earlier, the sums of money invested in
such projects are enormous; indeed, exploration costs pale in
comparison. This being the case, the operating companies (and their
partners) are understandably anxious to begin production as soon as
possible. It is this urgency which has given rise to the pragmatism
so prominent on the part of the operators dur ing this phase, but
conspicuous by its absence during the production phase.
The major oil companies have always used contractors for major
projects such as platform design and construction, and other work
which will wildly fluctuate, as is standard practice in industry.
The construction industry is, by tradition, heavily unionised on
large sites and platform construction yards are no exception (though
the platform construction yards are not covered by the national
construction agreement). This also means that construction workers
on a hook up project are likely to be union members. Onshore, the
relationship beween unions and employers has been very strong, and
with good reason; the construction contract is for a set time and
budget, and therefore the contractor wants to minimise if not
eliminate - time lost in disputes. Thus it is in their interests to
have a well controlled, well managed workforce, and trades unions
can be of great help in maintaining discipline amongst what can be a
somewhat maverick, not to mention mobile, group of workers. In
addition, such arrangements stabilise wage rates.
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The rapid pace of development in the oil industry du r ing the
mid-70's resulted in a sellers' market as far as construction
companies were concerned, and clients and contractors shared the
same incentives for harmonious industrial relations as their
counterparts onshore. Indeed these incentives are enhanced in the
oil industry because of the comparatively short weather window. If
this is missed, then production will be considerably delayed. This
situation has very clear parallels to that identified in the
e xh i b i t i on industry by the National Board for Prices and Incomes.
In its report (17), the NBPI highlighted the ramifications for
industr ial relations of certain factors prevalent in the industry.
Firstly, exhibition space is limited and, given that London was
thought by most firms to be the most suitable centre for
eXhibitions, they were held in the Earl's Court and Olympia centres
"more or less continuously throughout the year with limited slack
periods in August and December" (18). Consequently, schedules were
very tight and exhibitions had to be "built up" or "broken down" in
the shortest time possible. This pressure on "build up" time to
meet the deadline of the exhibition opening can be equated to the
deadline created by the "weather window" for the operating companies
and, as in the exhibition industry, this has "important consequences
for the pattern of work - for example in the amount of week-end
working which it makes necessary" (19).
Furthermore, the oil industry, particularly in an offshore
location, is capital intensive, and can therefore more easily
tolerate increases in the labour budget if necessary. Similarly,
the NBPI discovered that "it seems that exhibitors are not primarily
concerned with stand construction costs, which are only one element
in the total cost of participating in an exhibition, and even those
costs usually represent ••••• only a fraction of a firm's total
promotional budget" (20).
In these circumstances, the operating companies found it in
their interests to accept some form of trade union agreement and
therefore endorsed the Offshore Construction Agreement (OCA) which
the Labour government of the day encouraged the Oil and Chemical
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Plant Constructors Association to conclude with various trade
unions. It is important to note that the operators do not sign the
agreement. Again there are parallels here with the exhibition
industry.
The OCA (or hook up agreement, as it is often called) was
renegotiated annually until 1987, when a two year agreement was
made. It is quite detailed and wide ranging, covering: working
hours and rates, shift and travel allowances, proficiency payments,
productivity, safety, guaranteed payments, holidays, termination,
redundancy, and disciplinary procedures. It appl ies only to work
carried out in preparation of production when the platform is in
place in its final position, and ceases to apply as soon as "first
oil" is produced, or some subsequent date stipulated by the
operator. The work carried out thereafter is classed as maintenance
work.
Hence, it is during this phase (ie hook-up) that the operating
company is most vulnerable to pressure exerted by an organised
workforce, and conversely labour has most leverage, as is the case
with workers in the exhibition industry who have been able to
exercise influence in the past by virtue of the necessity to finish
the job on time.
For other contractors such as helicopter, supply boat and
catering companies, the only major difference between phases is the
amount of work in each; during the hook up phase there are more
personnel on the platform and therefore more people to cater for and
more people, materials, equipment and food to be transported to the
platform. There is no drastic alteration to the industrial
relations environment as is the case for companies involved in
fabrication and hook up work. On the other hand, the competitive
bid system is applicable to these companies and therefore they must
operate within the constraints this system imposes.
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While the production facilities are being constructed, the
operator selects and trains the individuals who will monitor the
production process, and will establish a shore-based support team
for the field. Industrial relations for these groups do not differ
significantly between the fabrication and hook up phase, and the
production phase. Thus they will be summarised under the production
heading, and examined in more detail later in the thesis.
Production
The production phase can be considered "the norm"; after a
period of frenetic activity the company can settle into as much of a
routine as the North Sea will allow. It was examination of this
phase in particular that highlighted the uncommon elements in the
industrial relations of the industry. During the production phase,
auditors from the operating company and its partners are keen to cut
costs and maximise revenue. Maintenance work is therefore allocated
to contractors by the process of competitive tendering, on a regular
basis. As the North Sea oil industry developed, so the number of
contractors chasing work proliferated. The existence of the OCA
stabilised wage rates during hook up work, and since for these
companies labour costs are a comparatively high proportion of total
costs, the OCA provided some shelter from the ravages of unregulated
competition.
In the production phase, however, there is no such stabilising
agreement, and labour costs become an important element in the
ability of a contracting company to compete successfully with its
peers. Inevitably this results in a downward pressure on wage rates
for contractors' personnel. Excluding the Offshore Post
Construction Agreement for the Scottish Joint Industry Board of the
electrical contracting industry, there is no universally recognised
agreement covering post-construction work. The Offshore
Construction Services agreement was signed between the OCPCA and
appropriate trade unions in 1986, but has not been effective,
basically because it explicitly excludes maintenance work and, more
importantly, it was not sanctioned by the operating companies.
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In the absence of a post-construction agreement (the reasons
for which are explained later in the thesis) the contractors'
personnel do not have the protection afforded by grievance and
disciplinary procedures as is the case when the OCA applies. Taken
together, these factors combine to ensure that the potential
leverage on the part of the contractors' workforce present dur ing
the fabrication and hook up phase is removed during production.
Nor is this potential leverage bequeathed to the operator's
personnel during this phase, as this group are relatively poorly
organised. The trade union movement made little headway in
organising the operators' personnel in the first twelve years or so
of the industry, with the exception of the oil terminals. A major
factor in this was the physical difficulties encountered by the
movement when faced with an isolated workforce which, when ashore,
was scattered throughout the UK.
Another hurdle was the lack of incentive for the operators I
employees to join a trade union. These companies placed great
emphasis on the individual at work, as opposed to the group; the
package of benefits provided was virtually second to none and,
certainly in every company visited, consultation arrangements had
been established and developed.
In addition, the recruitment policies developed by the
operators did not encourage trade unionism to flourish; many men
were recruited from the armed services, partly on the presumption
that they and their families would adapt more easily to the
lifestyle which resulted from working offshore, partly because they
would be well disciplined, and partly because they would have no
experience of - and no commitment to - trade unionism. Obstacles to
unionisation and prospects for change are discussed at length in
chapter 11.
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Summary
After giving a brief history of the oil industry in the North
Sea this chapter described the major phases in developing an
offshore find; exploration, hook-up and production. This background
is important in understanding the industrial relations system, as
the characteristics of the system vary according to the phase of
development underway. A short account of the nature of commercial
contracts allocated has been given as this, too, is essential
background information. Finally, the basic power relationships in
each phase have been descr ibed introducing both the dynamic nature
of the industrial relations system, and the concept of different
workforces.
This concept is central to the following chapter, which
demonstrates the employment patterns prevalent in the industry.
This provides the framework necessary to fully appreciate the review
and analysis of industrial relations in the oil industry which is to
follow.
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CHAPTER THREE
EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS IN THE NORTH SEA OIL INDUSTRY
Two of the most distinctive features of this new industry are
its dynamic and turbulent nature. Britain produced its first oil in
1975 amidst euphoria and optimism in both the industry and the
government. A boom period followed, with rapid expansion and
development onshore as well as off. Yet within five short years
many of the contractors which had sprung up in the shadow of the
operating companies were facing a downturn in their fortunes. Only
a decade after first oil the entire industry was shaken by the
collapse in the oil pr ice (1986) and the second phase of offshore
development virtually stopped in its tracks. This turbulence and
uncertainty stimulates and sustains a system of risk spreading in
the industry; the vast majority of fields are developed by
consortia, as opposed to individual companies. Risk and
responsibility are further spread by a very high level of
contracting and sUbcontracting. In terms of industrial relations,
such a system has resulted in an environment in which there are
gradients of security for those who work in it. Such a system is
commonly described in terms of 'core' and 'periphery'.
After summarising the major elements of the core-periphery
debate, the remainder of this chapter goes on to discuss the
implications of the model for the oil industry and its distinctive
pattern of risk shedding; and the influences on, and significance
of, the complex pattern of organisation and control.
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The Core Periphery Model
Many labour economists over the years have described the fact
that employers give different degrees of job security to different
segments of their labour force. In Britain the phenomenon has been
pUbliscised in the 1980s in the 'core-periphery' accounts of
Atkinson of the Institute of Manpower Studies. His work (1) claimed
that there has been increased interest by employers in more flexible
work patterns, stimulated by accelerating changes in technology and
growing competition from foreign competitors. Atkinson identified
three types of flexibility sought by firms: functional, numerical
and financial. Functional and numerical flexibility are encouraged
to flourish by financial flexibility, which links pay and labour
costs more closely to profi tabili ty, and supply and demand in the
labour market. Functional flexibility entails dismantling
demarcation barriers to enable the rapid and smooth redeployment of
personnel to suit the tasks at hand. Consequently, the workforce
profile changes in line with changes in products and production
methods. Numerical flexibility enables the firm to increase or
decrease the size of the labour force to match the needs of
production, ideally at short notice. Such arrangements would
inevitably have a considerable impact on the nature of the
employment relationship. Hence the Rflexible firm R exhibits the
core-periphery pattern of employment shown diagramatically in Figure
4.
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FIGURE 4
THE FLEXIBLE FIRM
Source: Industrial Relations rteview and Report, 7.8.1984
possibly carrying out firm-specific tasks.
The core group of ernpLoye e s are functionally flexible,
These employees do not
vary in number as output varies, and therefore enjoy security of
employment in addition to career prospects within the firm. Cor~
employees wi l I have access to training and retraining. Both the
first and second peripheral groups, as outlined by Atkinson,
numerically flexible, tjeir employmenc figures rising and falling to
suit the firm's requiremencs. :0 the first peripheral group,
employees have lower levels of JOD security and virtually no career
prospects. Access to ':rainins arid retraining -"rill be considerably
reduced, if it exists at all. :'he tasks ?erfor;nec by this group
~ill not ~e f~:~-speci~~c, ~nd ~i:: :~nd :0 8e les3 3~il:~d.
factors, together wich enhanced le~e13 of
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feDale recruitDen,:,
relatively high levels of turnover, facilitating the
of workforce numbers. Those in the second peripheral
contracts aimed at combining functional and numerical
eg part-time employees, short term contracts or job
encourage
adjustment
group have
flexibility,
shar ing.
These groups may be supplemented still further by the use of
self-employed and agency personnel, and the subcontracting of highly
specialised or mundane tasks (such as cleaning) to other companies.
Private tendering in the NHS is an example of this. A study carried
out by the General Municipal and Boilermakers' union revealed that
permanent employees had been replaced by temporary or casual workers
in more than half of the 370 workplaces studied (2). In addition,
the Industrial Society has published figures showing that the number
of temporary vacancies had risen from 19% in April 1983 to 38% in
January 1985. The society concluded that the use of temporary
labour has developed beyond the traditional uses for holiday cover
and to meet seasonal demand (3). This change in the workforce
profile has been the sub jec t of debate in the National Economic
Development Council. In 1985 Sir Terence Beckett, director-general
of the CBI urged that trends towards a flexible workforce be
"deliberately encouraged". Norman Willis, TUC general secretary,
took issue with the CBI attitude, suggesting Britain was "moving
from a service to a servant economy·, naming the economic recession
as the catalyst for change, not popUlarity of new work patterns with
the workforce (4).
The rationale behind the adoption of such a pattern requires
little explanation: it enables employers to improve control over
labour costs (though relying on casual and uncommitted labour can
create its own problems, particularly in periods of expansion when
employers may wish to retain valued staff), linking them more
directly to demand for the firms product or service, and to supply
and demand in the labour market, in the belief that this will
improve efficiency and therefore competitiveness, :esulting in a
healthier firm.
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In spite of the above, the model has been regarded as being of
limited value in some quarters, in particular by Pollert of the IRRU
at Warwick University. The purpose of her paper is to ask "whether
the model is indeed a practical tool of analysis" (5). Though
Pollert goes on to quote Millward and Stevens' Workplace Industrial
Relations Survey as giving "some weight to the view that non-core or
'peripheral' workers are, perhaps increasingly, being used by
employers to make a closer connection between output and employment"
(6), she points out that,
"there is little in this to prove a long term trend, rather
than a short term response to tentative recovery from
recession ••••• a cyclical response witnessed in previous
periods". (7)
This is a fundamental difference between Atkinson and Pollert which
stems from their explanations of the rationale for the development
of such a pattern. Atkinson's explanation suggests that the
"flexible firm" is essentially a proactive creation; a policy
deliberately developed as part of an overall strategy. Pollert, on
the other hand, suggests that the "flexible firm, if it exists at
all, is a reaction to economic circumstances.
Pollert goes on to assess the evidence supporting the model in
a number of areas, including part time work, sub-contracting, and
the evidence for a 'core', eventually referring to Atkinson's work,
albeit indirectly, as a "useful journalistic construction which
makes clear, simplified 'news 'out of complex developments" (8).
Central to her criticism is the charge that the model appears to be
explanatory, prescriptive, and predictive all at once. Pollert
claims,
"The appeal, but also the weakness, of this model is both its
comprehensiveness, in covering a wide number of employment
situations in one model, and its simplicity" (9).
With regard to the oil industry, the core periphery model is a
useful descriptive device for summarising the complex pa t t e r n of
organisation, but it raises some important questions which go
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unanswered. For example, what were the causal influences in the
development of this pattern in the industry? Nor does the model
offer any insight into the relationship between the core and the
periphery, the clients and the contractors. Furthermore, the model
is naive in that it makes no attempt to explain how the core
maintains control in circumstances where it has voluntarily devolved
responsibility, or the implications for industrial relations which
result from them. These questions are considered in this thesis.
The Core Periphery Model in the Oil Industry
Both observation and employment statistics suggest that the
exploration and production sector of the oil industry can be
descr ibed in terms of the core-periphery employment diagram. Table
1 (overleaf) gives a breakdown of oil related employment in 1987,
and of changes in the figures since 1985 (10). The figures given
were derived from Grampian Regional Council surveys, based on
interviews with employers and MSC data. The 1987 information was
gathered in the latter half of 1986, ie six months to a year after
the oil price began to fall. These figures indicate that of a total
40,000 employed in 520 oil related firms, only 11,900 were employed
by the operators. Furthermore, if the figures for offshore workers
in only the two contractor sectors examined are added together
(construction 3,950 and catering 1,300) the total, 5,250, exceeds
the total offshore workforce of the operators, 4,900. In the oil
industry therefore, it appears this pattern does not correspond to
"a short term response to tentative recovery from recession".
The major oil companies (operators) have always used
contractors for major projects such as platform design and
construction, and other work which will fluctuate. This is standard
practice in industry. The majors are distinctive, however, in that
they have also used contractor s, agency and self-employed personnel
to a considerable degree in work which does not fluctuate, eg
catering, cleaning, some clerical and administration work, and
platform maintenance. This cannot be described as short-term; the
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TABLE 1 OIL RELATED EMPLOYMENT
1985-6 1986-7 1985-7
ACTIVITY 1985 1986 1987 01 CHANGE 01 CHANGE 01 CHANGE,0 'a '0
Oil/Gas Onshore 6,240 6,400 7,000 ... 2. 56 +- 9.38 +12.18
Operators Off 4,530 4, 570 4,900 + 0.88 + 7.22 + 8. 17
Total 10,770 10,970 11 ,900 + 1 .86 .,. 8.48 +10.49
Other 5, 500 5,250 3 ,000 - 4. 0;- -42.36 -45.45~:J
Explorat:'on 7,730 5,900 4, 500 -23.67 -23 .73 -41 .79
13,230 11 ,150 7 500 -2.5. :"2 -~2.
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example of an individual who worked for a major for six years on an
"agency" basis before being taken on as staff is not an isolated
one. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for employment agencies in
Aberdeen to advertise temporary posts as "long term positions".
Figure 5 attempts to fit the oil industry into Atkinson's
core-periphery diagram.
One significant employment-related impact of the establishment
of the North Sea oil industry in Aberdeen has been the growth in the
number of employment agencies and businesses. This is evident from
walking along the main streets of the city, but more so from the
"situations vacant" and the classified advertisments in the local
press. By far the bulk of oil-related advertisements are placed by
agencies. This, together with conversations with non-operator
personnel, suggested that the pattern of employment in the industry
was and remains more complex than had ever been suspected.
Furthermore, the oil industry has developed the use of
sub-contractors to such a degree that the contractors themselves
have developed along the core-periphery lines in order to survive in
the fiercely competitive environment which has evolved. Hence, as a
result of these practices on the part of the operators, particularly
competitive tendering, the major construction and maintenance
contractors maintain computerised employment registers and hold
Employment Agency licences. Some contractors have also been known
to issue employment contracts which specify that they are only for
the duration of the contract with the client. This behaviour
suggests that the contractors themselves are developing
core-periphery policies. While on the whole this has been confined
to the labour intensive sector, or areas where the use of temporary
labour is traditional (eg clerical, administrative and draughting
work), applications for Employment Agency licences from, for
example, laboratories, may be an indication that this pattern is
emerging in more highly skilled areas, though further research would
be required to produce firm conclusions.
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The identification of this 'waterfall' effect suggests that
Atkinson's model is not sufficiently developed to illustrate
adequately the pattern of employment in the offshore oil industry.
This shall be considered later in the thesis, in the light of
evidence gathered from the fieldwork.
Though in legal terms each worker has only one employer, the
industry is organised in such a way that there are a number of
organisations with influence on the employment relationship. As
mentioned in the previous chapter the oil companies spread the
financial burden amongst themselves, one of them taking
responsibility for developing the find and the day to day running of
production facilities. The operator's partners in the venture,
however, closely monitor the progress of their investment, maintain
constant contact with the operator, and are free to conduct an audit
when they so wish. Thus the partners can, if they choose, exercise
considerable influence on management decision making in many
spheres, including industrial relations. Hence, if the partners are
more hawkish in their industrial relations attitudes than the
operator, this can be reflected on the platforms in question,
particularly with regard to contract workers as will be shown
below. Indeed, such a scenario was suggested by a participant as a
possible explanation for the Griffin/COTA affair discussed in
chapter 9.
The proportion of the offshore workforce not employed by the
operating companies required explanation. Prior to the price fall
(a consequence of which was the reduction of personnel on board -
POB in an effort to cut costs) the proportion of contractors'
employees on a platform was 50% or slightly above. During the
"hook-up" phase, this proportion is very much higher, thereby making
the hook-up phase that in which operator control over industrial
relations on the platform is (theoretically) dt its lowest.
52
Figure 6 shows the usual control structure during development
of an oil field (see overleaf). If an operator has more than one
project in the development phase, this structure will be repeated
from the operator project team downwards (inclusive). In such a
situation, it is not necessarily the case that the operators will
commission the same platform designers, project management team,
fabrication company or other contractors. These contracts do not
come up for periodic renewal, as they are on a Wjob and f i.n Ls h"
basis, ie the contract runs until whook-upw is completed, though the
contractors concerned must initially compete with their rivals for
work during the development and hook-up phases.
Dur ing the production phase the structure is slightly
different (see Figure 7). As stated above, though the number of
contractors' employees is reduced, there is still a considerable
contractor presence. The structure shown in Figure 7 will prevail
until the productive life of the platform ends. Throughout this
period the various contractors will have to compete regularly for
finite contracts. In the two sectors examined, catering and
construction/hook-up, the normal length of these contracts is two
years, possibly with a 12 month option (ie the contract at the end
of two years, can "r o Ll, on " for 12 months n.o r e if the operator so
wishes). The impact of the competitive tendering process on
industrial relations is discussed later in the thesis.
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Implications for Industrial Relations
When questioned on the rationale behind using contractors for
work which does not fluctuate, in particular catering, cleaning and
security, respondents explained that the oil companies have chosen
not to develop expertise in these fields, as it is more efficient
and cost effective to bring in specialists in the field in
question. Having said that, three managers voiced the reservation
that they could be storing up trouble for themselves by deliberately
creating what they called a "two tier society". One particularly
sympathetic manager saw no real reason for not employing such
workers directly, believing them to be just as much part of the
"team" as everyone else.
Atkinson has pointed out that the securing of some employees'
pay, security and career opportunities at the expense of others
without creating a clear division of status or organisation, is
ill-advised as it spoils morale, affecting productivity. Certainly
for the peripheral individual, job insecurity, and fluctuating
income can lead to problems. These may be exacerbated for
contractors', and particularly agency, personnel by lack of
training, holiday and sick pay. All of these factors will have a
negative impact on industrial relations. In fact some concern was
expressed by unions, operators and contractors, with regard to
attracting and retaining suitably skilled staff, particularly in
light of the anticipated upturn in construction activity onshore.
In the highly competitive environment which exists, the
contractors are fighting for survival as opposed to growth. Should
industrial relations deteriorate as a result of the inevitable
downward pressure on wage rates this competition has created, the
operating company is relieved of responsibility. Thus if an
industrial relations problem occurs, the offending individuals can
be replaced easily, or the contract can be transferred to another
contractor (though this latter course of action has never been taken
in the sectors studied). Supply and d ernanc in the labour market
will be of relevance to this point, having a direct affect on the
ability of contractors to find and provide suitable replacements at
the right time and at the right price.
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This spreading of risk by the operators on the employment side
is analogous to the spreading of risk on the financial side, and
perhaps adds credence to Pollert's assertion that, the "maintenance
of a 'core' and 'periphery' in the 'flexible firm' may be far more
concerned with the establishment of control over labour than with
encouraging f Lex Lb i l Lty" (11). The ease with which contractors can
adopt this model is not universal: in the construction and catering
sectors it is much easier to ·man up· or ·de-man· than in the
helicopter or supply boat companies who have to recruit highly
skilled specialist personnel and retain them because they are less
readily available in the labour market than many other occupational
groups.
The potentially volatile nature of industrial relations on the
periphery is apparent. Less obvious, however, is the means by which
the operating companies maintain overall control in this complex
pattern. This is revealed later in the thesis, where it will be
shown that the pragmatism, if not ambivalence, of the operating
companies towards unionisation is a key element in the explanation.
With this in mind, it is now appropriate to give a brief industrial
relations history of the North Sea oil industry.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING OFFSHORE
It is the popular belief that "there are no unions offshore"
and that all oil companies are hostile to trade unions. In reality,
the system of industrial relations is far more complex, and the
purpose of this chapter is briefly to describe the pattern of formal
agreements which exist in the industry.
Work Organisation Offshore
It has already been established that there are two very
different workforces offshore; the employees of the operating
companies, and those of the contractors. The latter group are
involved in an extensive variety of occupations including drilling,
electrical work, welding, rigging, scaffolding, and other associated
construction occupations as well as catering. The contractors'
employees outnunber those of the operating companies offshore,
though the actual ratios vary over time. This variation is a
function of the phase of the development, descr ibed in chapter 2.
To avoid confusion, the operating and contractor companies are
discussed separately.
Table 2 - Offshore employment by activity
Drilling Hookup Production Total Offshore
1981 3,200 5,200 10,100 18,500
1984 4,400 4,900 13,700 23,000
1985 4,300 3,300 13,600 21,200
1986 2,400 3,800 13,000 19,200
1987 2,500 3,600 12,300 18,400
1991 3,500 2,600 13,600 19,700
1996 3,500 2,900 16,200 22,600
2001 2,400 2,200 17,400 22,000
Source: Grampian 2egional Council (1)
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Industrial Relations in the Operating Companies
In October 1985 it was reported that ASTMS were claiming "a
major breakthrough" in the offshore oil industry ( 2) • The
"breakthrough" was ASTMS's success in gaining recognition agreements
for five of Star's 12 platforms in the North Sea. The same article
pointed out that the ASTMS already had a representation agreement
for one platform belonging to another operator. Thus it can be seen
that with regard to the operating companies trade unions were
involved, albeit to a minor degree. Two operat ing companies (there
were 15 when this study was initiated) have recognition-only
agreements with one union, ASTMS, while a third company has an
agreement in the southern sector of the North Sea. However, most of
the operating companies visited were quite prepared to admit that a
number of their employees have come from unionised backgrounds and
have retained their union membership, perhaps in anticipation of one
day returing to work in such an environment.
The managers of those companies participating in this research
had a number of different comments to make with regard to their
reputation as being "anti-union". For the most part there was a
natural reluctance to say that their company was anti-union, but one
manager was frank enough to admit that it was a conscious decision
to operate in the North Sea without trade unions, and that the
company would resist any moves in that direction. (It was later
discovered that this company had been successfully pursuing a policy
of resistance for some time.)
The general attitude of the operators' employee relations
management has a paternal element, as demonstrated by comments such
as :
"we like to think we are good employers";
"we would feel disappointed if the men felt that they needed a
trade union - it would mean we had failed";
"we don't think there is anything a trade union could do for
our lads tnat we can't do better ourselves".
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To some extent the latter point is true in so far as the vast
revenues generated by the exploration and production industry enable
the operators to offer terms and conditions which are considerably
superior to those offered to similar occupations in other sectors.
For example, the EETPU, when carrying out a pay survey in 1987,
accepted "that the primary reason for joining and staying in a trade
union for such workers may not be salary levels, but in the wake of
the change in world oil prices, issues affecting job security".(3)
Before going any further, it is useful to outline the pattern
of existing agreements, in order to establish a backdrop against
which the central actors can play out their roles. Both of the
major oil terminals, one in the Shetland Islands and the other in
the Orkney Islands, are fully unionised. The operators have
negotiating agreements with various trade unions. In both cases
these agreements were set up in the early days of the plant's
existence indeed before they were operational, and there are
common elements in the explanation given for both. According to one
trade union official, there were several factors which contributed
to the comparative success of the trade union movement at the
Flotsam Terminal.
An important formative event was the bitter firemen's strike
of the early seventies. The potential dangers of a fire in an oil
or gas terminal are such that both the Flotsam and Jetsam terminals,
as others, require their own firemen on site. The firemen who were
brought in were politicised and committed to trade union membership
and activity following the national strike. Furthermore, the
construction site was, as is quite normal on such sites, highly
organised. Indeed, its size was sufficient to justify several
full-time trade union convenors among the workforce. In addition, a
number of unionised dockers were brought in during the construction
phase and they generally see themselves as amongst the "vanguard" of
the trade union movement. The firemen joined the TGWU straight
a'Nay, and .Jon chernse I ves goorj terms:lnd conditions. The catalyst.
was a disagreement over contractual hours and the length of shifts.
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The firemen, who were a sufficiently large core group, capitalised
on the disagreement to press successfully for unionisation. The
Flotsam operator now negotiates with the TGWU, AEU, and EETPU.
There were similar circumstances at Jetsam, in particular
politicised firemen and the construction site environment. At
approximately the same time as this terminal became unionised, ASTMS
was successful in gaining a recognition agceement on the Mercury
platform. Mercury and Jetsam share a common factor in this respect,
that is, the perception by the workforce of bad judgment on the part
of management. An additional element at Jetsam was that many of the
locally recruited personnel came from fishing or farming
backgrounds. They regarded the oil industry as a risky source of
employment and viewed trade union membership as an insurance
policy. This operator negotiates with the TGWU and EETPU.
He observed that: "there were quite a few American managers -
and they all thought that they were John Wayne ~ " Many of the oil
company's employees had worked abroad in the industry, were high
earners, and used to being well treated. It is indicative of the
nature of the men's discontent on the Mercury platform that they
requested only a recognition agreement as opposed to full
negotiating arrangements, which suggests that they were quite
satisfied with their terms and conditions in general.
In addition to the recognition agreements on five Star
platforms, ASTMS already had a representation agreement on the
Mercury platform (but not on its sister, Mars) which is operated by
an Amer ican company. Thus it can be seen that wi til regard to the
operating companies, trade unions are involved, albeit to a minor
degree. Two operating companies have recognition-only agreements
with one union, ASTMS, while a third company has an agreement in the
southern sector of the North Sea. It would appear that ASTMS' s
success in recruiting members in Star stemmed, once again, from bad
judgment on the part of management concerning the handling of .?t
safety incident. Following a serious accident offshore (involving
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some fatalities) it seems that the company disciplined its
supervisors harshly, driving them into the ASTMS. In the ballot,
more than 82% of eligible staff voted, 70% favouring trade union
representation (4).
An alternative interpretation was that the "honeymoon" period
was over. One observer suggested that the Star offshore staff
simply felt taken for granted, that there was some "them and us"
feeling developing towards onshore staff by those offshore, and that
the latter felt they endured the hardships to bring the oil in while
others were taking the credit, and they were treated, at best, with
indifference. Furthermore, an interviewee working on one of the
affected platforms considered industrial relations to be at "an all
time low", not simply because of the accident mentioned above, but
also because of flexibility problems. The company is now training
its operators to carry out certain maintenance wor k, which will
break down the present demarcation between operators and maintenance
staff. These moves, according to this unconfirmed source, were made
without consultation with the workforce, such consultation
arrangements as do exist being completely management dominated.
Two factors make a more accurate assessment of whether the
"honeymoon" is indeed over more difficult. Firstly, the high
unemployment rates mean that alternative employment opportunities
are severely limited. This is particularly the case in areas like
Teesside, where many offshore workers have their homes. Thus
disenchantment, frustration and irritation on the part of the
workforce are unlikely to manifest themselves in terms of high
labour turnover. Secondly, the excellent remuneration packages
offered by the operators can become "golden handcuffs" in that even
if they can find alternative employment outside the industry, people
cannot leave without taking a substantial drop in salary. Hence low
labour turnover should not be taken as an indication of high job
satisfaction.
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There are several feasible explanations for the limited
success of the trade union movement in organising the operators I
employees. As mentioned above, a major factor has been the highly
attractive terms and conditions which the operators can afford to
offer their employees. A second major factor cited by interviewees
was the 'team spirit' which is generated by the physical isolation
of the platform. The practical difficulties of organising an
offshore workforce are a third factor. Though the industry has
accepted the Memorandum of Understanding on Access (see Appendix C),
visits by trade union officers to offshore installations are still
very much dependent on the whim of the company concerned. Indeed,
one officer gave an example of how the Memorandum could be abused;
an October date was given in response to a request made in
February. Furthermore, the homes of the workforce are scattered
throughout the UK, making organisation very difficult during leave
periods. In addition to the geographical consideration, there is
the further obstacle of apathy to be overcome; having spent two
weeks offshore, the workers are much more interested in getting home
than in attending union meetings. Another major stumbling block is
the domination of the industry by American companies and their
culture, which seeks the free operation of market forces and they
therefore exhibit a negative reaction to anything which inhibits
them, including both trade unions and employers organisations.
These obstacles are considered in more detail in chapter 11.
However, the operators do engage in dialogue with the trade
union movement through the UK Offshore Operators' Association
(UKOOA) and the Inter-Union Offshore Oil Committee (IUOOC). As will
be explained in more detail in the following chapter, UKOOA has a
number of permanent committees, one of them being the Employment
Practices Committee (EPC) which deals with the trade union movement
and contractors. There are about 45 members on the EPC, and
therefore dialogue with IUOOC representatives is conducted by the
Liaison Panel, which is made up of six members of the EPC. Panel
members are not representing t he i r individual companies, but are
representing UKOOA. The Lia ison Panel meets with the IUOOC on a
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quarterly basis. It is stressed by those concerned that these
meetings are strictly consultative, and not negotiations. Terms and
conditions, recruitment, manning levels, and specific complaints
about individual companies are outwith the remit of the meetings.
Instead, discussions are confined to concern about safety matters,
difficulties of access to offshore installations, and trade union
recognition.
Given that current industrial relations thinking portrays
unions as defensive organisations, reacting to management
initiatives and stimuli (5) the failure of trade unions to modify
their strategy and tactics in the face of increasingly sophisticated
management policies is an interesting and valuable point to
consider. Therefore chapter 11 considers this matter in more depth.
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Industrial Relations and the Contractors
Contractors' employees provide most topics for discussion
between the IUOOC and the "Liaison Panel, as opposed to those of the
operators - yet the contractors themselves are not represented at
these meetings. However, the union movement is considerably more
involved in this arena. More specifically, a variety of agreements
exist. For example, a number of British shipping companies have
built semi submersible drilling rigs (which for the purposes of
maritime law are regarded as ships) and, following shipping industry
custom and practice, they have entered into negotiating agreements
with unions represented on the British Seafarers Joint Council.
Following a sit-in by divers on the Saturn platform in 1983,
diving companies with offshore interests formed the Diving
Contractors' Association to negotiate with the NUS, the first
agreement on pay and conditions being implemented in August 1984.
Prior to this, such trade union recognition as existed had been on a
company to company basis and did not relate to pay. This group is
even harder to organise than the rest of the offshore workforce as
they are particularly independent, and are almost all
self-employed. In the early 1970' s, divers' rates were high in
comparison with other skilled workers in the industry, simply
because there was a great demand for their skills in relation to
their numbers. However, by the turn of the decade, these
differentials had been considerably eroded. The NUS became more
involved during the Saturn sit-in and became recognised as the union
which would negotiate for the divers, though the Professional
Divers' Association (PDA) has been attempting to claim recognition
for the divers it has in membership.
An agreement, which significantly remains unwritten, exists
between the Catering Offshore Traders Association (COTA) and the
TGWU. This is particularly interesting because it is generally
agreed that this agreement was made as a direct result of pressure
frow the operating companies. During the late 197U's, intense
competition between catering companies meant that they had to reduce
bids in order to gain (or even maintain) cor.t r ac t s . This led to a
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corresponding reduction in rates of pay for catering company
employees, and thus resulted in very high rates of labour turnover,
which in turn had an adverse affect on the quality of service which
the companies could provide. There were periodic bouts of unrest,
and the quality of some of the caterers' staff offshore was poor.
This had a direct impact on the operators' own staff. The operating
companies brought the catering companies and the TGHU together and
actively encouraged an agreement. Minimum rates were effectively
set by the operators, though this has never been made public. This
group is the sUbject of the case study in chapter 9.
Probably the most significant agreement is the Off~ho[e
Construction Agreement (OCA). The parties to this are: the Offshore
Contractors Council, which represents the offshore interests of the
Oil and Chemical Plant Constructors Association (OCPCA, an employers
organisation made up of construction contractors), the Electrical
Contractors Association (ECA), the ECA (Scotland); AEU TASS;
GMBATU ; EETPU (Plumbing section); and EETPU (Electrical Section).
The construction industry is, by tradition, heavily unionised
and therefore the trade union movement has some presence offshore in
the form of men who have retained their trade union membership.
Onshore, the relationship between contractors and unions is very
strong; the contract is for a set time and budget, and therefore the
contractors want to minimise if not eliminate time lost in
disputes. Thus it is in their interests to have a well-controlled,
well managed workforce, and trade unions can be of great help in
maintaining discipline amongst what can be a difficult group of
workers to manage. Furthermore, such arrangements are seen as
stabilising rates.
This was particularly applicable in the mid-70's when the oil
industry was developing rapidly, resulting in a sellers market as
far as construction companies were concerned, and clients and
contractors shared the same incentives for harmonious industrial
relations as their counterparts onshore. Indeed, these incentives
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were considerably enhanced because of the comparatively short
weather window. Exploration and development costs are
astronomically high and it is therefore imperative to begin
production on time. Thus, the operating companies found it in their
interests to accept some form of trade union agreement and it was
with their sanction that the OCPCA entered into the OCA with the
trade unions mentioned above. The operators do not sign the
agreement.
The most recent review of the OCA (or hook-up agreement as it
is often called) produced a two year agreement covering 1987 and
1988. Until then agreements had generally been of one year
duration. Its scope is extensive, covering: working hours and
rates, shift and travel allowances, proficiency payments,
productivity, safety, guaranteed payments, holidays, termination,
redundancy, and disciplinary procedures. It applies only when the
platform is in place in its final position, and ceases to apply as
soon as "first oil" is produced, or some subsequent date stipulated
by the operator. The work carried out thereafter is classed as
maintenance work, for which there is no agreement other than the
Offshore Post Construction Agreement for the Scottish Joint
Industrial Board for the electrical contracting industry.
The trade unions have been pressing for a Post Construction
Agreement (PCA) for several years, arguing that if the operators can
accept the need for an agreement prior to production, then surely
they can accept the need for one to cover maintenance work. The
operators argue that it is nothing to do with them and the trade
unions must take their case to the OCPCA. In 1986, as part of their
campaign to achieve a post construction agreement, the unions
refused to sign the OCA, and began preparations for a strike
ballot. The unions involved experienced some problems, at least
ini tially, in that many contractors wi theld the names and addresses
of employees, thereby making it very difficult for the unions to
comply with the law in making sure that all :.hose entitled to vote
received a ballot paper. (Construction workers move between
companies fairly free,uently, but often fail t o notify their union
office.)
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The operators appeared unperturbed, referring to it as yet
another recruitment drive, though they admitted that the OCA is an
expensive agreement and they would resist a similar agreement for
post construction work. Various employee relations managers also
admitted that they were digging a hole for themselves in creating a
"two-tier" society offshore, and that they can sympathise with
workers who find their wages have dropped significantly overnight
when "first oil" reaches the platform and hook-up ends. However,
contracts are awarded according to strictly commercial criteria, and
these managers face an uphill battle in justifying anything other
tLan the cheapest bid.
The timing of the trade union action, early 1986, was
decisi ve; although claiming to be optimistic, the unions admitted
that it would have been a much easier task five years earlier. The
fall in oil prices did not help their case, though they could not
have foreseen the extent and implications of the price fall when the
decision to act was taken. Furthermore, there were only two hook-up
projects scheduled for that year, and it is doubtful that bringing
pressure to bear on only those two operators could change the
overall stance of the operators.
There are two major complaints which the trade unions have
with regard to the present system. The first is that the terms and
conditions of the men on maintenance work are being continuously
eroded: "Bear Facts No.5" (a leaflet produced by the OCA unions for
their members in the industry) states that "the post-construction
man is working for 30% less than the union negotiated Hook-Up
Agreement". Not only are maintenance rates low in comparison with
OCA rates, but the gap between them is growing because conditions
have deteriorated in the fierce competition for work.
The second complaint is that the absence of an agreement
leaves the maintenance man vulnerable to victimisation, since he has
no protection from a grievance or disciplinary procedure. Thus,
"they risk the N.R.B. [Not Required Back] syridr ome if they attempt
to agitate, organise or educate." (Bear Facts No.5) Though union
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officials admit companies allow them visits offshore, they point out
that they are usually chaperoned, and the room they are given tends
to be next door to the Offshore Installation Manager's (OIM) office
or some similar situation, thereby allowing the operating company to
keep a check on which members of the workforce are showing an
interest in trade union affairs. Nor are they protected by
legislation; contracts of employment may apply only for the duration
of the contract between the contractor and the client. As a result,
length of service may fall short of the two year period of
employment necessary for recourse to an industrial tribunal on
grounds of unfair dismissal. Similarly, if contractor X fails in
its bid to renew a contract, and its workforce is taken on by the
successful contractor, as is sometimes the case, the transfer of
undertakings regulations do not apply and therefore employment is
not deemed to be continuous. Furthermore, individuals may be asked
to waive their rights to obtain employment (see the contract of
employment in Appendix D).
It was believed that the OCPCA would never enter into a
post-construction agreement without the sanction of the operating
companies but in 1986 the Offshore Contractors Council signed the
Offshore Construction Services Agreement with the AEU, TASS, GMBATU,
AND EETPU. However, because the agreement was concluded without the
blessing of the operators, its scope specifically excludes "Repa i r
and maintenance work and minor modifications, unless otherwise
determined by the oper ato r " (6). Moreover, although OCPCA members
agreed to bid according to this agreement, the client companies did
not agree to limit themselves to accepting bids from OCPCA members
alone. This failure of the operators to confirm that they would
accept bids based on the OCSA led OCPCA members to believe that they
would be unable to successfully compete for work if they bid
according to this agreement. Hence not only has maintenance work
been excluded, the agreement has never been applied, and is unlikely
to be renegotiated.
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The pragmatic approach of the operators to trade union
involvement is further demonstrated by the following example. One
operator, using a revolutionary type of platform design, carried out
much of the hook-up work in the Moray Firth as opposed to in the
platform's final position. It was easier and cheaper to transport
the men, there were fewer weather worries, and once hook-up was
completed the oil could be produced more quickly. The most
important activity to be carried out was welding. As stated
earlier, the OCA applies only when the platform is in its final
position, which was not the case in this instance. The company
wished to avoid any delays due to disputes, and therefore they
initiated an agreement between the contractor and the GMBATU, AUEW,
AND EETPU, but they did not sign it themselves. Indeed there was a
dispute, and having the agreement saved the operator considerable
time and trouble.
The PCA which the EETPU has with the ECA (Scotland) is
applicable only to employees of major electrical contractors which
are members of the ECA. At least one trade union officer has
alleged that some contractors have set up new companies outside the
ECA in order to evade honouring this agreement. Similarly, some
major contractors are not in the OCC and therefore would be outside
the control of any PCA, assuming the unions are eventually
successful.
The principal explanation for the operators' overriding
control of contractors is the highly competitive bid system which
operates in the industry. As a rule, contracts for maintenance and
catering work come up for renewal on a bi-annual basis. To gain new
contracts, or even hold on to existing ones, contractors are having
to cut tenders to the bone, and therefore there is a downward
pressure on wage rates, particularly in labour intensive sectors
such as construction and catering, on which research attention was
focussed. Hence, there is evidence from as far back as 1982 to show
that trade union agreements with individual contractors have been
terminated because they inhibited the ability of the company to
compete (see the letter included as Appendix E).
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The change in fortunes in the oil industry serves only to
illustrate this more clearly. During the boom period of the mid
seventies, when oil was selling at more than $30 per barrel, money
was virtually no object for the operators in a rush to begin
production and recoup their investment. Once a field began
production, then the operator, if not its partners, sought ways to
control, if not reduce, fixed costs. Hence the operators refused to
sanction a post construction agreement to cover maintenance work,
the operators choosing instead to allow the operation of free market
forces to regulate contract prices. The fall in the price of oil in
effect increased the operators' leverage, in that some exploration,
development, and non-essential maintenance projects were postponed,
resulting in less work being available for contractors. This
inevitably led to a fall in real terms in contract prices, and thus
attempts on the contractors' part to reduce wage bills. Though the
price crash exacerbated the situation, there is no doubt that this
is only an exaggerated version of events whicn could be observed as
the pace of North Sea development slowed dramatically in the ear ly
1980s.
Summary
In short, it can be seen that the industrial relations
experience of contractors was seen to be more complex than that of
the operators: though forced to conduct their industrial relations
within constraints set by the operators, there was, at the same
time, considerably more trade union involvement. There is
sufficient evidence to indicate that the operators though
themselves showing ambivalence to trade unions have encouraged
contractors to involve trade unions when expedient, thereby allowing
the contractors to "police" agreements while they themselves control
the environment from a distance.
72
This chapter has summarised the pattern of existing agreements
in the offshore oil industry, considering both those which exist
between the trade unions and operators and between trade unions and
contractors. This review illustrates the contrasts in the
industrial relations in the two arenas, contrasts which become
clearer when the fieldwork results are considered in the chapters
which follow. One major difference is that where formal trade union
agreements exist with operators, they are at establishment level (if
platforms and oil terminals can be considered establishments); in
the contractor sector, such agreements exist at industry level.
Furthermore, the operating companies exercise considerable influence
over the industry level arrangements in the contractor arena, as
will be demonstrated in more detail later in the thesis. The
primary institutions involved in collective bargaining, introduced
in this overview, will now be considered in greater detail.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE MAIN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING INSTITUTIONS
The operating companies and contract companies which
participated in the study will be introduced and descr ibed in due
course. Before discussing individual companies, the main collective
institutions on both sides, already touched upon in chapter 4 will
be considered in more detail. They have an important and recurring
role to play in the remainder of the thesis.
EMPLOYERS ORGANISATIONS
UK Offshore Operators Association
The UK Offshore Operators Association Limited (UKOOA) was
formerly known as the UK North Sea Operators Committee. This latter
body was established shortly after the UK I s first licensing round,
1964. The operators of these licences formed the Committee to
provide a discussion forum for technical and administration
matters. The Committee also served as a means of communication with
the government and other appropriate bodies. The new body was
welcomed by the government, which consulted with it extensively, and
became involved in virtually all matters relating to the offshore
industry. The Committee became UKOOA in 1973, and gained a small
permanent staff. Membership of UKOOA is restricted to oil and gas
companies which are operators of licences for exploration and
production on the UK Continental Shelf, and is concerned solely with
offshore matters. Present membership totals about 40 companies.
UKOOA elects a Council, approximately half of the membership,
to control its affairs. This Council appoints five Executive
Off icers: a President; two Vice-Presidents; an Honorary Treasurer;
and an Honorary Secretary. There are 20 Permanent Committees and
two Ad Hoc Committees, on which relevant experts from UKOOA members
sit (see overleaf).
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The Association is in regular and frequent contact with
government, representing the industry in presentations to select and
back-bench Committees. Its involvement with government covers two
and conditions, and
effect on offshore
2
main areas:-
1 "Legislation, including licence terms
financial measures having a direct
activities".
"Regulations and standards directly relating to offshore
operations, such as engineering standards, work practices and
safety regulations" (1).
UKOOA is also represented on a number of joint industry
bodies, such as the Offshore Petroleum Industry Training Board
(OPITB), and the Oil Industry Advisory Committee to the Health and
Safety Commission (OIAC). The OIAC was formed in 1977, as a result
of the extension of parts of the Health and Safety at Work Act to
offshore facilities, and is made up of representatives from the
Departments of Energy and Transport, and the trade union movement as
well as the oil industry.
The most important organ of UKOOA with regard to this research
is the Employment Practices Committee (EPC), in particular two of
its subcommittees, the Liaison Panel (LP), and Contractors' Liaison
subcommittee (CLSC). The Liaison Panel is made up of six
representatives from the EPC, and it is this body which maintains a
dialogue with the Inter Union Offshore Oil Committee (IUOOC).
According to UKOOA, this contact is aimed at "promoting orderly
industrial relations throughout all offshore operations" (2). To
the same end, the EPC maintains regular contacts with contractors'
organisations, particularly the Offshore Contractors' Council
(OCC). Interaction between these various groups is discussed below.
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Employment Practices Committee
The EPC meets six times a year, four times in London and twice
in Aberdeen. All members of UKOOA are entitled to send a
representative, but attendance usually numbers 20-24 senior employee
relations managers, as many companies in UKOOA are operators in name
only, ie they do not have responsibility for day to day production.
The terms of reference of the EPC are as follows:
n 1. To provide a forum where Member companies can exchange
opinions, and when necessary formulate an industry viewpoint
in the field of employment practices including Training,
Employee and Industrial Relations.
2. On behalf of UKOOA and as generally directed by the Council
to conduct studies, make reports and recommendations, and
represent UKOOA in meetings with other bodies on matters
concerned with the above sUbjects.
3. To keep abreast of, review, and disseminate as appropr iate
details of companies' employment practices in the interest of
promoting orderly industrial relations; and to keep abreast of
employment practices' trends in industry generally.
4. To encourage major contractors engaged in work for Member
Companies to ensure a reasonable degree of uniformity in terms
and conditions of employment.
5. To maintain liaison with Government or other bodies as
required to achieve these objectives.
6. To advise Council as necessary on all matters affecting
employment practices in general, and the offshore oil industry
in particular.
7. Recommendations of the Committee concerning UKOOA policy or
financial involvement are in all cases to be submitted to
Council for prior approval.(3)"
Examples of items on the agenda of the EPC
compensation (remuneration) terms; industrial
include: changes in
relations problems;
reports from subcommittees (the LP and CLSC); and any other
business, such as health and safety executive reports, and items
from UKOOA Council. Meetings last up to two hours, which would
suggest discussions are of a fairly superficial nature.
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However, given that UKOOA has no authority to bind companies, this
is perhaps inevitable. Decisions are reached by consensus, not
vote. It would appear that the LP has a higher profile, if not an
altogether more significant role, in industrial relations.
The Liaison Panel
The Liaison Panel represents the EPC, and provides an
interface with the IUOOC. It cannot commit the EPC, or UKOOA in any
way, rather it is a listening body which reports back to the EPC.
To this end it meets with the IUOOC four times a year. There are no
Panel meetings outwith these quarterly encounters. Six
representatives sit on the Panel, and two alternates are appointed
to deputise for members unable to attend. However it appeared from
meetings attended, and was confirmed by a participant, that there
was little turnover of membership of the Panel. The main criterion
for membership appears to be a high level of offshore activity, eg a
hook-up imminent. The Panel has no prepared agenda for its ~eetings
with the IUOOC. Instead it was described as a "firefighting, if not
stonewalling, exercise". Nonetheless, it was considered useful as
an "escape valve", and for providing and maintaining a valuable
interface with the appropriate trades unions, contacts which would
be already established should an operator experience an industrial
relations problem. The lunch which follows the Panel IUOOC
meeting was considered particularly important in this respect. The
joint meetings are discussed in depth in chapter 10.
Offshore Contractors Council
The Offshore Contractors Council (OCC) was formed in 1984 to
act on behalf of the Electrical Contractors' Association of Scotland
[ECA(S)], the Electrical Contractors' Association (ECA), and the Oil
and Chemical Plant Constructors' Association (OCPCA). These three
bodies are signatories to the national agreements which cover
hook-up work: the Offshore Construction Agreement (OCA) in the
northern North Sea (and hence, the one vh i ch is of most concern
here) and the Agreement for Major Hook-Up Contracts in the southern
sector (the Southern Waters Agreement).
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The oee, which represents more than 200 contractor companies
in the offshore industry, was formed as a result of plans for future
development in the North Sea as revealed in a UKOOA report produced
in 1984 (4). This nTechnical Paper" predicted major investments in
new developments in both the northern and southern sectors, and
anticipated an upturn in the volume of work on existing platforms in
"ma t ur e " sectors. A second incentive for the creation of the oee
was the commitment on the part of the Department of Energy and the
Offshore Supplies Office to a higher degree of UK involvement in
forthcoming licensing rounds. Taken together these factors resulted
in the identification by the contractors' associations of an
overwhelming need for closer liaison between the government, the oil
industry and contractors, and the oee was established for this
purpose.
An information leaflet issued by the oee (5) lists the
objectives of the Council as follows:
nBy acting as the coordinating body of all member offshore companies
the Council has the following aims:
to give strong leadership and direction to the offshore
contracting industry within the UK, by promoting the aims and
objectives of all members.
to promote constant liaison between
Government bodies and institutions
offshore contractors.
the industry 's cl ients,
(UKOOA, GSa, etc) and
to recommend and approve policies for negotiation of
agreements with Trade Unions and Employer Federations in the
interest of the industry as a whole.
to undertake a specialist advisory role in the areas of
Industrial Ralations, Training, ~ealth and Safety."
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A significant element in the industrial relations brief of the
acc is to monitor the application of the national agreements
mentioned above (the OCA and Southern Waters Agreement). Though
originally the actual parties to the agreement on the employers'
side were the individual employers' associations, ie the aCPCA,
ECA(S), and ECA, the acc is now signatory on their behalf. The
Council also endeavours to maintain a stable relationship between
the member companies, trade unions, and the workforce.
The Council is made up of 14 representatives from the
employers associations, and a secretary. Three Council members are
nominated by both the ECA and the ECA(S), and six by the aCPCA. In
each case, the nominees must include the Director of the
Association. Two members are nominated by the Association jointly.
Council members are required by the Constitution, (see Appendix F),
to be "executives with authority to make policy decisions and to
commit the industry in the field of offshore work". Members are
nominated (or renominated) on an annual bas is Council members
elect a Chairman and Vice-Chairman for the year. The Chairman has a
casting vote, but cannot be an Association Director. In addition to
the pursuit of the objectives outlined above, it is the duty of
Council members to ensure acc policy does not run counter to that of
the constituent associations they represent.
A quorum requires eight or more members, at least four from
the ECA's, and four from the aCPCA. The Council cannot commit the
Associations to financial outlay without their approval. The
Council actively seeks to expand its membership, but some important
contractors remain outside the organisation. This has a
destabilising effect, as it makes it more difficult to maintain
cohesion and uniformity amongst Council members, particularly during
periods when there is a shortage of work. The Council's
difficulties in this respect are exacerbated by the fact that the
operating companies have not commited themselves to using only
contractors within the Council. 1'hese difficulties are not unique
to the acc members; the existence of COTA (discussed below) was
threatened by very similar circumstances, as explained in chapter 9.
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Catering Offshore Traders' Association
The Catering Offshore Traders' Association (COTA) is
especially significant because it is widely agreed by the operating
companies, unions and the Association itself that COTA was
established at the operators' behest. COTA was formed in 1978 by
eight companies involved in providing catering and housekeeping
services to the offshore industry. As outlined in the previous
chapter, during the late 1970s, the intense competition between
catering companies resulted in constant undercutting in bids
submitted in the attempt to gain or main~ain contracts. This
inevitably led to reductions in pay rates for catering employees
which, in turn, resulted in very high levels of turnover; Buchan 's
research (6) revealed turnover rates of 150 and 300% per annum.
Such instability adversely affected the quality of service which was
provlded. There were periodic bouts of unrest, constant rumours of
industrial action, and the calibre of some of the catering staff
offshore left much to be desired. The importance of a high standard
of catering and clean and comfortable living conditions is
considerably increased when workers are isolated on an oil platform
from family and friends, and recreation facilities are limited.
Hence, the unhappy situation 'which had developed in the catering
industry offshore had an immediate, and direct impact on the
operators' own employees.
The unrest allowed the unions (TGWU and NUS) to step up
recruitment, and there was an increase in claims for recognition.
Meanwhile there was a growing perception amongst the operators of
the potentially volatile nature of industrial relations offshore
which, it should be said, was not confined ::0 the catering sector
(for example the following year, 1979, saw a lengthy but
unconstitutional stoppage by offshore construction wor ke r s l , They
therefore initiated an investigation into industrial relations among
their contractors.
82
In the catering sector this revealed a lack of organisation
amongst employers which, in this case, was working against the
operators' interests. Hence, the operators used their considerable
influence to encourage the establishment of COTA. Opinions vary as
to the exact nature of this encouragement. An office-holder in COTA
was of the belief that a major catering company had been the driving
force behind COTA. At the other extreme, a catering company
spokesman (see chapter 8) claimed the caterers were virtually given
an ultimatum: "if you don't form COTA we won't deal with you".
Although there was no written policy as such, it was understood that
UKOOA companies would not give consideration to bids submitted by
companies outside COTA.
The precise origins of trade union involvement with COTA are
hard to determine. One manager pointed out that the "operators
encouraged the catering contractors to establish proper terms and
conditions. This did not necessarily imply negotiating with the
Union" (7). On the other hand, a former manager in the same company
has stated COTA was formed "primarily with the aim of negotiating an
agreement with the TGWU on wages and conditions of employment" (8).
This brief history of COTA's origins offers some insight into
the relationship between the operating companies and the
contractors, at least in the catering sector, and indicates the
influence which the former can exercise.
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TRADE UNION ORGANISATION
Inter Union Offshore Oil Committee
The Inter Union Off shore Oil Commi ttee (IUOOC) was formed by
eight unions at the Scottish TUC (STUC) conference in April 1974 but
is a TUC sub-committee. The composition of the IUOOC at the time of
writing was TGWU; NUS; NUMAST; MSF; EETPU; AEU (Engineering and
Construction sections); and the Boilermakers (full membership), and
BALPA (associate membership). However, the expulsion of the EETPU
from the TUC in 1988 was having repercussions in that one or two
unions were threatening to withdraw in response to the expulsion of
the EETPU from the Committee.
The Committee was established to facilitate recruitment and
organisation among the offshore workforce. At the 1974 STUC
conference Jack Jones, TGWU General Secretary, criticised the
attitude of some American companies towards labour, describing them
as "wild west". There was a dispute between the unions and a
drilling company at this time, the workforce seeking a change in the
work cycle from 14 days offshore, seven leave (14/7) to an equal
time basis (Le 14/14 or 7/7). In addition there was, and had been
for some time, widespread concern over the safety record in the
industry, an issue central to the work of Carson (9). Though the
Committee had the public support of the STUC, Kitchen's assessment
(10) of the initial reaction of companies as one of
"non-eo-operation" is essentially correct. The IUOOC wrote to
drilling and operating companies shortly after its formation,
inviting them to a meeting to explain the reasons behind it. The
Committee was formed,
"for the express purpose of establishing in the oil industry
the right of workers in that industry to belong to a Trade
Union and, as a consequence of that membership, the right to
enter into negotiations with the employing company to
establish agreed wages and conditions." (11)
84
While the operating companies recognised the importance of keeping
abreast of the situation, the operators and drillers decided not to
attend the meeting. Their perception of the situation was that
attendance could be taken as formal recognition of the IUaaC, and it
could appear that the companies were prepared to come together as a
negotiating body. Developments in the IUaaC were, however,
monitored by the operators to whom inter union rivalry prior to the
formation of the IUaaC was giving concern.
Each union has one vote on the IUaaC. Hence the merger of the
ASTMS and TASS reduced the total number of votes by one, and though
three MSF officers can attend, MSF has only one vote. The rucoc
elects a Chairman and a Secretary on a biennial basis. The post of
Secretary had, however, been held by the ASTMS off icer for eight
years at the time of writing. This has the advantage of providing
continuity in administration and communication, and a point of
contact for outside bodies. Another major reason for the retention
of the office by the ASTMS was that the '..wrkload of the other
officers was such that they did not wish to take on this extra task,
and some of them are not actually based in Aberdeen. The nature of
the relationship between the IUaaC and the operating companies,
individually or as UKaOA, is such that an onerous burden of
correspondence falls on the Secretary of the Committee. Individual
unions cannot approach companies directly on matters such as
recogni tion, or visits offshore. All such approaches must be made
through the IUaaC. This is not to say that informal communication
does not take place from time to time between individual union
officers and companies.
According to the Constitution of the Iuaac (see Appendix G)
meetings are held on a quarterly basis. However, in practice this
did not seem to be the case. Instead, on the morning of the meeting
between the Committee and the Liaison Panel of the EPC, the IUaae
holds a "pre-meeting" at the venue before the joint meeting begins.
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Attendance at the quarterly meetings which do take place can be
extremely low (four off icials are required for a quorum) due to
pressure of work, other commitments, and the geographical location
of officers, who were based in Inverness, Edinburgh, Glasgow and
Norfolk in addition to Aberdeen.
Ad hoc meetings can be arranged to deal with pressing issues
or problems. A tragic example of this was the Chinook crash in
November 1986, which initiated a number of IUOOC meetings. As a
result of attending meetings between the ruooc and the Liaison
Panel, it was possible to attend a number of ruooc meetings. These
took place between December 1986 and May 1987. Three of these were
·special meetings·, called specifically to discuss the Chinook
incident, though this issue also appeared on the agenda of the two
additional meetings attended. The mechanics of the ruoae are
discussed at more length in chapter 10.
Summary
In this chapter the constitution and machinery of the relevant
employer organisations have been described. It can be seen that
there are industry level links between these organisations, as well
as links between individual companies. In addition a short
description and history of the IUOOC has been given, tracing the
emergence of and influences behind inter union collaboration. Hence
over a relatively short time span, the industry has acquired a
relatively complex set of institutions for which a prime concern is
collective bargaining. The interaction between them is considered
later in the thesis, particularly in chapters 9 and 10 which deal
with industry level relationships between operators and contractors,
and operators and trade unions respectively. Before that, however,
the individual participating companies will be introduced, and the
industrial relations policies of the operating companies will be
discussed (chapter 6), followed by a discussion of the operators'
perception of the client to contractor relationship, in chapter 7.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OF THE MAJOR OPERATING COMPANIES
In the popular view, the operating companies are the oil
industry, but as we have seen they are only the tip of a complex
iceberg. Nonetheless, the operating companies must manage labour
relations in a young, turbulent and high profile industry. This
chapter considers the means by which this is achieved. Hence
attention is focussed on several specific areas of policy considered
germane to the central theme of the thesis, namely the management of
labour in circumstances of extreme risk. These policy areas include
unionisation, consultative arrangements, and remuneration. However,
prior to this discussion, the participating companies are introduced.
Operator Profiles and Structure
All companies which agreed to take part in the study are
invol ved in exploration for and production of oil and gas in the
North Sea. In addition, they are all offspring of huge
multinational corporations which are fully integrated, ie the parent
corporations are involved in all aspects of the oil industry as
outlined previously. Efforts were made in selecting the sample to
mix the nationalities of the companies as much as possible, but two
factors worked against this: firstly, the international oil industry
is dominated by American companies and therefore it was inevitable
that the companies studied would include a substantial proportion of
companies of US parentage. Secondly, the group was self selecting
to some degree since only those companies which allowed access could
be studied. Four of the six companies are American, one is French
and one is British.
The Aberdeen offices of all six companies are responsible for
day to day operations in the North Sea. Each of the companies
reported to a London office, and the nature of these links was
examined. Of the six, one company was of the group designated as
large, two mec i um, and three small. The group of companies wh i c c
refused to participate was made up of one large company, one small,
88
and four medium. The descriptions given below are necessarily
brief, in order to preserve the anonymity of the companies and
interviewees. The ERR (estimated recoverable reserves) figures have
been calculated from those available when the research began.
Company A
The parent of company A claims to be the second largest
industrial concern in Europe, and the sixth largest industrial
company in the non-Communist world. This company conducts its
business in separate business streams in order to "facilitate the
management of the groups increasingly diverse activities whilst at
the same time ensuring the necessary management accountability for
decisions and actions" (Company Report). Overall control is
exercised from a Corporate Head Office. In March 1981, significant
changes were made to central organisation, taking into account
increasing diversity in worldwide operations, and allowing for
greater devolution in decision-making. Company A is the operating
company of the Exploration stream.
Company A, British in origin, is large, being the operator of
production facilities which controlled 21% of total ERR in the
British sector of the northern North Sea, as estimated in 1985. At
the beginning of the fieldwork for the project, Company A had three
fields in production, and one in the development phase. By the end
of the project, the company had one more field in the development
phase. Thus in 1985, production facilities consisted of six
platforms with another under construction. At the end of the
research, the platform under construction 'Has in the process of
being installed. Production on the new field in the development
phase, scheduled to begin in 1988, is to be done by vessel. Company
A also operates Flotsam, one of the two North Sea oil terminals.
The workforce numbered approximately 1,000 offshore, 1,400 onshore
in Aberdeen (the latter figLce includes about 200 agency personnel)
and 550 at the terminal. Several people were interviewed in this
company during the fieldwork: the Employee Relations i1anager;
Er.lployee Relations Off icer; Senior Personnel Off icer; and the Head
of Training.
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Company B
American in origin, Company B is the operating unit
responsible for exploration and production of oil and gas in the UK
sector of the North Sea. The parent corporation is itself a
subsidiary of a giant multinational in the chemical industry, bought
by the chemical company in 1982.
Company B, medium in size, is responsible for about 4.7% total
ERR. In 1985, as in 1987, two fields were in production.
Production facilities operated by the company total two platforms.
The offshore workforce numbered about 300, onshore 263. The
Personnel Superintendent was the contact in Company B, and the
opportunity also arose to talk to the London-based Manager of
Employee Relations.
Company C
The head office of the parent company - which is in the top
ten largest US oil companies - is based in California and, like all
the parent companies, has interests s t r e t cb i nq across the globe.
Company C placed applications for North Sea blocks with the
Government in the fourth round of licensing, 1971, and by 1974 had
discovered two fields.
In 1985, this medium company was operating these two fields on
behalf of itself and its partners, responsible for reserves
representing 9.8% of total ERR. Production facilities comprised two
steel platforms. In 1987, a third field came on stream, producing
oil by means of subsea production facilities. This company operates
Jetsam, the other oil terminal. The workforce numbered about 900,
40U of these based in Aberdeen, 270 at the terminal, and 230
offshore. In the main, the fieldwork interviews were conducted with
the Manager of Human Resources. However, the Industrial Relations
Co-ordinator also had some input, as he was present on the offshore
visit made during the research.
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Company D
The parent company of Company D was established in 1917. It
is engaged in oil exploration and production across the world, this
being one of the five groups into which the company's activities are
organised. This group in turn is divided into geographic zones, UK
operations coming under the auspices of Europe and Africa.
Throughout the project this small (in North Sea terms) company
operated one field, accounting for 1.2% ERR, with production
facilities comprising one steel platform. Company D had 140
employees, 80 offshore and 60 in Aberdeen.
Company D was a comparative new-comer to the North East,
having had a base in Aberdeen for only four years at the start of
the project. The Head of Administration and the Employee Relations
Supervisor were interviewed during the fieldwork.
Company E
The parent corporation of Company E was founded in 1890, and
has its headquarters in California. Company E's head office is
based in London, though Aberdeen is the base from which operations
in the UK sector of the North Sea are directed. The London office
is also the Regional Office for the Middle East, Europe and Africa.
The Head of the Administrative Services was interviewed during the
fieldwork.
Like Company D, this company is small, and produced oil from
one field by means of one steel platform. This field was discovered
in 1973, began production in 1978, and represents 0.8% ERR. No
further field developments were undertaken by this company during
the research. The workforce comprised 82 offshore, and 63 onshore
in Aberdeen.
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Company F
This company is the offspr ing of a French parent. Like the
other companies in the study, Company F has a UK Head Office in
London, in addition to its substantial presence in Aberdeen. It was
founded in 1964, and drilled its first North Sea well in 1965.
Following the discovery of the Pluto gas field in 1971, Company F
took on the responsibility for the construction, installation and
operation of the delivery system for Pluto gas (the production
facilities on the Pluto field itself are operated by another
company). This entailed the installation of two pipelines, each 225
miles long, to carry the gas from the field to a terminal in the
North East Scotland operated by Company F. The first deliveries of
gas to the UK were made in 1977, and the system now delivers
approximately 40% of Britain's needs. Company F also installed, and
still operates, a platform midway on the Pluto pipeline, one of its
main functions being to compress the gas, facilitating the
continuation of its journey along the pipeline, and thereby boosting
the overall capacity of the system.
Throughout the project this company was developing an oil
field, the production facilities for which consisted of two steel
platforms, and which has ERR equivalent to 1. 5% of total. Forty
eight people, from a total of 419, were employed offshore in 1985
(though this figure will increase substantially when the oil field
comes on stream), the remainder being employed in Aberdeen (303),
and at the gas terminal (48). The main contact in Company F was the
Head of Personnel Studies (he had formerly been Head of Personnel),
but the Head of Personnel and the Head of Training were also
interviewed.
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AREAS OF POLICY
Industrial Relations Policies
With two exceptions, the companies preferred to use the term
'employee relations' instead of 'industrial relations' with
reference to their own employees. Reasons given included the
explanation that 'employee relations' emphasises the individual as
opposed to collective relationship; and 'industrial relations'
implies the presence of trade unions. The latter was described by
one interviewee as a 'subset' of employee relations. The term
'industrial relations' was confined to contractors.
The companies agreed that the offshore situation gave rise to
a unique environment in which industrial relations were to be
conducted. One interviewee explained that the need for harmony was
heightened offshore, as the workforce was compelled to work and live
together in a conf ined space for two weeks at a time. Another
interviewee thought that the isolation aspect was an important
factor in 'team building', and that the existence of 'team' feeling
amongst the workforce negated the need for a structured trade union
organisation. Furthermore, he continued, the 'greenfield' aspect
motivated the workforce.
It can be said that there was some degree of formality in
employee relations policies, as all companies had a manual in which
such policies were contained. However, three interviewees (C, D,
and E) stressed that there was room for some flexibility in
application of policies, taking into account individual
circumstances. Monitoring of adherence to these policies, mentioned
by companies A and F, is by internal audit of the payroll. In
companies Band E monitoring was carried out by those in London to
whom the interviewees were accountable.
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Attitudes to Trades Unions
The attitude of the companies to unionisation is a central
feature of their industrial relations policies, and the alleged
anti-union stance of the companies was investigated. More
significantly, the longer term intentions of the companies regarding
unionisation were considered. Questions also sought an explanation
for the apparently ambivalent attitude to trade unions which the
operators exhibited overall.
The interviewee from Company A dismissed as "nonsense" the
popular view that there were no unions in the oil industry, as its
sister companies in downstream activites were heavily unionised.
Interviewee F thought the myth grew up through the companies who had
no operating experience in the UK environment, especially American
drilling and service companies, those often referred to as 'cowboy
outfits'. Such companies, he said, held the 'popular' view that
trades unions in the UK were disruptive, and wanted nothing to do
with them. The majors were believed to be of the same opinion.
Interviewee A said that his company tr ies to take a neutral
stance on unionisation; not encouraging organisation, but leaving
the membership decision to the individual employee. Many of the
workforce had come from unionised backgrounds, and the interviewee
believed that the majority of these were likely to have retained
their union membership in the event of returning to such an
environment. The exact level of membership was unknown, as the
company was not party to any agreements and therefore check off
arrangements did not exist.
It was felt by A that the majority of management accepted that
a trade union agreement leads to "more hassle", because it inhibits
their ability to manage, and "people's attitudes to relationships
change as they adopt stances". Furthermore, there had never been
any pressure for trade union representation from the offshore staff,
which numbered more than 1000 spread between seven installations.
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The company put no restriction on access for trade union officers
going offshore, and provided the facilities considered appropriate.
At a rough estimate he thought that perhaps 12 out of 75 of A's
employees would visit the officers, the others "vot.inq with their
feet w•
However, there are two areas where the operating companies are
happy to accept trade union agreements; hook-up and cater ing. The
explanation given for the former was that hook-up involved large
numbers, included many different contractors and disciplines, and
required massive investment. Without the OCA it would be more
difficult to manage the hook-up, as the agreement eliminates a major
potential conflict area by keeping everyone on the same terms and
conditions. On the catering side, the COTA agreement stemmed from
unrest amongst catering workers in the late 1970s. It was also a
result of the poor terms and conditions at that time, which in turn
led to a calibre of staff which failed to satisfy the clients, the
operating companies.
The likely response to a request for unionisation in this
company would be an investigation to find out the cause, as
wobviously this would mean something had gone wrong w• At the end of
the day, A continued, everything depended on the relationship the
company wanted with its workforce. Company A had worked at creating
an environment in which an individual could air grievances via the
line manager without third party involvement and without fear of
victimisation. Hence they had been trying to encourage employee
involvement for 20 years, with consultation, pension and share
schemes.
Given that interviews were conducted in the wake of Star Oil's
recognition of the ASTMS on five platforms, and the fact that the
AEU and EETPU were preparing to hold a strike ballot, all
interviewees were asked if they felt a significant industrial
relations change was imminent. Interviewee A thougnt things were
not changing before the price fall, but that perhaps the ballot was
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evidence of change. Though he believed that some contractors'
employees had seen their real wages fall, such a reduction was not
visible on A's platforms as the company had been monitoring
contractors' wage rates without a formal agreement. The environment
however had inevitably changed, from one of all boom, to a turndown,
and the service companies - particularly drillers - had felt "the
cold wind" first. In the oil majors themselves, there had been very
little evidence of real change.
Interviewee B considered it "fair to say that the company has
a preference not to be unionised: they do not want to recognise a
trade union if they can help it - and the way to prevent it is to
make sure there is no need for a trade union". He thought that if
the workforce wanted a trade union then the company would have to
accept it, but it is more efficient and better for morale without a
trade union, as "even the best unions have an interest in some
degree of conflict, if only to justify their presence". It was
suggested that there was little to fear from the union at the
forefront of organising the North Sea workforce (the ASTMS). There
was no company directive with regard to unionisation; he described
the company's approach as pragmatic.
When asked his opinion as to why client companies accepted a
union agreement to cover hook-up work (the OCA) but will not
sanction such an agreement to cover maintenance (a PCA) the reply
was that the oil companies were made to see the need for the OCA
because they were beginning to have labour problems. It was a
'seller's market' with considerable potential for stoppage and
delay, and a very short 'weather ·window'. It was his opinion that
the unions got "an exceptionally good deal" in the OCA.
Furthermore, from the point of production (first oil) onwards the
operation should be a commercial exercise. However the interviewee
believed that such a stance could prove to be 'shortsighted' as by
not taking a more proactive role they have opened the door to
problems (at the time of interview, t no s e unions signatory to t ne
OCA were organising a ballot for strike action). He stated that
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UKOOA endorsed the OCA and its annual reviews, but would not do the
same for a post construction agreement. The OCPCA was free to enter
an agreement without UKOOA's sanction (it eventually did so, in
signing the OCSA discussed in the previous chapter) but the
interviewee believed it would not do so because of the significant
number of firms outside the OCPCA, which would have a commercial
advantage if OCPCA members tendered for work based on a post
construction agreement.
He continued that now it is a buyers market: those with
business to dispense can pick and choose, and the selection is done
commercially "which obviously results in the diminution of rates".
Though the company did not want to see contractors paying their
people substandard rates, it had no desire to tell them what to
pay. The company was faced with the problem of finding a middle
course.
Company C thought that there was no doubt that historically
oil companies have been anti-union, the problem being that American
.companies do not understand British trade unions. For example,
their perceptions of trade unionism in the UK had been coloured by
the very poor reputation of the Teamsters union in the USA.
He argued that the absence of a post-construction agreement
enables the oil companies to contain costs. Furthermore, there was
some feeling amongst the oil companies that the OCPCA and the unions
were in league with each other when pressing for an agreement, as
both would benefit from an increase in rates. However, though he
would not admit as much in an open forum, the interviewee considered
the request for an agreement to be reasonable, and could foresee
problems in creating a two class society offshore. The unions were
described as being on the horns of a dilemma; if they were
successful in their efforts to improve rates then there would
inevitably be lay-offs amongst contractors' personnel.
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In Company D, two areas of concern were expressed with regard
to trade unions. First, companies are concerned about their ability
to manage with 'interference' from a third party; and second, there
was a fear of the political aspirations of some trade unions, as
demonstrated said the interviewee by the miner s' str ike of 1984-5.
In addition there was a view that 'classical' trade unions do not
have a part to play in an industry where terms and conditions are
very high. The interviewee drew attention to the fairly low profile
kept by some unions: "they are aware that their members have a
pretty good deal and wouldn 1 t want to disrupt that". Hence "oil
companies are anti-union but for these very reasonable reasons".
It was stated that downstream operations were heavily
unionised and that trade unions play an important part in
coordinating communication. This function was not really needed
offshore as workforce numbers are smaller and therefore more
manageable, and also the workforce cannot leave the workplace.
When recruiting offshore workers, the company realised that
many would come from a unionised environment. Management considered
the facilities provided by a union which they would have to provide,
the main things being communication and consultation. Company D
therefore deliberately developed very open and easy consultation
arrangements. These do not involve representation as all members of
the workforce are seen by management once a month.
The company response to a request for union recognition would
depend on "who asked and which trade union" it was said, albeit
tongue in cheek. However the interviewee continued by saying that
the answer would be no, because employees are single status, and
therefore one group seeking unionisation would affect all (the
company would not entertain separate bargaining groups). Since
trade union strength is vested in the hands of the membership, there
would be no recognition agreement unless feeling was demonstrated by
a strike.
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A very different view was expressed with regard to a post
construction agreement. The interviewee shared the desire on the
part of the unions for an agreement after hook-up, as the decline in
terms and conditions is too great. ~Market forces determine terms
and conditions for contractors~, it was said. The interviewee
considered this to be a risk area in industrial relations and,
because contractors I personnel were no less important than D'S own
employees, the company should treat them in the same way. Company D
were therefore addressing the matter at the time of interview,
seeking a commercial method of offering contractors long term
secur i ty. Such a method, it was c l a imed, had been dev ised
'downstream'. At a refinery, the contractor was offered a two year
rolling contract in return for improved productivi ty, in spite of
the fact that the company claims to prefer control by market
forces. However to ensure the contractor does not take advantage r
bids are invited every two years for the purposes of making
comparison with the market rate. This description is very similar
to the competitive tendering system discussed in chapters 7 and 8.
In Company E the interviewee explained that the company viewed
itself as a good employer; and that it was felt that the terms and
conditions offered were such that the company would be disappointed
if their workers felt the need to seek trade union membership in
order to negotiate them. Management would be similarly disappointed
if employees regarded grievance procedures as requiring a need for
trade union representation. In the view of the interviewee,
"pro-wo r kf o r ce " was a better description of the company's attitude
than "ant i.e-uni on ", Negative attitudes towards unions had emanated
from the drilling sector, said the interviewee, and the operating
companies had been tainted by the drillers' reputation for hostility
to organised labour.
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Marketing and refining in E's sister companies were highly
unionised, as was exploration and production in the USA. The
explanation given for the company's labour practices in the North
Sea was that they were shaped by those of other companies in the
industry already established. He thought the most likely reaction
to a request for unionisation would be to find the source of the
problem. However without widespread grievances the unions were
considered to have no real prospects for organising the workforce,
and terms and conditions were so good unionisation was highly
improbable.
Resistance by the client companies to a post construction
agreement was explained as follows: in the early days of the
industry, companies tended to issue contracts with far less regard
for costs - if costs were high, returns were even higher. Hence
they cared very little that the OCA was expensive. However, once
hook-up is finished, the companies start looking to cut costs. The
OCA was described as extravagant and expensive, and the interviewee
believed that if the companies could turn back the clock they would
not agree to it. Sympathy was expressed fur the contractors, but
the interviewee explained that the client companies are very
hardnosed.
Company F thought there were several reasons for the failure
of the trade unions to make inroads amongst oil company employees.
The basic explanation was the excellent terms and conditions
package. A second explanation was that offshore was definitely not
a shopfloor - everyone worked together as a team and this was a very
important aspect, as was the isolation factor. Furthermore, the
interviewee explained, many of the workers company F recruited
wanted to get away from heavily unionised backgrounds, due to their
experience of restrictive practices.
However, though the interviewee did not think that the Star
agreements would have a domino effect in the North Sea, he
considered the extension of trade unionism in the North Sea likely,
as the production peak was passed and people became more worried
about their future.
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The company response to a request for union recognition would
be to establish the amount of interest in the common interest group
by asking either the Electoral Reform Society or ACAS to hold a
ballot. The company would then follow the employees' wishes, as it
would be bad practice and shortsighted to show any resistance.
According to this interviewee, resistance to a post
construction agreement stemmed from a fear of putting too much power
in the hands of the trade unions, thereby diminishing the power of
the company. The hook-up situation was very different, because it
was of a very limited duration. The interviewee believed there
always had been a 'two tier I labour force offshore, recalling his
horror in the mid 1970s when he found some contractors' personnel
were paid far more than those of the oil companies. This had
resulted from a shortage of skills, and the fact that work on a
contract basis was a new phenomenon in Aberdeen. Therefore a
premium had to be paid to persuade workers to join the industry from
secure posts. He recognised that the balance had now tipped the
opposite way.
Consultative Arrangements
Investigation of consultative arrangements revealed the scope
of issues subject to discussion in the companies and, perhaps more
important, those excluded. The discussion also aimed to discover
the means available for dealing with grievances.
Two companies, A and P, have formal consultative arrangements
covering all staff. Company A has produced a handbook for
consultative representatives, wherein I consultation' is extensively
defined:
wconsultation is a process for communication between staff and
management to enable the views of staff to be expressed,
discussed and taken into account before management makes a
decision on a matter w•
101
The handbook clearly states that consultation is not "a forum for
negotiating the terms and conditions of employment. •••• (it) is not
negotiation or a substitute for unionisation". However, it also
states that "terms and conditions of employment •••• can be discussed
and suggestions and views taken into account by management".
Three types of issues are not discussed; individual
grievances, issues for which a forum already exists (eg pensions and
safety), and commercially sensitive issues. Prior to 1981, all
areas (eg Aberdeen, offshore) fed into the Company Consultative
Committee (CCC) with the result the CCC became loaded with items
related to offshore terms and conditions. Hence in 1981 an offshore
meeting was established, and continues to meet twice a year. Each
area is free to devise its own constitutional ar rangements, thus
some meet monthly and others quarterly. The CCC meets on an annual
basis at a hotel with approximately 45 people in attendance. Items
discussed are those which are applicable to the company as a whole,
such as terms and conditions, hours and holidays (see figure 9,
overleaf).
It was estimated that about 60% of items on the agenda were
initiated by employees. Efforts were being made to redress the
balance, given the potential of the CCC as a sounding board for
management proposals. At local level, the interviewee estimated
that about 75% of items on the agenda were initiated by employees.
He considered this to be due to the failure of management to fully
grasp the potential benefits of consultation.
In Company F there is a consultative committee in London and
another in Aberdeen which meet quarterly. Management nominate
members and staff elect representatives. In addition, local
committees have been established for Aberdeen, offshore and the
terminal staff. These meet more frequently but "tea and toilets
still prevail". Any sub j ec t , including terms and conditions, may be
raised with the exception of individual grievances.
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FIGURE 9 - Example of CCC Agenda
1. Chairman's Introduction.
2. Matters Arising from last meeting.
a) Disciplinary Procedures.
b) Communications Briefings.
c) Participating Share Scheme.
d) Education Trust.
e) Staff Appraisal.
f) Pensions.
3. Remuneration Policy.
4. Community Relations.
5. Employment Mix.
6. Voluntary Early Retirement - More Flexibility.
7. Future Prospects.
8. Relocation Package.
9. Holioay Entitlement for Employees with Long Term Sickness
Absence.
10. Staff Appraisal.
11. Training and Further Education.
12. Chairman's Summing Up.
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The interviewee expressed disappointment that nominated
members (ie management) are always better prepared than the elected
representatives, and therefore little real discussion, other than a
question and answer, takes place. The company has offered elected
members the opportunity for training in public speaking, and runs
meetings in company time. Overall he considered arrangements to be
successful.
In Company B, formal consultative arrangements only exist for
offshore workers. The committee has 12 representatives from
offshore crews, is chaired by the General Manager in Aberdeen, and
meets three times a year. These arrangements have evolved over time
from the briefing group system which eventually proved inadequate in
providing feedback from employees.
The interviewee revealed that in reality management had never
really used the arrangements to consult, but considered them to be a
"safety valve" for airing grievances. Pay rates and terms and
condi tions cannot be discussed. Issues are in the main employee
driven, but management are making efforts to use the meetings for
communication and discussion.
Formal consultative arrangements had existed offshore in
Company C, but had eventually collapsed because the workforce
started talking in terms of negotiating terms and conditions;
representatives raised these matters time and again. After
management had made it clear that such issues were not up for
discussion and removed them from the arena, there were not really
any other items to discuss. Since then the General :1anager has
implemented Briefing Groups (as promoted by the Industrial Society)
which are held every five weeks. It was emphasised that these are
strictly local arrangements and the corporation as a whole does not
engage in consultation.
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Companies D and E are relatively small companies, and can
therefore meet with every crew on each offshore trip. In E, 'Good
Operations' meetings are held with the whole crew, at which the
employees can air grievances. However, there is no consultation on
pay, and this is a purely local arrangement. It was thought that
management and workforce raise an approximately equal proportion of
issues.
A very similar system operates in Company D: a visit is made
by management from Aberdeen on each tour of duty, and an operations
meeting is held with both crews on the platform. There is no limit
to the subjects which can be raised, and the interviewee stated that
the company had discussed and moved on a terms and conditions item,
that of a payment of travel to Aberdeen and overnight
accommodation. Again, management and employees raised about the
same proportion of issues. The nature of issues raised tends to
vary according to the time of year, but has included holidays, pay
rises, and arrangements for providing coverage of the World Cup.
According to Marchington, the form of consultation described
above has been introduced by some companies (not specifically oil),
Wto prevent the development of independent trade union
organisation ••••• (The) principal activity of the JCC [Joint
Consultative Committee) will be educative - ••••• to inform employee
representatives and persuade them to go along with management
thinking; representatives will be left in little doubt about
managerial prerogatives. W (1) Furthermore Marchington describes the
mechanics of the non-union model:
wInformation of both a 'hard' (business-oriented) nature and a
'soft' character (welfare, social and personalities) will be
given to the workforce. It is unlikely that the employee
representatives will meet outside of the JCC, partly because
there is no provision for so doing during working time bu t
also because they lack any sense of collective
identity •••••• The chair of the JCC will be taken by a senior
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manager ••• who has high status and is seen to command the
respect of the representatives: other managers will attend as
appropriate ••••• Meetings will be held several times a year but
not usually monthly."
The above accurately portrays the consultative arrangements in
the operating companies, which were found to include discussion of a
variety of matters from company share information (hard) to coverage
of world cup football (soft). The fact that consultation fell by
the wayside in Company C when management made clear it was not to be
confused with negotiation is indicative of the reminder to the
workforce of managerial prerogative, as mentioned by Marchington.
Furthermore Company B stated quite clearly that the mechanism was
seen by management as a ·safety valve". Marchington further argues
that, "Meeting with senior managers on a regular basis, and perhaps
spending time before or after the meeting may help to confirm the
belief that the management is reasonable and committed to the
overall benefit of the company and its employees; this in turn would
help reinforce the idea that belonging to a trade union would not be
in workers' interests." It is likely, given the applicability of
the model to the operating companies, that this aspect would also be
valid. Given the above, it is reasonable to conclude that the
operators use consultation procedures at least partly as a
counter-measure to union organisation.
Remuneration
No industry wide agreements exist for pay for operators'
employees; each company has developed its own ar rangements, though
there is considerable similarity be t ween them. It was explained
that the remuneration structure was initially developed to at tract
personnel to an unknown industry in a ~ostile environment.
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In Company A the remuneration structure is based on the
concept of market groups. Those in the professional group are
covered by a UK-wide salary scheme, though there are subsets, eg
drillers and geologists, who are paid more because they are in
relatively short supply. The 'local' group covers all onshore staff
outwith the professional group. At the time of interview all were
on the same salary scales, but the company was about to look at
"tailoring" the package to fit the local market. The third group
compr ises offshore staff. Prev iously they were paid according to
the onshore grading system, topped up with a system of allowances.
However the company decided that these jobs wer e not equivalent to
those onshore, and workers in them were adversely affected because
allowances were not pensionable. As a result some allowances have
become part of the bas i c salary, thereby becoming pensionable. All
salaries are reviewed annually.
In Company B pay increases are totally merit based, and the
remuneration structure is based on a grade system encompassing
personnel on and offshore. There is a 'core' package of benefits
which are common throughout the corporation, eg pension, stock
ownership plan, and holidays, all other items being determined
locally. No overtime payments are paid in northern operations, a
policy in line with the company's single status philosophy.
The offshore allowance is divided into three parts:
a) offshore supplement fixed sum, pensionable, not attendance
related, this is paid to cover bank holidays and hours worked in
excess of 40 hours per week (2);
b) offshore allowance - to compensate for the social and domestic
inconvenience of offshore work;
c) northern North Sea allowance - to compensate for extended travel
time.
Items band c are not pensionable, and are attendance related. In
theory, this means they are not paid to an employee who arrives late
at the heliport and misses his flight, is sick, or training. In
practice the rules have been relaxed, and only apply if the employee
is truly responsible for his absence.
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Aberdeen based staff in Company C are paid according to a
total merit programme, the remainder of staff are on incremental
offshore scales. The offshore package comprises base salary: 42
hour premium (covering the two additional hours worked per week):
additional overtime: a job flexibility payment; offshore allowance
(including a shift allowance); travel allowance; and a clothing
allowance. Less than half of the total monetary value is
pensionable.
Similar ly, in Company D, the offshore allowance package is
made up of a number of items, including an offshore allowance paid
as an incentive to encourage people to work offshore: a shift
allowance; and balanced hours pay.
In Company E there is a national pay structure applicable
throughout the company, with the exception of offshore workers, who
are paid "a rate for the job n , plus overtime. All others receive
merit-based salaries. There are no corporate elements in the
package. The interviewee felt that in general offshore allowances
are excessive, and that his company's was probably the lowest in the
industry. When allocating rises, the company tends to put more on
the base salary, which is pensionable, than on the offshore
allowance. It was explained that if the offshore allowance was too
big, then the company had difficulty in transferring an individual
from off to onshore. The offshore allowance system had been
introduced as an essential incentive in days of full employment. An
attendance related bonus scheme had been introduced to combat rising
absenteeism; it was explained that the company had become a victim
of its own generous sick pay scheme.
In Company F, the structure covers all UK employees, and has
14 grades, progress through which is merit based. The company has
followed what became established practice and pays offshore
allowance. However, they did not follow the proliferation of
allowances, but pay only one, pensionable allowance. The proportion
of the package which the offshore allowance represents varies from
one third to one fifth according to the Le ve L of the individual.
The allowance is, and always has been, attendance related.
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Most, if not all, interviewees referred to an annual survey of
remuneration levels in the operating companies conducted by a well
known management consultancy. Though the survey refers to the
companies as A, a, c and so on, it seems that the identity of the
companies was an open secret. Furthermore it was revealed that
monthly lunch meetings of employee relations management from the
operators take place, at which any improvement of the remuneration
package by an individual operator would be discussed.
Job Flexibility
Given that the operators considered offshore work to be little
different to processes employed onshore (the environment was
considered the unique factor) and that this work is carried out in a
workplace with limited accommodation, the questions of manpower
utilisation and demarcation are highly relevant. Furthermore, the
research presented an opportunity to investigate to what extent the
operating companies took advantage of their greenfield sites to
revise working practices.
Flexibility in company F was described as having developed by
custom and practice, as the company did not stipulate to the
workforce that they would be multicraft. Offshore workers are known
as either technicians or operators, but over the years the company
has come to expect them to do more than the limit of their job
title. The company has made minor adjustments in job
responsibilities, and has increased salaries where appropriate,
"almost a productivity bonus". The interviewee said that management
and workforce were working towards the common goal of efficiency.
Management and technical staff in Company A were described as
already eXhibiting a high degree of flexibility, voluntarily
expanding the parameters of their post to "tackle a job and get it
done".
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Company B explained that it had no problem with regard to
flexibility. It was made clear to contractors' personnel that
demarcation practices would result in 'NRB I (Not Required Back).
The interviewee stated that the contraction of the offshore
workforce meant that people were being expected to carry out tasks
they had not done before. He revealed that the company was meeting
some resistance because of job security worries.
Company C had "grasped the nettle early on", buying out
restr ictive pract ices, though the interviewee explained that there
had never been a problem. He thought that this was just as much to
do with the team or family environment as the payment of a
flexibility allowance.
Interviewee D revealed that flexibility had been built into
the organisation, the assumption being that all members of the
workforce have some spare time. Hence they are given additional
tasks, eg onshore secretarial staff will do helicopter schedules and
payroll administration. Offshore, however, he said that the company
had not been as progressive as it had hoped to be.
Company E thought flexibility a very important issue, and
essential in the workforce. It is company policy to develop "all
rounders", and implement succession plans.
Training
The amount and type of training carried out by each company
was examined, as it was believed that this would be indicative of
the overall attitude of the participating companies to employee
relations. It was anticipated that there was heavy investment in
human resource development within the companies, and this was indeed
the case.
Most of the training for Company A in the UK is done in
Aberdeen as it is from here that the majority of staff are
administered. There is a separate Training Centre staffed by 12
people providing safety, technical and development training.
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In 19&6 an extensive review of training was carried out, the major
outcome of which was the identification of the need for a training
policy and strategy to be modified annually. The training
superintendent stated that the company had always carried out
extensive training, and estimated the proportion of the manpower
bUdget spent on this as about 5%. On average, individual employees
receive one and a half to two weeks per year training, depending on
age, discipline and grade. The value per capita was thought to be
approximately £1000.
About 40% of training was resourced by in-house personnel, the
remainder by consultants, vendors of technical equipment, and
outside bodies, eg the OPITB. Training was described as
exploration-specific (as opposed to firm specific), though the
content is tailored "to the culture in which the company operates",
and emphasis is placed on the need to link training to the workplace.
Training was reviewed with the downturn in the industry, but
if anything, had been increased. This was partly due to new
projects, for example in the southern North Sea; information
technology; and the introduction of new safety training standards.
Continued increases in the training bUdget were predicted. In spite
of this, the interviewee still regarded the Centre as facing an
"uphill battle", as some line managers view training as a panacea,
and others do not appreciate their responsibility with regard to
training, not least in feeding information back to the training
centre. As a result they tend not to brief individuals before they
commence training, or give the individual enough scope afterwards.
Company B was descibed as carrying out a "phenomenal amount"
of training in the past, but was now cutting back. However training
was available for all employees. Virtually all of the 'personal
development I type training is car r ied out in-house, while technical
training is to a large extent external. Training is carried out to
suit the organisation's needs, but a more thorough analysis of those
needs now takes place.
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Company C carries out "qu i t e ex t ens i ve " training, with
particular emphasis on supervisory training. Over a two year
period, supervisors will receive at least twelve and a half days.
Staff in lower grades receive on average two days per annum, others
eight days. Approximately 50% of training is carried out in-house.
On the whole the company recruits experienced personnel, but trains
staff in areas where there are shortages, eg data processing and
petroleum engineers. The training budqe t is approximately 2.5% of
the total manpower budget, but this figure was considered an
underestimate as it did not include the manhours involved in
in-house training.
In Company D, the amount of training carried out peaked in
1983-4 (during preparation for production) and since then there has
been a steady stream of refresher training. Efforts are made to try
and anticipate training needs before a problem arises. Once a
training budget has been set, the company gives priority to needs,
taking into account individual weaknesses, and potential career
development. The motivational aspect of training was considered
important: it was thought that employees' perception of their value,
and job satisfaction could be helped by the company encouraging
them.
Company E explained that because of its size (small) there was
something of a tendency to attract personnel from other companies.
However training was still required to familiarise them with E I S
procedures. The majority of training is carried out in-house. The
training budget had been cut in the industry slump, but at the time
of interview was estimated to represent almost 2% of the salaries
and benefits bUdget.
The interviewee in Company F described the emphasis placed on
the development of the individual as paternalism. For example the
company was moving into career counselling. Each autumn a training
needs analysis is carried out, whereupon a training bUdget is
allocated and a plan drawn up. All management and supervisory
training is carried out in-house, and the company brings in a number
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of external speakers. In some areas, training is 'company
specific', again due to the need to train people in company
procedures. Despite a very positive attitude to training, and the
active role played by the training department, the company still
tended to buy in experienced personnel. However, efforts were being
made to change this.
Approximately 3% of the manpower budget is spent on training.
In the recession, training is reviewed more frequently, but there
has been little change. The interviewees nevertheless felt that it
was difficult to convince line management of the need for training
during the recession.
The volume of training undertaken, and the resources devoted
to it in all the participating companies, underline the paternalist
nature of the companies' attitudes towards their employees which was
revealed in other ways, for example by their emphasis on the
'offshore family' and in their attitudes to unionisation.
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Summary
All the companies agreed that the North Sea created a unique
environment within which industrial relations were conducted. It
was thought that the need for harmonious industrial relations was
heightened offshore, as the workforce lived and worked together for
two weeks at a time. However to some extent the geographical
isolation of the workforce was considered by respondents to be an
advantage in that a 'team' or 'family' spirit was created and
fostered on offshore installations. This 'team building' aspect
negated the need for structured trade union organisation.
The 'popular' view of British trade unions as too powerful,
disruptive, and politically motivated appears to have contributed to
the development of the industrial relations system in the industry.
This is not altogether surprising given that the industry became
established in the period immediately after the Donovan Commission
had published its report (1968), the Commission itself having been
set up in part as a result of growing concern regarding the
frequency and effect of strikes. Not only did companies wi s h to
avoid trade union involvement, it appears from the respondents'
comments that many of those recruited to work offshore sought to
avoid unions, and escape restrictive practices experienced in their
workplace onshore.
The reputation of the industry for being vehemently anti-union
stems from the largely American drilling and service companies,
highly prevalent in the early days of the industry. Such companies
made it clear that they wanted nothing whatsoever to do with
unions. Furthermore these companies were (and are) associated with
a 'wild west', pioneering culture, portraying those who work in them
as tough, individual, 'macho' types, laughing in the face of danger.
The operators themselves have taken a more 'softly softly'
approach, developing a remuneration package which they each describe
as competitive, and which by any standards is certainly generous
(3), thereby removing any financial incentives for the workforce to
organise in a union. However it is interesting to note that in four
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of the six companies offshore employees have a different
remuneration system, which does not reward individual performance in
the way that those onshore are rewarded, conjuring up the suggestion
of a division along blue and white collar lines. This is possibly
due to the fact that those offshore are in control of the flow of
oil and therefore potential sources of disruption, such as salary
differentials between individual employees, must be minimised.
In addition all operators studied have ensured arrangements
exist whereby the workforce can air any grievances they may have,
and management can quickly dispell any dissatisfaction. In the case
of two of the companies this was done by ensuring that a management
representative talks to all offshore employees on every tour of
duty. The remainder of companies have developed more formal
consultative arrangements, in some instances with the remit to
discuss anything including terms and conditions, in others anything
but terms and conditions. As described by the respondents, the
consultative arrangements correspond to the specifications of
Marchington's non-union model of consultation.
The interview results indicate that the overall attitude of
the major oil companies, while pursuing a policy of resistance to
unionisation, is essentially pragmatic, and that their stance at a
given point in time is dictated by expediency. The hook-up
agreement, lack of a post construction agreement, and the operators'
involvement in the establishment of COTA and its policies (discussed
in more detail later in the thesis, especially chapter 9) all
illustrate a pragmatic approach. In particular the hook-up
agreement (OCA) and COTA illustrated the operators I propensity to
encourage trade union involvement and collective agreements, formal
or informal, to bring order and stability to an unstable situation
when the instability is working against the interests of the
operators. By sanctioning trade union involvement as opposed to
signing the agreements themselves, the operators have managed to
achieve stability, flexibility, and some control over costs.
Chapters 7 and 8 give greater insight into how this is achieved.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE CONTRACTORS AND THE OPERATORS' POLICY TOWARDS THEM
As knowledge of the exploration and production industry was
built up, it became clear that it was impossible to carry out a
comprehensive analysis of industrial relations within the oil majors
without researching attitudes to contractors, and those of managers
in the contracting sector. The research sought to investigate the
client-contractor relationship from both sides, to ascertain thereby
how the operators maintained control in circumstances where there is
a high level of contracting as part of the process of risk
shedding. Hence this chapter is concerned with the contractors'
external environment, and in particular to what extent this is
determined by the behaviour of the operating companies. Several
areas of possible influence were examined, including the rationale
behind the high level of contracting, and the degree of intervention
by the operators in contractor industrial relations.
The industrial relations experience of contractors was found
to be more complex than that of the operators: though forced to
conduct their industrial relations within constraints set by the
operators there was considerably more trade union involvement,
possibly denoting a different attitude to trade unions among
contractors, which required exploration. There was also evidence to
suggest that the operators - though themselves showing ambivalence
to trade unions - had encouraged contractors to involve trade unions
when expedient, thereby allowing the contractors to "police"
agreements while they themselves controlled the environment from a
distance. Before discussing the attitudes of the operating
companies to contractors, the sample group of contract companies is
introduced.
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Choice of Case Studies
Without exception, the operators studied used contractors
offshore for catering, drilling, construction, and some maintenance
of the platform structure, plant and instrumentation. Though only
mentioned specifically by three of the six companies (A, C and D) it
is known that all companies make use of helicopter companies to
carry personnel to and from offshore platforms (and between
platforms on a field, in some instances). The same is true for
supply vessels (which carry food, equipment, mud, cement and so on
to the platform, and scrap and waste back to shore) and standby
boats (usually converted trawlers, these stand by in a field in case
of accidents or emergency). Diving was also mentioned by only three
companies, but the understanding gained during the research is that
this is also a contracted function throughout the exploration and
production industry. Other functions mentioned were specialist
services (mud, cement, etc); supply base facilities; and
electrical/instrumentation work. In addition, some individual posts
are held by non-operator personnel, usually via a recruitment
agency. For example, Company B mentioned that its deck crew was
made up of contract labour, and though some companies employ their
own crane drivers, others contract.
It was not feasible in the time available to survey all
contract industries and it was therefore decided to concentrate on
the two most labour-intensive sectors, catering and
construction/hook-up. As in the operating companies, data were
gathered by means of face-to-face interviews, one in each company.
Appendix B shows the sUbject areas covered in the interview. Four
companies were interviewed in each sector, and the secretary of each
of the trade associations, the Catering Offshore Traders Association
(COTA) and the Offshore Contractors Council (OCC).
Originally the size of each company was taken as given in the
NESDA (North East Scotland Development Agency) Directory, a
directory of local businesses (particularly oil and oil related
companies) which is produced annually. The tlESDA classifications,
based on number of employees, are:
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Small - 1-25 persons
Medium - 26-100 persons
Large - 101-500 persons
Very Large - over 500 persons
Accordingly three of the four catering companies were
designated large, and one medium. In total there are nine catering
companies, eight large and one medium. The group of companies from
which the construction sample was selected totalled seven. There
are many more companies listed as construction or hook-up, but
because the industrial relations system changes significantly on
completion of hook-up (ie during the maintenance phase) the list was
narrowed down to include only those companies which included
construction, hook-up, and maintenance work among their main
activi ties. In the construction/hook-up sector, two of the
companies were large, and two very large. Managers in one medium
and one large company declined to be interviewed.
As will be demonstrated, the size of the company as given in
the NESDA Directory can be misleading. Since the work of these
companies is allocated to them by the operators on a contract basis,
the workload of the contractors is prone to fluctuation. The
research revealed that this leads to corresponding fluctuations in
the size of the workforce.
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CATERING
To call these companies Wcaterers W is something of a misnomer
as the service they provide is much more extensive. A more accurate
description would be housekeeping, as in addition to providing food
they are responsible for cleaning, laundry and the shop on a
platform (the shop stocks sweets, toiletries, perfumes, sweatshirts,
jumpers, stationery, etc). With the exception of one or two
drilling companies, all catering/housekeeping services are
contracted out to companies like those in the sample, P, Q, Rand
S. Three of the four companies were members of COTA, and the fourth
was a former member.
Company P was at one time one of the biggest caterers in the
North Sea, but one consequence of the contract nature of work is
that the ranking of companies can be altered drastically over time.
Hence, it is now designated medium by NESDA. It does not have an
agreement with a union at the present time though it had a
recognition agreement with the TGWU in the late 1970s. This expired
as a result of the loss of the contracts on which the members were
employed (agreements, where they apply, cover only those employed on
a particular commercial contract). The offshore workforce numbered
approximately 150 at the time of interview (1987), compared with the
company's peak employment figure of 700. There are 12
administrative staff. Company P was one of the four Wfront men w in
COTA following its formation, ie it negotiated with the unions, TGWU
and NUS. The interviewee in Company P was the Personnel Director.
Company Q was one of the largest caterers in the North Sea,
claiming that until two years before it had been the largest. Its
position slipped slightly when two hook-Up contracts came to an
end. Like Company P, Q at one time had had recognition agreements
with the 'I'GWU. These covered employees on two platforms, but lapsed
when these contracts were lost to another company (1986) in the
circumstances discussed in Chapter 9. The offshore workforce
numbered 200, from a peak of between 400 - 500, and there are ten
administrative staff. Company Q is one of the companies wnich
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participates in the wage talks with the TGWU, and has been since
these talks first took place (1978). The interviewee in this
company was the Personnel and Administration Manager, and the
Managing Director was contacted by telephone, with regard to the
origins of COTA, as was the company's Industrial Relations manager.
Company R is probably the leading caterer in the North Sea at
the moment, though this has not always been the case since the
workload of this company is prone to fluctuation, like that of
others. It is descr ibed by NESDA as large. Both the TGWU and the
NUS are recognised by Company R for the purposes of negotiation.
These negotiations exclude wage rates (as this is the subject of
talks between COTA and the unions) but can cover any other topic.
Furthermore, agreements which result from discussions with the
unions are unwritten (ie informal), and to some extent are based on
custom and practice. The level of membership on platforms for which
R holds the catering contract varies significantly from 80% to 10%.
(The number of R personnel on board varies f r om ten to 40, giving
figures of 20 to 80 when including those on leave.) The workforce
of Company R had virtually doubled in size over three years, and
the total stood at approximately 700 offshore, working on 19
contracts. In Aberdeen there are 20 administrative staff. Like
Company Q, R was at the forefront of the original COTA talks, and
this is still the case. The interviewee in this case was the
Personnel Director, negotiator for the company with the unions,
based in the Strathclyde area but in the Aberdeen office regularly.
Company S did not give figures for the size of its workforce
but it is referred to as large by NESDA. However, it was known that
it had only one production contract at the time of interview (1986),
covering two platforms in the Northern sector. (7his contract was
lost in 1988.) In addition, Company S also has work on diving
support vessels (DSVs) and drilling rigs. It is therefore difficult
to gauge the exact position of Company S in a ranking of catering
companies. Tnere were no current agreements with a union covering
the platform work, but the work on DSVs usually involved agreements
wi th the NUS oecause they are classed as boats. Though the exact
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size of the workforce was not given, the proportion of
administrative staff was given as 8 10 %. This company is a
former member of COTA. The Personnel Manager was the interviewee in
Company S.
The information relating
summarised in Table 3, overleaf.
to the catering companies is
CONSTRUCTION/HOOK-UP
These companies are engaged in construction-related activities
on offshore platforms. The workforce they employ includes the full
range of skills associated with the construction of oil and chemical
plant, eg welders, fitters, riggers and scaffolders. As indicated
in Chapter 2, a platform is only partially built onshore, the
various sections being assembled, or "mated", at sea. Assembly of
first generation platforms took place in the platform's final
position, but changes in design and technology have enabled more
recent platforms to be assembled inshore, and towed out to their
production site. Nevertheless, there is still a significant amount
of work remaining to be done before production can begin. This is
the "hook-up" phase, as described in Chapter 2. Once production has
begun, the work of these companies is classified as "maintenance".
Contracts for maintenance work are put out to tender on a regular
basis, as in the catering sector, and hence the size of each
company's workforce will vary significantly over time. Companies K,
Land M are members of the OCC (see chapter 5).
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Company K, described by NESDA as very large, is one of the two
major contractors in this line of work in the Northern sector. It
is a member of the Oil and Chemical Plant Constructors Association
(OCPCA) and the OCC, and as such is party to the Offshore
Construction Agreement (OCA) and Offshore Construction (Services)
Agreement (OCSA). During hook-up work there is a formal recognition
relationship between the company and the unions which have signed
the OCA (AEU, EETPU, GMB). Outwith the hook-up phase, no such
formal recognition exists, but there is a dialogue with appropriate
union officers on an informal basis. Permanent head office
(administrative) staff number 35, and is supplemented when necessary
by using the company I s own employment agency. The offshore
workforce numbered about 1,200. In the past this figure had been as
low as 250, and as high as 2,300. The company maintains a
computerised register of labour on which there are over 5,000
people. The interviewee was the Manpower Services Manager.
Company L, also very large, is part of a group of companies
with interests in many oil-related areas, as well as non-oil related
industry. Again, outwith the hook-up phase there is no official
relationship with the trade unions, but an informal dialogue is
maintained. It was also pointed out by this company that some of
their employees could be working on a hook-up project, but not be
covered by the OCA, eg if they are working in a support function
role, such as that of safety officer. The offshore workforce
numbers about 600 at present (two years ago it was less than 200),
and administrative staff, ten, in addition to engineers, based
onshore. The job title of the interviewee in Company L was Labour
Manager.
Company L': works alongside a sister company providing
personnel, supplies and technical expertise for projects managed by
its sister company. Though personnel are employed by Company 1-1,
they are generally known offshore as employees of the sister
company. The relationship between Company [1 and the unions is on
the same basis as that between the union and companies K and L -
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formalised during the hook-up phase, informal but ongoing at other
times. At the end of August 1987, the offshore workforce employed
by Company M numbered 1,705. In the past it had been as high as
3,500, and at the beginning of 1987 was less than 200. The
interviewee was the Industr ial Relations and Saf ety Manager,
employed by the sister company but working in Company M.
Company N, described by NESDA as large, is not a member of the
acc. The aCA was acknowledged where appropriate, but outside of
this it appears that this company's relationship with the unions has
a very low profile in the organisation, if it exists at all - "we
occasionally talk to them". (In fact the interviewee queried the
purpose and necessity of investigating the issue of trade union
recognition during the interview.) The offshore workforce numbered
350, from a peak in 1987 of 450. In addition there are 30
management and administration staff.
The information given is summarised in Table 4.
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CLIENTS, CONTRACTORS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
The relationship between client and contractor is a
particularly difficult area to investigate and evaluate for a number
of reasons. Firstly, this is a very sensitive area as far as the
client (in this case the operator) is concerned, for reasons which
will be explained more fully below, but which can be summarised as
the desire on the client I s part to tread the thin line between
retaining control and delegation of responsibility. The problems in
gathering data which result from this sensitivity on the operators'
part are compounded by the fact that the quantity under discussion
cannot be measured empirically, and was sometimes difficult to gauge
exactly what was meant by phrases such as "we monitor industrial
relations".
Secondly, some generalisation in the discussion will
inevitably occur, as the operators' conduct will differ from one to
another. The operators were not asked which contractors they used,
nor the contractors aSked which operators they were working for, as
it was felt that asking for this kind of sensitive information might
inhibit responses given. Quite often, however, this information was
volunteered and in any case was available from other sources if
necessary.
The contracting out of those functions for which requirements
will fluctuate is not unusual. For example, the drilling function
fluctuates considerably, being much more predominant during the
exploration phase, and immediately prior to production. It is now
commonplace for production wells to be drilled by a rig or drillship
through a drilling template on the seabed, while the platform itself
is being constructed onshore and floated out to its final position.
Once production begins, the drilling function, though still vitally
important, is much reduced, being confined to the production
platform and conducted by drilling company employees under operator
supervision. The operator may simultaneously be conducting
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exploratory drilling elsewhere. The amount of exploratory drilling
taking place will be directly related to the economic climate
prevalent in the industry. Hence the drilling companies were some
of the first to feel the effects of the oil price crash in 1986.
Other contractor functions, for which requirements are more
stable, were investigated, eg secur i ty and cater ing. Onshore, all
the operators used contractors for security and cleaning, and four
of the six for catering (companies D and E did not have canteen
facilities). When asked why these stable (ie non fluctuating)
functions were not performed by operator personnel, company F
explained that these are not an i nt.eq r a I part of the oil business;
and company B explained they contract out these functions because
they do not want to be involved in them. Company D said contracting
was "economically effective" because a cleaning company, for
example, would be more likely than itself to invest in up to date
machinery, since that is its chosen area of expertise.
Such comments are even more pertinent when applied to the use
of contracted helicopters, supply vessels and standby boats.
Helicopters and vessels are expensive pieces of equipment, reqUiring
highly skilled specialist personnel to crew and maintain them, as
are drilling rigs. By allocating transport and drilling functions
to contractors, the operators gain several advantages: a specialised
service provided by experts, which is therefore more cost effective;
they are free to invest capital in exploration and other projects as
opposed to investing it in expensive transport facilities, or
drilling rigs; they do not have to develop expertise in these areas,
and therefore attract and retain specialist crews; the operators can
maintain control without responsibility for eqUipment or workforce;
and, most important of all, they can control costs by means of the
competitive bid system.
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Contracts are put out to tender on a regular basis (see next
chapter) and therefore companies providing these services are in
constant competition with each other. When the oil industry was
expanding rapidly in the early-mid '70s, it was a 'seller's market'
because there was more than enough work to go around. The potential
rewards for operators, with oil at more than $30 per barrel, meant
that contract price became an almost secondary consideration, since
each day's delay was a day's revenue lost. Inevitably new companies
sprang up to seek work from the operators, intensifying the
competi tion. As the rate of expansion slowed considerably at the
turn of the decade, contractors found themselves competing for a now
virtually static volume, whatever the service they provided. When,
in early 19b6, the oil price plummeted, r e a ch i nq a low of $3 per
bar rel, contract pr ices assumed unprecedented importance, and were
driven down further by intense competition between contractors,
undercutting each other in attempts to survive the downturn in the
oil industry's fortunes. Hence, there was evidence of drilling
companies hiring out rigs at a loss, simply to make a contribution
to fixed costs (1).
For certain types of contract work, however, there was not
such a straightforward explanation. Draughting is by tradition an
area where high levels of self employed and/or agency personnel are
found, and given the high incidence of project work in the oil
industry (development of a field up to the point of production) it
is understandable that this is indeed the case. With regard to
clerical and administrative work, the use of temporary labour has
traditionally taken place on an ad hoc basis, to cover peaks in the
workload, or holidays or sick leave. In the operating companies,
the numbers involved on a fttemporaryft basis, and the length of time
for which these individuals are deployed, suggest a different
rationale for their utilisation. Recruitin; an individual from an
agency may be a convenient way for the operator to have someone
serve a ftprobationaryft period. Yet, numerous examples exist of
individuals classed as r.temps" or "agency" out whose service can be
counted in terms of years as opposed to we e ks or nont.h s , In one
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operating company (not in the sample), for example, an individual
worked as WagencyW for six years before being taken on as staff.
This, together with the conduct of the operators in the wake of the
price collapse, suggests that it is deliberate policy to maintain an
abnormally high level of RtemporaryW labour, and that this group of
workers serves as a wbuffer w around the more secure core group. For
example, one company studied divested itself of almost 150 temporary
clerical staff as the recession started to bite; another imposed an
immediate freeze on recruitment, so even "temps" who had proved
their worth to the company had to remain on temporary status. A
third company (not studied) jettisoned virtually all agency
personnel.
Since these interviews were carried out, trade union sources
have claimed that the practice of recruiting agency personnel as
production operators (offshore) has grown. Of the examples cited,
only one company was in the sample group studied (A). It is known
that on one field operated by this company, "agency workers are now
being used to replace (A's) employees when posts become vacant", and
another field "came on stream in 198(*), usi~g a combination of (A)
and agency staff" (2). Thus "(security) of employment for (A) staff
is reinforced ••• by the buffer of agency workers who will be the
first to be dismissed when shutdown approaches." (3)
Whatever the explanations, it is clear that the operators
consider functions to be 'core' or 'peripheral'. Application of
Atkinson's core-periphery diagram to the oil industry (see figure 5
in chapter 3) extends the debate as to the model's validity. A
variety of employment relationships exist on the periphery, but
those on the periphery are carrying out work for the Jil companies
and are influenced by them. The model is therefore a valid
descriptive device, illustrating the way in which the oil companies
organise their business and thereby their employment. Statistically
there appears to be some evidence that the peripheral sector acts as
a Duffer zone, protecting those in the core when the business faces
adverse conditions, such as those which followed the oil price fall
in 1986.
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Grampian Regional Council noted that,
"Al t houqn a few [operators) made redundancies in 1986, their
total employment actually increased by 300 over the year.
They have therefore escaped the serious retrenchment seen in
several other sectors w.(4)
Maintenance of Control
There was considerable involvement of the management
industrial relations function in the allocation and monitoring of
contracts. Two companies, D and E, said they "vetted" contractors.
Company D (American) said that they are not supposed to intervene at
all in a contractor's business because of the anti-trust legislation
in the USA. In practice, some efforts are made to "try and
harmonise some conditions of sub-contractors with our own, but
inevitably there are differences •••• If (the company) has had a
contractor for a long time, these employees have much expertise and
value to the company", because of their thorough knowledge of the
platform, and its operating procedures. Management in company E
must be able to justify their decision if a contract is awarded to a
company whose bid is not the cheapest. In the early days, company E
looked at curricula vitarum of contractors' personnel, the training
record of the company, and the terms and conditions paid by the
contractor. Now arrangements are well established.
The company said that they exercise indirect influence over
contractors by looking at their terms and conditions during the
tender ing process. According to this company, they r..ould normally
say to a sitting contractor wwe will accept an increase in
(contract) rates in the order of, for example, 6%. It is up to the
contractor to decide how that is divided." However, it was added
that the company may offer "informal" advice if asked. The
Industrial Relations department of company A requests a thorough
breakdown from contractors of any trade union agreements, terms and
conditions, wages, fringe benefits, and holidays. '::'he interviewee,
Senior Personnel Officer, said that to some extent this had been the
case for about five years, but there was now more emphasis.
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Hence the department's influence is increasing, and its input
positively sought. It was explained that this interest in
contractors was good industrial relations practice; it is no good to
the company if its contractors are unhappy. The involvement of the
department in this area is accepted as valid by other departments.
However it was stressed that a firm line was drawn with regard to
contractors' industrial relations: company A seeks to monitor, not
influence.
Companies Band F were similar in that vetting and monitoring
of contractors by those with responsibility for industrial relations
was increasing. In the past, company F had no systematic monitoring
process with regard to industrial relations, only taking an interest
when something looked amiss. Now the process is more systematic;
all contracts with "ma j o r person us e " are vetted by the Personnel
department. An example given was that of an instrumentation
maintenance contract. A company bid according to the terms of the
SJIB post construction agreement, believing the work to be done fell
within the scope of this agreement and it therefore applied.
Company F thought it did not apply, and the issue had to be resolved
with the contractor concerned. Companies are vetted during the
final bid analysis stage, when the head of personnel will request
the terms and conditions of employment. This company also pointed
out that most of the major contractors are well established, have
better, more professional departments, and ftknow the ropes ft•
LIke F, Company B has seen the input and i nf luence of the
personnel department grow in the area of contractors comparatively
recently. In the past, the per sonnel department of Company B has
practised a fthands offft approach, though they sometimes heard
informally what contractors were paying. The interviewee believed
that his department should be more involved with the selection of
contractors within Company S, but not with the contractors
themselves, as this would make the operators the target for trade
union attention. It was his belief that the company should be mor e
sophisticated in assessing contractors with regard to the terms and
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conditions they are offering. At the time of the interview
(February 1986) the company only received (as it requested) the most
basic information in this area, whereas the interviewee expressed a
desire to see a more detailed breakdown including holidays, sick
pay, etc. It was likely, he added, that management changes would
allow movement in this direction.
Company C said that the personnel department can give an
opinion on contract allocation, but that in fact this rarely happens
because only about four major contractors have been used since
production commenced. If a new contractor were to be brought in,
then the department would probably get involved within Company C,
but it has not in the past. The interviewee also pointed out that
if you get involved in running your contractor's business then you
must take responsibility for any problems or difficulties.
Companies A and B believed that they made less use of
contractors than some other companies, but this is likely to change,
and they "will go along the same road", (Company A), as "in the
current climate contracting saves a lot of money".
Contractors' Morale, and Operator Employees
The importance of the "family atmosphere" or "team spirit" on
an offshore platform was stressed time and again by the operators,
as an explanation for the harmonious industrial relations
environment Which prevails. On one occasion it was suggested that
in the offshore situation, this bond was so strong that an
individual's first loyalty was to the platform, and then to the
company by which he was employed. However, press coverage of
industrial unrest offshore suggested that not all family members
were happy with their circumstances. For example, the Press and
Journal, 4th February 1986, carried an article relating to a strike
ballot to be held covering offshore construction workers (6), and
the same newspaper four months later referred to a "row" between the
TGWU and a catering company (7).
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Company F agreed that it was conceivable that poor morale
among contractors could rub off on its own employees. Two
companies, A and E, said that there had been occasional "sympathetic
noises· for contractors' employees from their own people, but that
was the full extent of transfer of poor morale from one group to
another. The four remaining interviewees expressed personal concern
regarding the plight of contractors' employees. This centred around
the reduction in contract rates, caused by a slowing in the rate of
expansion of the industry, following the initial boom period (which
ended around 1981-2). This meant that contractors - particularly
those involved in construction and hook-up work - were chasing fewer
contracts. As a result competition between them was intensified,
and contractors were undercutting each other in an effort to win
hook up contracts, aijd retain maintenance contracts. In the labour
intensive areas, such as catering and construction/hook up work,
this inevitably created a downward pressure on wage rates, (though
wages of construction workers on hook up projects were and are
protected by the OCA - see Chapter 5). Undoubtedly the situation
was exacerbated by the price fall in 1986, but it is important to
note that the contractors were already facing problems.
Despite this concern, Company B said that it was a "buyer I s
market", and therefore contract selection was done on a commercial
basis. Company F said that though the climate was giving concern
with regard to industrial relations offshore, companies had to be
more cost conscious. However, the interviewee added that while
people will accept a standstill in wages, "managers must be mad if
they expect people to accept the cuts reported by unions". Company
F was not interested in saving pennies at the risk of problems in
the long term, and therefore it "would not screw contractors just
because other operators were". The interviewee in Company C
expressed misgivings about contractors doing the same job as C
people but being paid only half as much. It was his belief that
there should be some relativity between the two groups, but if he
suggested this then he would be out of line with his own
management. The operators had created the problem by paying their
own people too much. Contractors faced a choice, he said, between
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laying people off, or retaining contracts at cheaper rates dictated
by the market. This, the interviewee continued, created a di lemma
for trades unions; should they protect wages or jobs? The "two
tier" system was creating problems, but a post construction
agreement was not the answer, as fixing the rates would be
problematic. If set during a boom period, they would be artifically
high, and, conversely, if set in a harsher climate they could be
artifically low.
Likewise, Companies E and D said they had no wi s h to see
contractors reduce wage rates. Company D suggested that more work
needed to be done in this area, as contracting on this level was a
US phenomenon, alien to British industrial culture. Some
contractors on D's platform were going through a wage freeze, while
D's employees were receiving rises on average of 6%. This he
identified as a potential area of conflict, but added that they
(operators and contractors) are working in different marketplaces.
Company B, though it does not want to see substandard rates paid by
contractors, does not want. to tell contractors what to pay. The
problem is finding a middle course. A post construction agreement
would not make commercial sense. However, two interviewees said
that they believed their companies should nevertheless consider a
minimum rate. The impression gained was that were such a suggestion
put forward within their companies, it would not find favour with
their superiors.
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Summary
The main impetus behind the high level of contracting is
commercial considerations. The oil companies do not wish to develop
expertise in catering, or invest huge sums in helicopter and supply
ship transport. Contracting is deemed to be more efficient as the
contract companies can achieve economies of scale. The 'boom'
nature of the exploration and production industry encourages the
rapid growth in number of contract companies, and the operators can
control costs by maintaining constant competition amongst the
contractors. The high use of agency or temporary labour in stable,
key functions ( eq production operators) as well as in more
traditional areas such as clerical work, suggests that the operators
have encouraged the growth of a peripheral, or buffer, group. This
is supported by employment figures in the industry (see chapter 3)
which show that on the whole the operators have not experienced the
retrenchment of other sectors.
While devolving responsibility for certain functions to
contractors, the operators seek to maintain control in the
industrial relations sphere. The industrial relations function
within the operating companies has a high profile in the selection
of contractors, and monitoring of existing contracts, though it
should be borne in mind that in the harsh economic climate of recent
years it is difficult in some companies to argue against the
cheapest bid. Despite the fact that they claim to seek to monitor,
as opposed to influence, contractors' industrial relations
(simultaneously shedding responsibility and avoiding trade union
attention) the operators require details of contractors' terms and
conditions and industrial relations record, including existing trade
union agreements. On the whole, unionisation or non-unionisation of
contractors is not a criterion for selection. However, as will be
shown, the operators exercise a major influence on whether or not a
contractor is unionised.
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The drop in wage rates for contractors I employees, observed
prior to but highlighted by the 1986 price fall, is causing some
concern in the operating companies. Interviewees were aware that
there were potential problems of unrest, and attracting and
retaining skilled personnel in the 'two tier' system, and that they
had to some extent created them by paying their own people so well.
However the operating companies do not see a post construction
(maintenance) agreement as providing a viable solution, though two
interviewees thought there was some merit in considering a minimum
rate, a view which was not consistent with company policy. Despite
these concerns, the inherent tensions in the system can be
contained, partly because of the prevailing economic circumstances
in the industry, and partly because of the lack of suitable
alternative employment for contractors' employees elsewhere.
However, if the predicted upturn in onshore construction work takes
place, the operators will have to address these problems and seek
solutions.
In the next chapter, the two most labour intensive contractor
sectors are examined, catering and construction/hook up, giving an
insight into the contractor side of the relationship.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE CONTRACTORS' PERSPECTIVE
Introduction
In order to fully under stand the industr ial relations system
in the industry it was necessary to investigate both sides of the
relationship between clients and contractors. Literally hundreds of
service companies have established themselves in the wake of the
operators in a variety of disciplines. These include transport
companies (helicopter, supply boat and standby vessels); drilling;
catering; construction, hook-up and maintenance; diving; project
management; instrumentation and supply bases. Time and resources
were limited and therefore attention was confined to the two most
labour intensive groups, catering and construction/hook-up. There
were two main reasons for choosing these sectors. Firstly, the fact
that they were labour intensive suggested that these sectors would
best illustrate the industrial relations implications of operator
behaviour, particularly the practice of allocating work by
competitive tender, which by this stage was suspected of playing a
major role in shaping the industrial relations system and the
relationships within it. The second reason was purely practical;
the researcher already had access to the appropriate trade union
officers, and had begun attending the COTA wage talks. This being
the case, it was comparatively easy to establish contacts within the
contract companies (though some companies still refused to
participate).
Since the research concerned the power relationships between
clients and contractors as well as those between employers and
employees, the investigation centred on possible areas of
uncertainty, dependence and control. Interviews in the contractor
companies covered five specific areas; namely the preparation of
tenders; contract length (relevant to the level of security enjoyed
by individual firms); monitoring of contracts by the operating
companies (to determine contractors' discretion); the nature of
employment contracts, and remuneration levels (g i ving some insight
into the level of security enjoyed by the workforce); trade union
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recognition; and the general commercial environment, including the
impact of recession (to determine how far the pattern of industrial
relations and its inter-relationships could withstand economic
shocks). These data, which complement the previous chapter, offer
further insights into how the operating companies can devolve
responsibility without incurring unacceptable levels of
vUlnerability. As will be shown, a key element in sustaining stable
relationships is selective application of collective agreements.
This feature is introduced in this chapter, but demonstrated more
clearly, using a case study from the industry, in chapter 9.
Preparation of Tenders
The different types of commercial contracts, lump sum, cost
plus, fixed term, and job and finish, were explained in chapter 2.
By investigating how the competitive tendering system worked in
practice, it was possible to ascertain the implications for
industrial relations, and also to shed more light on the shifting
power relationships.
In the construction/hook up group, all four companies, K, L, M
and N, agreed that the length of time taken to prepare a bid can
vary considerably, because each job is unique. Company K estimated
the time as "about; a month, though some are longer, some shorter ft.
Likewise Company N suggested three weeks to one month. Company L
did not specify a time, but stressed that fteach bid (was) different,
because all jobs are different ft• According to Company M, 10-14 days
was a "qu i t e common" time to spend on preparing a bid, but added
that if it was a small tender, the company may have only one week's
notice to prepare a response. At the opposite end of the spectrum,
the same company revealed that a ft lump sum" bid can take two to
three months to prepare, that this preparation can cost fthundreds of
thousands of pounds.", and ft therefore (we) can't afford to miss too
many b i d s "; The figure given by Company K for preparation of a
major hook-Up bid was £200-250,000. The same interviewee estimated
ft labour on Ly " contracts as costing £50,000 to prepare. Company N
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did not give a figure, as the manager thought "figures (are) not
useful because thay vary so much from job to job". Company L also
stressed the var iety, but revealed the last unsuccessful bid cost
~66,000 to prepare.
Whatever the exact figures, their magnitude is such that
unsuccessful bids can be a considerable drain on managerial and
financial resources. Thus the companies were asked to give the
proportion of bids which are successful; three of the four did so.
Companies K and 11 appeared to be enjoying the highest degree of
success, the former stating that 'probably one in two bids is
successful" • Company M said that on hook-up contracts they were
"very successful virtually 50/50 with (K)". With regard to
maintenance contracts, it was suggested by M that between themselves
and K they held about two thirds of contracts. In addition, M had
been successful with "lots of smaller jobs with which (K) are not
involved". Company N was not enjoying the same success rate,
estimating one in six bids as being successful.
Interviewees were also asked to assess the input or influence
of the operating companies at this stage, for example whether they
gave any indication of the price they were looking for, or the
wages, terms and conditions they would expect contractors to give
their employees. According to Company L, their "business system
doesn't change, it is the perception of what the oil company wants,
and therefore (L has) a 'skeleton' tender". Client visits are
encouraged by this interviewee, who felt that the operators
understood the pressures on contractors. In addition, he said that
the "more 'regular' companies are more organised and forward looking
with regard to IR". Company N stated simply that operator influence
was mostly "hands off", though one or two operators did exert a
"back door" inf luence. Companies K and M went into more depth on
this subject. The former made the important point that "the bid
system is the major influence" on industrial relations. More
specifically, the interviewee explained that "the 'majors' normally
specify terms and conditions to be pa i d on a hook-Up project", ie
Offshore Construction Agreement (or Southern Waters Agreement)
rates, as outlined in chapters 2 and 5.
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However, post-construction or maintenance tenders give no such
guidance. This explanation was also given by Company K. Company L
went on to explain that this lack of guidance "tends to be
interpreted as 'cheap as you can'". This results in a free for
all. It is especially difficult for the sitting contractor (as K
often is) because their "rate becomes the 'benchmark I under which
all others scrabble to get". The interviewee in Company M explained
that "different clients work different ways. One company goes round
the contractors and 'prequalifies' looks at their financial
affairs, and references from other clients. Another looks at terms
and conditions - if they are too low, they won I t get on the bid
list. Price is now critical." These comments are indicative of the
pressure put on contractors looking for work.
All four catering companies, P, Q, Rand S, were of the view
that the time taken to prepare a bid varies according to its
nature. For example, Company P said that the tender sent by the
potential client may be six questions on a sheet, whereas a bid
relating to a large company could take two to three weeks to
prepare, "probably five days non-stop activity - it requires a lot
of information, and several people". For Company Q the time taken
"depends on the time available and the nature of the tender. It
might be highly specif ic, (asking about) past exper ience; history;
menus; CVs. We have a pool of staff and can 'man up' in about two
weeks. The bulk of the cost in preparing a bid is manpower." The
interviewee from Company R estimated the usual time as about four
weeks, but added that "it depends on whether it is a new contract or
if (R) already hold it". This interviewee also gave a fairly
detailed description of how the bid system works in practice.
The operator concerned "sends a tender document to catering
companies, normally restricting the bid list [those invited to
submit a bid] to three or four companies [out of 11]. Prior to this
there may be a pre-tender enquiry which looks at the caterer's
industrial relations record, safety, reputation and trade union
involvement. The tender document, which is likely to be about 60
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pages in length and quite detailed, goes to the legal department of
(R's) parent company. If the tender refers to a new platform, then
(R) will make a site visit (ie offshore) to review facilities. From
the requirements outlined in the tender document, and a review of
the facilities, R calculates a Man Day Rate [MDR the cost of
feeding a man for a day 1. Every reply [to a tender document 1 is
personalised and different, as they are marketing the Company. They
are about 150 pages in length."
There was some contrast to be found between R's response and
that of Company S; "with computerisation etc preparation of bids is
really a cosmetic job, though the time taken depends on the nature
of the bid". The interviewee quoted examples; firstly that of a
tender relating to a semi-submersible drilling rig, immediate start,
of three months duration, and containing standard questions. Such a
bid, he said, could be ready in 24 hours. A bid for a platform,
however, could take a week to prepare.
Only one company gave any estimate of the cost of preparing a
bid, suggesting that since two people were employed solely for this
purpose (bid preparation) the cost could be put at a minimum of
£1000 per enquiry.
Company S was alone in thinking that the operating companies
had no influence at the bid preparation stage. The remaining
companies each stated that the operators gave no indication as to
the pr ice they were looking for. However, interviewee P said that
"major operators will indicate the hourly rate and offshore
allowance [to be paid J, for example, the COTA rate. This will be
spelt out. Sometimes other items will be included, eg travel
payments. If an operator indicates they want it included, it
appears in the bid. Otherwise it won't, and the employee won't get
it". Company Q said that while some operators just want a price,
others "give a tender document to be completed on the operator's
notepaper. (Though they) give no indication of price, over the last
year they have tended to look at the lowest. Some indicate the
wages, terms and conditions they expect to see (Q) pay. These are
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the most likely to have an escalator clause (1). This can lead to
difficulties within COTA; those caterers whose business is 100% with
such operators ••••••••••• will not have to bear the cost of wage
increases. For the others, the caterers will have to foot the bill. w
The interviewee from Company R explained that the tender
document contains wa screening questionnaire, (which) looks into
company structure; company directors; labour force; recruitment
policy; length of service of senior managers; and trade union
agreements". He went on to say that though in theory there should
be an advantage if (R) is the sitting contractor, "difficulties
arise because the people we talk to may not be the decision makers -
they may not even have been on the platform." Some operators do ask
about wages, terms and conditions, others do not. Some will
indicate the level of manning required, others leave it to the
discretion of the caterer.
The catering companies, like the construction group, were
enjoying mixed success. Interviewee P thought it "difficult to sayw
what proportion of bids were accepted, but admitted that the last 12
bids had been unsuccessful. In the previous 12 months Company Q had
won two contracts, retained six, lost four, and had submitted six
unsuccessful bids.
Summary
The above gives an indication of the financial, managerial and
time resources which are committed to preparing tenders.
Unsuccessful bids incur significant costs which must be recouped
from future contracts. Furthermore, it can be seen that the oil
companies exercise a major influence in contractor industrial
relations, in particular over terms and conditions. This is done by
stipulating when collective agreements should be applied, suggesting
that such agreements are viewed as a means of achieving stability in
potentially volatile circumstances.
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Contract Length
Contract length was an appropriate topic to investigate as the
length of contracts held by a company has a direct impact on the
level of security it enjoys, and hence on stability. For example,
there is more immediate uncertainty in a company holding five
contracts for one year each, than in a company with one contract
lasting five years.
Hook-up contracts held by the construction/hook up companies,
because they relate to 'one-off' projects, are on a 'job and finish'
basis, and can vary considerably in length. As Company K explained,
they can be six to eight weeks, 15 months or longer. It was clear
from the responses that post-construction (ie maintenance) contracts
vary in length and, more important, that there have been changes in
practice as the industry has matured. Company N considered the norm
for contract length to be one year minimum: some are of two years'
duration. The interviewee added that he had heard of three year
contracts, but this was not the norm. No other interviewee
mentioned three year contracts. The three remaining companies
specifically mentioned one year contracts with a 12 month option (ie
at the end of the year the contract can 'roll on I for another 12
months if the operator so wishes), and two years with a 12 month
option. K and M agreed that in maintenance the tendency now is to
go for two year contracts, plus option. Both commented that at one
stage it was normal practice to put contracts up for renewal every
year. Company M explained that not only was this practice costly,
it was also "Lnef r i c t ent , because of the learning cu r ve " ( i e it
would take new contractors some time to familiarise themselves with
the platform's layout, processes and procedures). This interviewee
also commented that WUS companies like to bid fairly often w•
Company M did not know if the recession in the industry (1986)
caused the change in contract length, but said that it had happened
at the same time. Interviewee K thought this change in practice
came about in mid 1986 and was wdefinitely related to the
recession. As rates were falling, those companies which were
commercially aware grabbed the lower rates - and can maintain them
as long as possible. w
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With regard to termination arrangements, Company L explained
that a client can terminate an individual worker's employment
contract or a complete commercial contract without notice and
without reason. The termination of a commercial contract was
unknown (this was also stated by M) but -clients do halt an
individual without reason-. This is the so-called NRB syndrome (Not
Required Back). The interviewee went on, "t.h i s leaves (L) open to
an Industrial Tribunal, because we can't make the individual
redundant. (We) need either to prove a breach of contract and fire
him, or keep him on". Company M said that termination of contract
was -threatened now and again", but was not aware of it ever
happening. However the interviewee was aware of instances where the
operator refused to take up the 12 month option on the contract.
The companies were also asked whether they held any short
term contracts (ie three months or less) and if so what proportion
of their business this represented. For Company K, short term
contracts were "an insignificant proportion in turnover terms". For
L, "short term work accounts for about 20% and seems to be
increasing-. Company ~1 has very little short term work offshore,
but about 95% of work in its onshore fabrication shop is short
term. Company N estimated its proportion of short term work as 15%.
Similarly there was a variety of responses in the catering
sector. -In the main", said Company P, "contracts are for two years
with a one year option ••••••• this has been the norm in recent
history- • Company Q indicated contracts could also be of only one
year duration with a 12 month option, or perhaps two such options.
Company R thought that "in the seventies, contracts were slightly
longer. Usually (they are) of two years' duration, but there may be
a year option. Some contracts allow for inflation lie contain
escalator clauses] others are 'fixed cost' - if the contractor makes
a mistake in the costing, they must bear the penalty." This
interviewee was also of the opinion that "the regularity of
tendering is increasing". Company S cited contracts of one or two
years with a one year option as the norm in both past and present.
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No changes had taken place in the termination arrangements,
though a variety of views were expressed. Company P said that close
reading of the contract showed that an "operator can remove a
caterer at 24 hours notice, without reason". Such an occurrence was
unknown. With regard to the expiry of a contract, interviewee Q
said that the "caterer automatically assumes the termination date.
Operators don't really give notice, the caterer will know two to
three months before expiry whether the option is to be taken up".
On the other hand interviewee R said termination was at 30 days
notice, and "very few were terminated". This is contrary to the
response given by Company P.
Two of the companies, P and S, thought the proportion of short
term work had increased. Company P explained that "because of the
restriction in the market, work is becoming seasonal - for example a
lot of flotels (2) when the weather is better •••• (short term
contracts) probably account for about 20% of business. The
proportion has increased throughout the industry, especially in the
drilling sector". Company S agreed that the "number of short term
contracts has increased in the immediate past", and claimed, "this
is a direct result of changes in practice in the oil industry".
Company Q has no short term contracts, and this has not been a large
part of their business in the past. Similarly Company R has
occasionally done short term work, but it has represented a very
small proportion. The interviewee did comment, however, that the
"industry tends to be cyclical and the pecking order changes. You
can only count on the contracts you have". In other words, the
ranking of the catering companies in the market changes over time as
each gains and loses contracts.
Summary
Though a variety of views were given, it appears that the
optimum length for contracts in both sectors is two years, possibly
with a twelve month option. The evidence suggests that the two year
period is favoured because it allows the operators to maintain
productivity which would be lost during the learning curve of an
incoming contractor, while at the same time putting the contract out
to tender fairly frequently.
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On the whole there has not been an increase in the proportion
of short term contracts, though the drilling sector, facing extreme
hardships, has shown some tendency t.owa r d s short term contracts.
The fact that clients can terminate either the entire contract or
particular individuals' participation in it, illustrates the
influence of the operators in the affairs of the contractor, in
particular, over the contractor's workforce.
Monitoring by Operators
The means by which the clients maintain control is central to
the thesis, and was investigated during the research from both the
client and contractor perspectives. In the experience of two
construction companies, K and N, the operating companies only take a
close interest in industrial relations if there is a problem
affecting the overall operation. At the other extreme, Company L
stated that industrial relations were "very closely monitored by the
operators" who "require a report on any incident." Company M
thought that it varies; with some clients the interviewee was not
even aware who the individual responsible for industrial relations
was, whereas with other operators there was very close contact, on a
day to day basis. For example, the client may go into M and check
survival course certificates (a prerequisite for offshore work),
medicals, and sit in on induction courses.
In addition to these comments by the participating companies
it should be noted that the operators are free to audit the payroll
of the contractors at any time to ensure, for instance, that the
elements the operator has agreed to pay with regard to wages, travel
payments, survival certificates and so on, have been passed on to
the workers concerned. Three of the four companies, L, M and N,
stated that operators inquire about labour turnover, Company M
adding that it is very difficult for them to say what this is.
Company K said that clients did not ask about labour turnover.
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According to Company N, there
industrial relations by the operators.
said that some operators do interfere.
the operators do not exactly interfere,
of pressure on to get things resolved,
contractor) towards a solution R•
was no interference in
Companies Land M, however,
Company K said that while
Rthey do put a fair amount
but they don't direct (the
All companies agreed that working within parameters set by the
operators posed difficulties. The biggest problem for Company N is
that there is no direct supervision by N present on the platform.
To counter this, N insists on having an individual from the company
at the heliport for the departure and arrival of employees. This
serves an administrative function (such as the collection of
timesheets) but also represents a point of contact for the
workforce. There were similarities in the view expressed by the
interviewee in Company L, who illustrated the potential difficulties
with the following example. At the time of interview Company L had
safety officers working on a hook-up project. They wore client
safety hats; wrote reports on client paper which the interviewee was
not allowed to see; took instructions from the client; but the
interviewee was left to handle any problems. Within maintenance,
said Company K, there are difficulties. Labour turnover is fairly
high, Rand made worse because clients ask, for example, for a man
for one trip, or a welder for two to three days "; Company H said
that Ragain it varies from client to client (but) there are always
difficulties working in other people's facilities, on or offshore R•
Some clients, for example, "q i ve crew change times at the last
minute - and (M) have to rely on the operators for (helicopter)
seats and beds R• Furthermore, the clients Rreserve the right to say
they don't want an individual on the p La t f o r m'", Indeed the OIM
(Offshore Installation Manager) does have considerable powers,
equivalent to those of a ship's captain.
It would appear at first sight that with regard to industrial
relations at least in the catering companies, the operators ke ep
their distance. According to Company P, the operators "don ' t want
to know unless there is a problem, then they will become involved R•
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This was reiterated by Company R: "hygiene and food are monitored
weekly if not daily, but not industrial relations. (The operators)
only become involved if there is a problem ••••• (R) is expected to
keep the operator informed of developments within COTA etc ••••• There
is no interference but operators reserve the right to reject anyone
[NRB l." Company S thought that "the operators monitor but don't
interfere - they would expect to be kept informed." The interviewee
from Company Q said that "the operators keep a close liaison with
their own personnel offshore, especially the OIM. (Q has) a close
working relationship with its own employees, (the interviewee) sees
them personally at least once a month ••••• the only time there was
industrial relations contact from the operators was when it was
rumoured that travel warrants were to be stopped", (these rumours
had led to rumblings of unrest).
However, Company P thought that "the operators control
everything", and likened the annual negotiations between COTA and
the unions (3) to "a puppet show". The interviewee explained: "in
terms of rates of pay and standardisation the operators are in
complete control. In the operating company it seems the Employee
Relations manager gets a signal from Finance of what percentage
increase in budget will be tolerated ••••• Also internal operator
affairs, and lines of authority mean the catering company spokesman
is in fact isolated from the decision maker." This latter point is
one which was made earlier by Company R. Furthermore, interviewee P
gave an example to illustrate his point. In the early 1980s, when
the interviewee was leading the employers' side at the annual wage
talks, he was interrupted by a telephone call while in the process
of presenting an offer. This call was "from the operators giving
instructions on what the actual offer was to be". The interviewee
added: "However .... the operators have made a conscious decision to
maintain a lower profile in the last few years because they felt
exposed and in danger of being directly approached by the trade
union movement .••••The difficulties faced by trade unions in
organising are an 'ace' for the employers".
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Only one company, R, said that the operators ask about labour
turnover, and then only at the pre-tender stage, not during the run
of the contract. The three remaining companies stipulated that the
operators were "not interested in" (p) or "never asked about" (Q and
S) labour turnover. This contrasts with the responses of the
construction companies, and is perhaps surprising given that the
high labour turnover was one of the reasons for establishing COTA.
Two companies, Q and S, felt that working within parameters
set by the operators did not give rise to any difficulties for those
responsible for industrial relations. Interviewee P thought there
were difficulties, "but this is all part and parcel of working in a
competitive arena". Company R explained that the "whole company is
geared to contract type work, therefore the offshore industry is not
unusual ••••• Different companies ask for different things (you)
need to know the contract and how the operators work."
Summary
It would appear from the above that operator influence is less
direct than initially anticipated. In the main the operators keep
themselves informed through their own personnel, and maintain an
open door to contractors by a system of ad hoc auditing.
Furthermore, it seems that the operators maintain an informal line
of communication with those in the contractors responsible for
industrial relations.
Employment Contracts and Remuneration
By this stage in the research, the existence of core and
peripheral groups was well established (see chapter 3). However,
more information was required on what this meant for industrial
relations in general, and for the security of those on the periphery.
The recession has undoubtedly had an impact on the levels of
remuneration enjoyed by workers in the construction/hook up
companies. Company N stated simply that "some have dropped ••••• The
marketplace has changed - any company makes it its business to find
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out what its competitors pay". According to Company L, some rates
have been more affected than others. For example, while there have
been definite reductions for welders, pipefitters etc, and slight
reductions for some technicians, there has been a slight increase in
some areas such as commissioning. It rests on supply and demand
which is "very dependent on the operators". This interviewee went
on to say that although some operators go for the cheapest bid, he
"manages to convince (others) that this will lead to problems
attracting and retaining skilled wor ke r s , and thereby (manages) to
hold rates".
Company K explained that those rates covered by national
agreements (ie the OCA during hook-up and SJIB Electrical Post
Construction Agreement during production) have "remained constant,
although the rate of increase has been behind the rate of
inflation". However, maintenance and post production rates have
fallen as individuals move from one contract to another. The
interviewee admitted that there "have been occasions when the
company has gone to a crew as the sitting contractor, and explained
that the company needs to cut rates to get work". The workforce is
now resigned to the situation, and there is an air of reality (which
the interviewee said was more likely desperation). The comment was
also made that the men work more overtime on maintenance than
hook-up, and this boosts their earnings.
Company M'S response was a little confusing. The interviewee
said that M has had to cut rates, especially when workers moved from
hook-up to maintenance. This is standard practice throughout the
industry as has been discussed earlier (see Chapter 2) and is not a
result of the recession. The interviewee went on to say that if it
is a lengthy maintenance contract, • the guys usually accept the
reduction". On one platform the contract in question was to be only
three months; the "guys didn't ~ant it - (it was) their option to be
made redundant". "Wage rates", he continued, "have remained static
and have therefore been reduced in real terms." In 1986 they lost
one contract on which they were about to cut rates. Furthermore,
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maintenance "rates are being cut in that new bids are being based on
a lower rate". Thus although an individual would not have the
monetary terms of his eXisting contract changed, new contracts could
contain a lower rate than previously enjoyed.
In all the contracting companies, the issue of types of
employment contracts provoked some interesting and illuminating
responses. In the construction sector, outside the application of
the OCA, contracts are on an individual basis between employer
(contractor) and employee, with the exception of the electricians I
SJIB agreement. Moreover, an individual worker I s employment
contract is project specific, ie it applies to work on a given
project. As individuals move from one project to another, or if the
sitting contractor successfully rebids for a contract, then the
workers will be issued with new contracts. The implications for
continuity of service were discussed, and all companies stated
service was deemed to be continuous, depending on the break between
jobs. Thus on the face of it, continuity of employment is protected
and workers can accumulate the necessary two years service to
qualify for redundancy payments, unfair dismissal rights and so on.
However, as interviewee K explained, the "workforce does tend to
move from one contractor to another and therefore there is a break
in service ••••• Generally speaking - there are lots of caveats - if a
sitting contractor loses the contract, the successful company would
keep the workforce on. This happens in the majority of cases. This
is what the clients prefer because they like to maintain the same
crew" •
With regard to the type of employment contract, it had been
suspected that perhaps the contractors would use fixed term
employment contracts or some other device, such as agency contracts,
because the work is regularly put out to tender and therefore cannot
be considered to be truly long term. ?his was not the case. In all
four construction companies open-ended contracts were issued, though
Company L pointed out that they have a different set of terms and
conditions for the "one trip man", known as "job and finish".
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As far as possible the companies appeared to strive to achieve
commonali ty in the elements of the remuneration package across the
company but in reality individual contracts reflect the terms of the
contract between client and contractor. None of the companies has a
pension scheme, and by and large paid holidays do not exist (4)
though Company L pointed out that it does "have some contracts where
paid holidays are awarded. Again it is down to what will attract
the client". Grievance and disciplinary procedures are the same in
all contracts within a company. Hence, though rates of pay may
vary, "basic terms and conditions are the same" (Companies Land
N). Apart from wage rates, it is in the 'fringe' areas that
contracts differ most. For example, some contracts will allow for
payment between Aberdeen and the individual's home on a radius basis
(fixed sum according to distance), for the issue of a travel
warrant, or may not pay transport at all.
With regard to the impact of the recession in the industry on
pay increases in the catering sector, three companies, P, Q, and R
talked of a wage freeze, as indeed was the case. The last pay award
for catering workers had been July 1985. A further increase in July
1986 would have been expected, but a freeze was agreed from then
until January 1987. This issue remained unresolved at the time of
interviewing (July to September 1987). Hence Company Q explained
there had been "a wage freeze for 14 months". Company P admitted
that "in real terms, (we) could have dropped 20% on the package over
the last two to three years travel; overtime [paid at straight
time as opposed to time and a half]; medicals [making employees pay
for their own]; and payment while safety training". It should be
noted that Company P paid the same wage rate and offshore allowance
as all other COTA companies; differences occur in the other terms
and conditions which were listed by the interviewee. Undoubtedly
interviewee R was correct in his statement that the catering
companies had "suffered over the last two years", but it would be
misleading to blame the extended pay freeze solely on the
recession. As Company R explained, the catering "companies (were)
under pressure because of (the Griffin affair)", which will be
discussed in chapter 9.
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Three of the four companies, again P, Q, and R, stipulated
that everyone in their employ was employed on the same basis, ie
open ended, 'permanent' contracts, as opposed to agency or fixed
term contracts. Company Q, however, said that fixed term contracts
had "been looked at". Company R made pertinent comment as to the
impact of the competitive tendering system on the pattern of
employment. For example, it was pointed out that catering "stewards
may work five years on a platform and have three employers ••••• If
(R) takes over a contract (it) will perhaps take on the incumbent
stewards, but fill promoted posts with (R) personnel." Presumably
this practice owes much to the fact that "the operators like
continuity, they don't like the movement of people between
platforms" (R).
This company also holds an employment agency licence, and has
done for 12 years. The explanation given for this was that when the
company started, it "provided labour, and needed the licence because
this was outwith catering (in other words) an individual was
working for someone else, outwith the control of (Q)". In some
instances, labour of this nature is tied into the catering contract
- for example, under the job title 'handy man/steward' - whereas
other operators require separate contracts to cover this.
Company P revealed that it had formerly had a uniform set of
contracts, covering the four standard grades (steward, leading
steward, baker and chef) but now have a variety of contracts, and
therefore a variety of terms and conditions, "reflecting the
contents of the tender package". Consequently, though hourly rates
and offshore allowance are standardised, fringe benefits differ.
The interviewee added that the company realised that in theory this
may provide grounds for being taken to an industrial tribunal; he
recognised that the package has been eroded, but said, "what do you
do •••• it is the only way to stay viable •••• the workforce have a very
good grasp of the situation."
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Summary
Though on the face of things employment in the contractors has
a conventional basis in that open ended employment contracts are
issued and employment is deemed to be continuous between commercial
contracts, it is apparent that those on the periphery still
experience considerable uncertainty. This manifests itself in two
ways. Firstly, in practice employment is frequently not continuous
since employers often move from platform to platform as commercial
contracts are won and lost, leaving their employees behind, possibly
to work on the same installation for a different contractor, and for
different rates. Secondly, staying with the same employer may
itself involve a reduction in terms and conditions as work begins on
a new commercial contract. In addition, the fringe areas of the
employment contract are subject to considerable variation,
reflecting the contents of the tender package or, more bluntly, the
elements for which the client is prepared to pay.
Trade Union Recognition
It was known that both contracting sectors had an employers
organisation which negotiated with trade unions. These were the
Offshore Contractors Council in the construction/hook up sector, of
which three of the sample group were members, and COTA in the
catering sector. Again three of the sample were members. However,
this did not offer any insight into the attitudes of the individual
companies to trade unions, nor of the 'grass roots' involvement, if
any, of unions in day to day industrial relations.
Outside the application of the OCA, there was no formal trade
union recognition in the construction companies. In fact, Company M
pointed out that though it is usual for "a hook-up to be done under
the OCA, this is not 100%". Company N, the interviewee claimed,
"was under no pressure from any operators to utilise a trade union
agreement. In some contracts in the past, operators specified the
OCA. That is illegal today". Presumably the last comment refers to
the provisions of the 1982 Employment Act, which
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Rmade discrimination against non-union fiLms in the making or
awarding of contracts illegal R(5) • Companies K, Land M, however,
maintain an informal relationship with appropriate unions (mainly
AEU, EETPU, and Boilermakers). Company N Roccasionally talks to
themR• None of the companies had formal consultative arrangements,
though Company K holds regular safety meetings. Company N stated
Rcontracts are on an individual basis, and therefore discussions are
on an individual basis R• For other companies, who gave a distinctly
less hawkish impression than N, the most favoured explanation for
the lack of consultative arrangements is the difficulty and expense
of setting such arrangements in place, given that the workforce is
scattered between the platforms of the North Sea, and is essentially
mobile. The interviewee in Company K added that Rthe company finds,
even on a hook-up, that the workforce don't tend to appoint shop
stewards, because [physical} conditions have vastly improved, and
they know they won't get any more money out of an agreement.
Discipline is fairly well structured and (K) have invested in
supervision and training. R Two of the four companies mentioned that
they had 'check off' arrangements for payment of union dues; Company
K on one contract only, and Company L, on Rs ome contracts R•
In chapter 4 it was reported that there is evidence of
agreements being unilaterally terminated by at least one contractor
as "t.h e remuneration and conditions of service in (the) agreement
(were) restricting the ability of the company to negotiate new
contracts in the extremely competitive environment brought about by
the current national recession R(6). However, none of the companies
interviewed had cancelled agreements, and no indication was given as
to company-level agreements having previously existed.
Comments made by companies K, L, and M were particularly
revealing, expressing concisely the influence of the operating
companies in this area. Company L said that as it was a member of
the OCPCA it was party to the OCA and OCSA, but added, Rthe
operation of these agreements is down to the operator: if the
operator says we will work to an agreement, we will work to it R.
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The interviewee from Company M stated quite simply, ~there is no way
(you) can enter a union agreement because other companies will
simply undercut you "; Client influence was described by Company K
as ~on a scale of one to ten ll:~. More specifically, the
interviewee went on to say that ~on an individual basis, no company
can steer its own course. They are bound by the bid situation.
Collectively, the OCPCA won't move without consult ing the clients'
association (UKOOA). We need a stronger bunch of contractors, and a
stronger bunch of unions, to be mutually supportive. There are no
cartels, but this is the major cry of the clients when the
contractors talk about national agreements.~
Only one of the catering companies, R, recognised and
negotiated with the TGWU and NUS at the time of interviewing. Two
companies, P and S, were party to agreements with the NUS relating
to Diving Support Vessels (DSV's), because these are classed as
boats, and one company, Q, had no official recognition agreements,
but acknowledged it had union members amongst its workforce. This
has not always been the situation: recognition arrangements have
changed over the years as contracts have been won and lost. In the
case of company P, it had negotiated with the TGWU from 1978
onwards, but now has no members (membership dropped in 1982 when P
lost three platforms in one contract). Similarly the TGWU had
recognition rights on two platforms held by Company Q, and
negotiated on such matters as terms and conditions, and discipline.
This arrangement lapsed in 1986 when the contract was lost. Company
Q was one of the companies at the forefront of the original COTA
talks in 1979, as were companies P and R. Company P is no longer
directly represented at talks with the TGWU, but Companies P and Q
were heavily involved in the talks discussed in the following
chapter. It was emphasised by the interviewee at Company Q that
~the companies can't negotiate as COTA because five or six companies
do not have recognition agreements ••••• the companies negotiate
individually •••• four elected companies go forward and the others
agree [gentlemen's agreement] to fall in line~.
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Company R's agreements are not in writing, but rest on custom
and practice. The company I s relationship wi th the TGWU dates back
to about 1978. As the interviewee put it, it is a case of
"(sitting) down with the TGWU and shop stewards and (discussing)
anything except wages, as these are covered in COTA" • Though this
is the most highly unionised company in the sample, if not the
entire catering sector, membership levels vary between platforms,
from 80% to 10%. Crew size (ie catering staff) varies from 10 to 40
on a platform which, doubled up to include the relief crew, gives
figures of 20 to 80. Company 5 said the company was not really
anti-union, it "just felt better off without trade union
involvement". As stated above, work done on D5Vs usually involves
agreements with the NUS: "(5) must accept such agreements or forego
the business. (But we) have handled them successfully". The
interviewee added that the downturn of the two previous years had
kept trade union activity to a minimum.
None of the three companies without agreements covering
platforms (P, Q, and 5) had formal consultative arrangements.
Interviewee P thought that "at the end of the day it breeds a trade
union. Also, it would be very costly because the workforce is
scattered". Company 5 "simply (listens) and (tries) to solve
problems in-house as soon as they occur". To this end the camp
bosses (those in charge of the catering crew) "are de-briefed as
they return from a trip".
Little comment was made with regard to operator influence in
this area. Company P said simply that "discussions tend to be on an
operator and individual caterer basis". Company R said that
appropriate trade union officers "can raise matters with UKOOA [ie
at the IUOOe-Liaison Panel meetings held quarterly] who ,Jill contact
(R) and ask what is going on". It will be demonstrated in the
following chapter, however, that operator influence is far more
significant than suggested by the comments just given, and it will
be shown that the statement "on paper, they refuse to say they will
only accept eOTA bids" (Company R) is far more important than it
first appears.
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Summary
It can be seen that day to day relationships between
contractors and unions are informal, where they exist at all.
Furthermore, the comments of the interviewees, particularly in the
construction/hook up sector, suggest that the contractors'
prerogati ve in this area is curtailed by the operating companies.
Chapters 9 and 10 discuss client influence over industrial relations
in greater depth.
The Commercial Environment and Impact of Recession
The circumstances in the commercial environment changed
dramatically while the fieldwork for the thesis was underway. It
was therefore important to investigate the impact of the oil price
collapse, in order to ensure that the data gathered reflected the
ongoing industr ial relations system, and not to short term
aberrations in the wake of the price fall.
The collapse in the oil price of 1986 was an obvious scapegoat'
to which the oil companies attached blame for the problems facing
contractors, and to some degree with good reason. There was, after
all, some credence in the operators' lament of revenues reduced to a
third as the oil price fell from $30 to less than $10 per barrel.
In terms of industrial relations, however, it was suspected that the
recession was at most a catalytic, as opposed to causal, factor in
contractors' difficulties.
When asked if competition had increased during the recession
two construction companies, M and N, said yes, K and L, no. Company
N said simply competition was "more fierce", and company M explained
that "competit ion has got worse because larger companies are now
bidding for work they previously would not have". The interviewee
in Company L thought competition had always been fierce though "the
recession seems to have forced companies to be more aware ••••• it has
been stabilised by the operators they look closely at (your)
tender and question on it; [for example] 'how can you do this with
x% mark up?'" Again the most revealing comment came from Company K;
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"competition has always been cut throat. Up until two years ago it
was because there were always new companies entering the market (by
cutting the price) and thereafter, because of declining work and
more companies. The recession has been the 'cherry on top', a focus
for the media to jump on. Clients are quite glad of it in some ways
- a chance to clear dead wood."
Company L thought that industrial relations had not been
adversely affected, though there were difficulties because clients
may instruct them to reduce manning levels. However it was felt
that "people are more approachable and willing to listen".
Similarly, interviewee M said the "recession has not manifested
itself in strikes, but a more realistic attitude - (the workforce)
realise it is better to accept £1 an hour less than be on the
dole". Nevertheless the interviewee admitted that industrial
relations was one aspect to worry about with regard to cutting
rates, the other being the problem of retaining skilled personnel.
This latter comment was reiterated by Company K; "it is probably too
early to call it a significant trend, but certain clients have
started to make noises with regard to diminishing returns from cost
cutting provisions. It's the old 'pay peanuts get monkeys'
syndrome". In Company N, the recession has "had an effect on the
level of remuneration employees can expect, but not on relations
with employees. (The workforce has) not received increases in
recent years - (there have been) some decreases".
While operator intervention had not increased during the
recession, all the construction companies made some comment on their
conduct. In the case of Company L, the interviewee believed "the
operators have probably distanced themselves as opposed to
intervening more 'it's your problem'". Companies M and N
indicated that the "operators are taking more interest in costs" (M)
and that "the price predominates •.•• (it) has always been a
significant factor, but has not always dominated" (N). Company K
thought that "though clients are no Qore likely ~o go for the
cheapest bid, this is still the norm. But we think we are detecting
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a trend regarding the quality of the workforce ••••• The companies are
very commercially aware extremely strategic. The EPC is
indicative that they keep an eye on industrial relations. As far as
I am aware, no tender goes out without the clearance of the Employee
Relations department, and it is involved in evaluating the bid
returned, with regard to the adequacy of the wage rate." The third
company to cite the problem of attracting and retaining sufficiently
skilled personnel was N:
"Things started off with a bang; large numbers were wanted at
short notice, and a lot of money was paid to attract them from
the Clyde and the Tyne •••••••Their skills do not now command
the levels of earnings they were getting, but they wouldn't
get it elsewhere. There has been some levelling out. (Rates
have) dropped to the level where they are insufficient to
attract the necessary skills because of the temporary nature
of the work."
Company L thought that in the immediate future industrial
relations would continue to improve, as it has done during the
recession. Interviewee M simply hoped ·offshore will be quite
stable, but you can't predict in industrial relations". It was
suggested by Company K that there would probably be another year of
the status quo. The biggest single factor would be the projected
increase in land based construction activities, which would make
offshore labour slightly scarcer. The workforce would be organised
on onshore projects, it was explained, and will draw comparisons
between the organisation onshore, and the free-for-all offshore.
"Once they have earned some money, they may have more stomach for
the fight •••••• therefore (we) need to be prepared for a slight
upturn in trade unionism, assuming a stable oil price. If the price
rockets, there will be more (oil field) developments, and pressure
to use the OCA."
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The catering companies were divided on the question of whether
competition had increased during the recession, Companies Q and 5
thinking it had not. Company P thought "things have become even
more competitive", and company R that the environment "has become
much fiercer •••••• reputation, ability and experience used to be as
important as cost - this is not so now ••••• Formerly the operators
very rarely, if ever, accepted the lowest (bid). Now it is a much
colder decision. In the past, the platforrr. concerned perhaps had
the biggest say." In addition, this interviewee indicated that MDRs
(Man Day Rates) had been reduced considerably as competition had
increased.
Companies Q and 5 thought the recession had had no affect on
industrial relations, though the interviewee from the former added
that "business has •••• shrunk with the recession •••• as the operators
reduced POB, so the catering crew was reduced". Company P was of
the opposite view that "industrial relations have been
affected ••••• the recession has added an air of uncertainty which was
previously absent ••••• (resulting in) insecurity, which leads to
unhappiness ••••• and less militancy". Company R thought, like Q and
5, that "industrial relations have not really been affected by the
recession". The interviewee put this down to the fact that R "has
picked up contracts". He also thought that R would have "the most
vociferous shop stewards ••• because: (a) they are sheltered, because
of the relative success of (R), and (b) most (R) shop stewards have
long service, and their employment is comparatively secure. (R)
people are more demanding. They have tried to push up other terms
and conditions when no increase was forthcoming."
With regard to industrial relations, all four companies were
in agreement that operator intervention had not increased. Company
P, however, explained that "the operators slowly came to understand
that their profile was too high, as they were being approached
directly by the trade unions". Though operator intervention in
industrial relations had not increased, Company R thought
intervention in operations had. "The operators", he added, "were
probably less concerned [with industrial relations] because they
were aware of the employment and competition situation."
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Only one company, Q, thought there would not be much change in
industrial relations in the future, but added, -the time is right to
start talking about an increase•••••• I can see a change or movement
in pay next year- (ie 1988). Company S thought that, -everyone will
be more tolerant and live in peace more because they realise that
the good days are over-. More specifically, Company P thought that
in the future, -there may be an increased tendency to contract
labour ••••• but I'm not sure, or I don't think, the operators would
allow it because it might appear that the caterers are not in full
control of the wor k t orce ", Given that at the time of interviewing
the issue of a pay increase for catering workers remained
unresolved, it is understandable that Company R, being at the
forefront of negotiations, should address its comments to the
immediate future, and this issue in particular: -the next 6 months
may be difficult •••• I don't think COTA will agree an increase until
July 1988 and therefore (the union officer) will have problems. The
(R) shop stewards will be barking in his ear. If they take action,
it will be in the company where the union has most strength, ie
(R). (The officer) knows that an increase could result in a lost
contract, because we could not compete; also the industrial
relations waves might work against (R), which (would lead to) lost
members. A few smaller operators would not go lie place work] with
(R) because of a dispute •••••• All operators ask about the strike
record, onshore as welL ••• The construction industry is worse, they
go into much more records.-
Summary
There is little evidence on which to conclude that the oil
price collapse of 1986 has brought about significant changes in the
industrial relations system, but it has served to highlight or
exaggerate certain features of it, for example, the importance of
price in winning tenders. However, there was some indication in the
construction sector that this emphasis, and the pressure it exerts
on remuneration levels, was resulting in problems in retaining
skilled personnel.
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Concluding Summary
Bid preparation absorbs considerable managerial and financial
resources; anything up to three months and £250,000 in the
construction sector. Though operators differ, in general it can be
said that during hook-up work they dictate terms and conditions by
stipulating the OCA will apply, thereby removing the terms and
conditions of the contractors' employees from the competitive arena,
but give no such guidance in contracts relating to work outwith the
hook-up phase.
In the catering sector the operators give no guidance as to
the contract price they are seeking. However, major operators do,
as a rule, indicate the hourly rate and offshore allowance to be
paid, ie the tender document stipulates that COTA rates will apply.
Some contracts will contain escalator clauses, others will not, and
this can cause problems within COTA.
The length of hook-up contracts var ies greatly, as each is
unique. With regard to maintenance work, the norm for contract
length is two years with a 12 month option, a comparatively recent
innovation identifiable since 1986. At first sight this might
suggest a link with the recession in the oil industry, but given
that only one company of the four linked the two events, this is not
a viable conclusion. No change has occurred in termination
arrangements. Short term contracts appear to form a significant
proportion of work in only one company, L.
The norm with regard to catering contract length is two years
with a 12 month option, though one year contracts with a similar
option are fairly common. Two of the companies felt the proportion
of short term work had increased.
From the responses given a number of features of the
client/contractor relationship in the area of industrial relations
are evident. Though two of the companies s t.o pped short of calling
the operators' conduct interference, it is nevertheless clear that
considerable influence is at work on the contractors: by the nature
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of the competitive tendering system; by operator stipulation as to
when collective agreements will apply; operator audits; the client's
ability to terminate the contract without notice or reason; and by
reserving the right to refuse to have certain individuals on the
platform. The competitive tendering method of allocating work
allows the clients to exercise over-riding influence in industrial
relations before a contract has even been allocated. Thereafter
close and systematic monitoring by the operators has a relatively
low profile, unless problems occur.
Monitoring of industrial relations by the operators appears to
have become more distant over the years, with operators relying to a
large extent on their own personnel to keep them informed. However
if a problem occurs the operator will become involved. In addition,
the operators expect to be - and are - kept informed of the progress
of wage talks and other COTA and OCC matters. Despite this apparent
distance, one interviewee considered the operators to Wcontrol
everything w •
Three of the four catering companies stated that all employees
had open-ended, 'permanent' employment contracts. However, one
company had looked at issuing fixed term contracts, and another
admitted that the fringe areas of employment contracts differed,
reflecting the contents of the tender. The latter interviewee also
thought that one possible industrial relations development might be
an increased tendency to contract labour. These comments suggest
that the conventional employment pattern is under threat, certainly
in those companies which have declined in business in the last few
years. This change did not occur in 1986 as a result of the oil
price collapse, but is a direct result of the environment created by
the competitive tendering system. This system results in
considerable fluctuations in workload, and therefore workforce
size. In these circumstances companies operating under this system
have sought to develop patterns of employment which will facilitate
their ability to compete.
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The pattern of union recognition is constantly changing in the
catering sector as contracts are gained and lost by the individual
companies. catering workers on DSVs tend to oe covered by NUS
agreements, as such vessels are classed as ships. At the time of
interviewing, only one company negotiated with a trade union (TGWU)
with respect to employees engaged on platforms. Two other companies
had done so in the past. No formal consultative arrangements
existed within the catering sector.
It appears that the recession has not wrought monumental
changes in industrial relations. Indications are that at most the
recession has sharpened price competition in allocating contracts.
The cutting of rates has not been confined to the post price fall
period: the price collapse simply exaggerated the outcome of
features which were already present, in particular the competitive
tendering system, and the fierce rivalry it creates.
These findings have a significant bearing on the institutional
aspect of industrial relations since, thouyh technically free to
negotiate and enter into agreements at either company or national
level, the confines of the bid system effectively curtail this
freedom. The operators, who are not party to existing agreements,
decide whether or not they shall apply, and if so, when they cease
to apply, as discussed in chapter 4. By refusing to accept bids
based on an agreement, the operators can render that agreement
useless, as has been the case with the OCSA, a national agreement
signed in 1986 but never used, an agreement drawn up without the
sanction of UKOOA.
The evidence indicates that the structure of commercial and
employment contracts, and the pattern of collective agreements, has
evolved to such a degree of flexibility that they can withstand the
shocks and traumas of recession without requiring the operating
companies to rethink or reorganise their industrial relations
policies and means of control. This flexibility allows the
operators to maintain an industrial relations stance of maximum
pragmatism.
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CHAPTER NINE
A CASE STUDY IN CLIENT INFLUENCE
Nowhere is the relationship between operator and contractor
more clearly demonstrated than in the example of the Catering
Offshore Trade Association (COTA). In this chapter a brief
background to the establishment of COTA will be given, followed by
an account of a very real threat to COTA' s continued existence,
which occurred during the fieldwork. This event, and its
repercussions, illustrate the subtleties of the constantly changing
power relationship between client and contractor companies.
In the boom period of the mid to late seventies, the catering
companies were engaged in fierce competition with each other in
order to obtain (and retain) offshore contracts and this had a
downward influence on wage levels of workers employed in the
catering industry. Being labour intensive organizations, the
catering companies cut wage rates as a means to undercutting their
rivals' bids. As a result, levels of turnover amongst these workers
were extremely high - Buchan's research revealed turnover figures of
150 and 300% per annum (1) - which had an adverse affect on the
quality of service provided by the catering companies; for example
the calibre of cater ing staff was often unacceptable. It was said
by interviewees that the catering companies were virtually
recruiting people from the streets to fulfil their commitments.
Had this been the case onshore it would have been, at most, an
inconvenient irritation for the operators. Offshore, however, the
importance of catering standards assumes unprecedented proportions.
For workers who are isolated from family and friends for two weeks
at a time, and for whom leisure activities are limited, mealtimes
are the highlight of the day, not to mention a major cause of
grievance if they do not come up to expectations. In addition, the
catering companies are responsible for the housekeeping functions
offshore, such as cleaning, laundry and bedding. Thus problems
which occurred with the catering workforce had direct repercussions
on the operators' personnel, with the result those problems came
quickly to the attention of the operators involved.
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In an effort to impose stability, the operators put pressure
on the catering companies to devise a collective means to resolve
the situation, and in 1978 COTA was established. For their part the
operating companies, through their organisation UKOOA, agreed not to
accept any bids from non-COTA companies. It is important to note
that there was no agreement of any kind in writing; the relationship
existed in honour only.
One of the first tasks undertaken following the formation of
COTA in 1978 was the rationalisation of the grading structure,
resulting in four grades common to all catering companies: steward;
leading steward; baker; and chef. Trade union involvement was
sanctioned, if not encouraged, by the operators and it was agreed
that a minimum rate for each grade would be established. The rates
were initially set by the operators, though this has not been made
public. COTA did not (and does not now) negotiate with the TGWU as
a body (NUS involvement has diminished over the years) since only
some of the caterers had agreements with the union, and if the
others sat down at a negotiating table with the unions this could be
construed, it was believed, as recognition. Consequently, talks
with the unions were conducted by those companies (initially four in
number) with the majority of union membership, and this is still the
case, though the make-up of the COTA delegation has varied over time
as a result of peaks and troughs in the catering companies'
businesses. For example, if a company has an agreement with the
TGWU pertaining to a contract which the company fails to renew, then
the agreement lapses. The wage rate agreed at these talks is known
as the 'COTA rate' but it should be stressed that it is strictly
informal, and at no time has it been set down in writing. The whole
ar rangement is based on a "gentlemen's agreement", whereby those
companies not present at the negotiations agree to abide by the
bargain struck at the table. They nevertheless have a significant
influence on negotiations as COTA meet prior to the talks to
establish the limit to which the 'delegate' companies may commit
them. ::'he' COTA rate' is, in effect, a safety net for cater ing
employees, a minimum wage removing their earnings from the
competitive environment and on which individual companies may
improve (at least in theory).
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The unions (TGWU and NUS) were relatively well organised in
the major caterers of the era, because of the problems cited above,
and by 1979 they were sufficiently organised to undertake industrial
action. The unions sent a massive wage claim to all catering
companies, regardless of whether there was an existing agreement or
not. While pointing out he could not be sure of the exact figure,
one manager suggested it was in the order of 300%. It should be
noted that catering employees were very much the 'poor relations' in
the North Sea at the time, not only in terms of wages, but also in
status. COTA responded with what has since been described as "a
very substantial offer" by a trade union officer, estimated to be of
the order of 22%. This was rejected by the workforce and a s t r i ke
ensued. Though the strike was patchy in its affect on platforms and
drilling rigs, due to the uneven distribution of union membership
between the catering companies, those worst affected were the
largest caterers in the North Sea at the time. Consequently, the
majority of operating companies were hit by the stoppage, which
crumbled after about 20 days.
The manager interviewed in Company P, heavily involved at the
time, made the following pertinent comments. First, the mood of the
workforce was such that they were determined to have a str ike and
nothing would have averted it: they were confident they could
actually stop oil production and viewed this as an opportuni ty to
recoup their losses (in wages and status) of previous years.
Secondly, the operators were heavily involved, partly because COTA
was formed at their request, but also because there was perceived to
be a comparative lack of industrial relations expertise amongst COTA
members. As mentioned earlier, the majority of union members were
organised in four catering companies, and between them these
companies covered all the major operators. Those companies affected
sought guidance from the operating fraternity via the Liaison Panel
of the EPC. They were in a dilemma: "if they negotiated with the
unions and conceded a large increase it would make them
uncompetitive in the market place, unless it was sanctioned by the
operators and thereby passed on to all caterers."(2)
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The strike eventually fell apart, the union spokesmen returned
to the negotiating table, and a settlement was reached applicable to
all COTA members. Thus COTA had passed through the first real test
of its unity, no doubt spurred on by the interests of the operators
in keeping COTA together.
Until June 1986 the arrangements went as planned, with the
desired results. Then it was announced that an operator had
accepted a bid from Griffin Catering for a two year housekeeping
contract on their platforms which was based on wage rates which were
in essence £2000 per annum below the COTA rate. For some time it
appeared that the first casualty of the slump in the oil industry
was going to be the COTA agreement, or even COTA itself. The TGWU
could not stand by and see wage rates cut, and the official
concerned began a campaign to publicise the workers' case. He
claimed in the local press (3) that Griffin had cut the wages of
workers by at least £2000 a year and that the company had broken an
agreement with fellow members of COTA. In the same article the
chairman of COTA said that complaints about Griffin had been
received from members and they were looking into the contract.
In defence of Griffin the managing director rejected the
accusations, saying that there was no agreed rate, and they had
certainly not cut the wages of their workers. There was an element
of truth in this in that since Griffin did not have any other
employees working on platforms in the northern North Sea, those on
the new contract would effectively be new employees and therefore
would not have been employed by Griffin on the COTA rate (which he
claimed did not exist) or any other rate. Thus, in reality, it was
the I rate for the job I which was cut, as opposed to any actual
salary. However, it is common in the North Sea for a company which
has gained a new contract at the expense of another to recruit at
least some of the staff laid off by the former contractor as a
result of its losing the contract. Therefore it was likely that
certain catering workers could find their income substantially
reduced.
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The attraction of the lower bid to th~ operator concerned as
the oil price slump was beginning to bite deeper was understandable,
but their decision to accept the bid in the light of past experience
of instability in the catering sector was nonetheless surprising,
not least to the rest of the industry.
COTA, fearing that this small shelter from the storms of
competition was about to be lost, willingly entered into discussions
with the TGWU, and it seemed that the objective of the two
organisations was the same. A complicating factor, however, was the
timing of the dispute, which occurred in the run up to the annual
wage talks between COTA and the TGWU, due in July 1986. As a
condition of co-operation, the shop stewards committee demanded the
immediate expulsion of Griffin from COTA. Since this required the
unanimous vote of the remaining nine COTA companies, there was a
very real danger that one or two of the more hawkish catering
companies would view the situation as an opportunity to break ranks
and follow Griffin's lead. However, Griffin was expelled from COTA,
and the organisation remained intact.
Despite having cleared this hurdle, COTA was still at risk
because several catering contracts were up for bid in the near
future. Should the operating companies concerned have followed the
lead set by the operator in question and accepted a bid from Griffin
based on rates substantially below the COTA rate - or such a bid
from any catering company - then there is little doubt that existing
arrangements would inevitably have collapsed in the harsh economic
environment. Thus all depended on the decisions of the operating
companies with contracts out to tender.
In the meantime, the shop stewards negotiating committee
offered COTA a goodwill gesture whereby the anniversary date would
be moved from July (1986) to January (1987), in effect a voluntary
wage freeze for six months. The TGWU officer concerned then
contacted the Employment Practices Committee of UKOOA, and asked
them to issue a statement to the effect that in future UKOOA
companies would not accept cater ing bids unless they were based on
the COTA rate. Such a statement was not forthcoming.
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The very existence of the COTA rate was in dispute, Griffin
still claiming that such an agreement had never existed. To thwart
any such claims in the future, COTA had drawn up a written agreement
with the TGWU which left no doubt as to the existence of such a
rate. At the eleventh hour, the COTA members refused to sign it.
The most likely explanation is that in the absence of an assurance
from UKOOA that the operating companies would accept only bids which
were based on the COTA rate, COTA members feared that they would be
placing themselves at a disadvantage to non-COTA catering companies
when competing for contracts.
While awaiting the outcome of pending contracts, the TGWU had
made clear to the operators, via the Liaison Panel of the EPC of
UKOOA, that should an operator accept a non-COTA bid, then the union
would have no alternative but to ballot its members for strike
action. The officer concerned pointed out that he was well aware
that this would not be an easy thing to organise, and that it was
not a step which he really wished to take. However, he felt - and
the shop stewards committee agreed that should other operators
follow the lead which had been set, industrial action would be the
only possible way to prevent a return to the I free for all' of
pre-COTA days.
The next three contracts which were issued were based on COTA
rates, and a fourth company allowed their catering contract to "roll
over" for a second year. Thus, at least in the short term,
stability was maintained. The immediate danger passed, attention
was focussed once again on the annual negotiations which had taken
something of a back seat during the crisis. The union officer felt
initially that a three per cent increase was a possibility, but had
canvassed the operating companies in preparation for the
negotiations, due to take place in about three months time. Of
those operators contacted, only one was not downright hostile to the
idea. Furthermore, indications from COTA spokesmen were that some
companies would walk out of COTA rather than accept an increase.
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The catering workers faced a dilemma: having survived the wage cuts
threatened by the Griffin crisis, did they gamble the future of COTA
for an increase, the maximum of which was likely to be three per
cent?
The shop stewards committee meeting called to discuss their
position revealed a wide spectrum of opinion. predictably, some
shop stewards indicated that their constituents were unwilling to
accept an extension of the wage freeze, accepted as a gesture of
good faith in the original negotiations, finding it hard to accept
that asking for a cost of living rise would break up COTA. Others
were more cautious, arguing that three per cent was not worth taking
that risk. Furthermore, if the decision to press for an increase
was to be taken, then the committee had to discuss its response to a
rejection from the employers. Several stewards claimed that the
members on their platform were quite prepared to strike in defence
of a claim but it was pointed out by others that everyone can put
their hand up - a secret ballot is a different thing. Conversely, a
new shop steward said that his members would not have anything to do
with a strike. Most, however, acknowledged that the union was not
sufficiently strong amongst the caterers and should a strike be
called it would certainly be unsuccessful.
The committee's final decision was to press for a three per
cent increase. When this was rejected by the employers, the
committee tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade them to go to
arbitration. Their case suffered a further setback when it was
learned that another major operator had allowed Griffin onto their
bid list. As it happens, the bid was not to be successful.
By August 1987 the wage claim was still unresolved. At a
meeting between representatives of COTA, and the offshore shop
stewards negotiating committee, the COTA spokesman reported the
outcome of two meetings he had attended since the last meeting of
the stewards. The first of these was between COTA representatives
and the UKOOA Subcontractors Liaison Committee, held the previous
month, and was described as confusing, rather than helpful.
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The Liaison Subcommittee felt that it was not the right time to pay
an increase; that the situation was changing constantly and was
under permanent review. The Subcommittee had added "that they were
only there to listen, it was not their role to tell COTA what to
do"(4). Though individual oil companies claimed they were not
averse to an increase being awarded, the spokesman for COTA said
that their collective stance was very different.
The second meeting was of the caterers' Association itself,
which was said to be "in disarray". Though some individual members
felt there should be an increase, they were in the minority, the
remainder being of the opinion that CO~A should not be talking about
an increase until July 1988. As a result, the spokesman explained,
they were not in a position to "put any money on the table" at this
meeting with the negotiating committee. The only "positive" move
they could make was a negative response to the claim made by the
workforce for a six per cent rise from the 1st September 1987.
The full time officer spoke for the negotiating committee,
explaining that they "were at the end of their tether •••• they could
go no further •••••members were threatening resignation" (from the
union) due to the perceived failure on the part of the union to
achieve any improvement in terms and conditions. The trade union
offshore was threatened to the extent of its survival, he said.
Thus, unless an increase was forthcoming, and pending the outcome of
the shop stewards meeting (due to take place that afternoon) the
membership would be balloted on industrial action. It was added
that if agreement was reached with individual companies, they would
be unaffected by action taken.
In reply, a COTA member said that the union would then have to
take selective action every year, because "there would be no COTA
left". The COTA spokesman explained that the smaller companies felt
the manpower bUdget was the only area they could control in order to
compete successfully with other companies, mainly because their
business was largely in drilling companies which, in turn, were
"under unbelievable pressure from the oil companies". He pointed
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out that wages comprise more than 50% of the contract price, and "if
an increase was incorporated into the price of a rebid, the company
would probably lose the contract, to be succeeded by a company with
a low level of trade union membership and 'safe' industrial
relations", not least because the nature of contracts had changed
over the previous two years in favour of I fixed price I contracts.
The belief was expressed that there were further avenues open for
exploration, but it was certain that there would be nothing on the
table before New Year. It was eventually decided that COTA should
be told that if no offer and date of implementation were forthcoming
by 4th September 1987, a ballot would be put in motion.
On 4th September, the COTA spokesman updated the shop stewards
negotiating committee. He told them that there had been a change in
COTA's stance, but there were still problems. Some member companies
still believed they should not be considering an increase until July
1988. Furthermore, though some oil companies were prepared to have
the cost of a pay award passed on to them by way of an increase in
contract price, it was revealed that two clients had already said
that the catering company would have to bear the cost of an
increase. A third COTA member then raised the matter of drilling
companies who, it was explained, would not accept an increase in
contract price. Nevertheless, COTA members realised that they
needed to change their stance and had considered the 6% claim
submitted by the workforce. COTA was prepared to consider an
increase, but from 1st January 1988 for 12 months. Though they did
not have a specific figure at hand, the spokesman could say that 6%
was too high. However, CO':'A was prepared to sit down and discuss
possibilities on the understanding that the ballot threat would be
lifted. It was also emphasised that awarding an increase may lead
to the withdrawal from COTA of some companies.
In reply the union off icer expressed disappointment that no
offer had been made, and went on to say that his members now faced a
dilemma because they had taken a stance from which it would be
difficult to withdraw, and he was not even certain they would wan':
to. The COTA spokesman thought that a "ballot arouses emotions
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•••• (and) ••• there (was) no point in having one at this stage." At
this point, the union negotiators requested a recess.
During the recess, the officer reminded the negotiating
committee that the commercial pressures on the contractors had
resulted in cuts in earnings of workers in other sectors in the
order of 25-30%. This was dismissed as "not relevant" by one of the
shop stewards. The officer then pointed out that some progress had
been made as the COTA team had said there would be an increase, and
this had been minuted. It appeared possible that those companies
contracted to drillers would not pay an increase (because it would
not be accepted by the clients), and it was acknowledged that this
would be difficult to explain to the members. Furthermore the
officer highlighted the danger of moving away from a unified (ie
COTA) rate to the establishment of two rates, one for oil majors,
the other for drilling companies. The former would find this hard
to accept. Once the ballot was under way there was no going back,
and it was not certain that the members would undertake industrial
action, despite the strength of feeling cited by some of the
stewards. He reminded them that the last strike (1979) had crumbled
within three weeks. It was decided to tell COTA that the workforce
was prepared to delay implementing a ballot until the end of
September; that they had the remainder of September to negotiate;
and the negotiating committee would be entering the negotiations
with a mandate from the members to seek a 6% increase, effective
from the 1st September. A meeting of the two sides was arranged for
later in the month.
This meeting was opened by the COTA spokesman who explained
that there were still difficulties within the Association, and there
were still some clients who, while stating they had no objection to
cOTA paying an increase, were warning that they would not fund it.
However, he continued, COTA felt that the time was right to make an
offer, which they envisaged as commencing on 1st January and lasting
12 months. Six per cent was out of the question, three to three and
a half per cent being "more acceptable". The negotiating committee
178
was told that COTA members were Wstill being reminded that people
are working for less offshore w , for example security men were
earning £2.50 per hour (£420 per trip). Taking these factors into
consideration, COTA had prepared an offer of approximately three per
cent, to be paid entirely on the offshore allowance, thereby
avoiding the 'knock-on' effects of an increase on basic rates to
overtime rates, sick pay and so on. Before the union replied, they
were again reminded of the problems emanating from the drilling
sector. The union officer said the committee was pleased COTA was
able to make an offer, but was disappointed as it was lower than
they had hoped, and not valid until January 1988. The COTA
spokesman acknowledged that their first offer would not be their
final one, as history had shown, but warned that there was not room
for a great deal of movement. In addition the Association would be
looking for something in return, namely the surrender of container
payments (5) which were said to account for 0.6-0.8% of the wage
bill. The negotiating committee withdrew at this stage to consider
the offer.
The negotiating committee amended their claim in light of
COTA's comments, deciding to pursue 4.5% on basic rates and leaving
aside the issue of container payments. It was explained to the COTA
representatives when negotiations resumed, with the additional
concession that the committee would be prepared to accept the
January date for implementation. The reponse of the COTA spokesman
was that the claim caused a problem: Wif your genuine aspirations
are 4.5%, we don't have that kind of money", The union officer
restated the importance of producing a settlement, given that the
members had allowed the negotiating committee what he called "one
last shot w •
When negotiations resumed after lunch, the COTA spokesman
outlined a second offer, which he described as Wthe limit of our
remit agreed at the last COTA meeting ••.. the orange is s quee zed'";
This offer was an average 3.5% increase on the basic rate, offshore
allowance, and holiday credits. The spokesman went on to say that
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they could envisage paying 4% but only on the proviso that container
payments were bought out. The union officer asked for a recess, and
also whether it would be possible to have two offers outlined, one
with container payments consolidated, the other without.
During the recess, the union negotiating committee considered
what their recommendation to the full committee would be if two
different offers were forthcoming, and also considered the merits of
proposing a two year settlement. When they returned to the
table,they were informed that the offshore allowance in the second
offer had been increased to accommodate container payments, a method
COTA preferred to consolidating the payment in the basic rate, as
this was more complicated. The union team withdrew to consider.
There were considerable differences of opinion amongst the
negotiating committee, some wishing to take a hard line and push for
a higher increase, others more cautious. After lengthy discussion,
agreement was reached amongst the negotiating committee, and the
COTA team was informed that the committee would "give unanimous
recommendat ion to an offer of 4% for grades 1 and 2, and 3.5% for
grades 3 and 4, implemented on 1st January 1988. The concept of a
two year deal was also raised, though it was acknowledged that the
COTA representatives could not address that issue at the meeting
taking place. The COTA spokesman replied that 4% was outwith their
remit, and even if they went back to the individual companies, the
chances of achieving it were remote.The union team were asked how
they wanted to progress. The officer replied that they were
reluctant to end the meeting without a settlement, and "did not want
to go to 'brinkmanship'". The employers requested a recess.
After the recess, the negotiating committee was told that the
COTA representatives were prepared to offer a slight increase on
grades 1 and 2 (bringing them up to 3.7 and 3.8% respectively) and
hoped that the committee would accept it. It was pointed out that
the representatives themselves were not unanimous in the offer.
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The offer was being made on the condition the committee would
recommend acceptance: if not, it would be withdrawn, as "it would
not be worth going through the hassle" (with COTA). The negotiating
committee withdrew to condsider the latest movement.
Again there were differences of opinion amongst the
negotiating committee. The union officer reminded them that they
had come wi thin 0.3 and U. 2% of their settlement terms; that they
had fended off wage cuts (with the exception of Griffin employees),
had kept their members, and had had to threaten strike action to get
an offer. Eventually a majority decision was reached and
communicated to the COTA representatives. The offer would be
recommended to the shop stewards committee, due to meet a fortnight
hence.
At the shop stewards committee meeting, the negotiations and
various offers were outlined by the union officer. The discussion
which followed clearly demonstrated the divisions amongst the
stewards. There were some who felt the employers had "got what they
asked for 18 months ago - an 18 month freeze" (because the offer was
not backdated). Others felt rejection of the offer would lead to
its withdrawal, and ultimately the collapse of COTA. The members
themselves had to be balloted on the offer. However the officer
explained that it was the duty of the committee to recommend to the
members that they vote either for or against the offer. It was also
their duty to explain to them that a 'no' vote would require them to
undertake industrial action. The committee was evenly divided,
eight votes for, eight against. The chairman used his casting vote
against, saying it was "up to the members to decide".
Further discussion ensued, the chairman saying he had heard
that members on four platforms had already decided to reject the
offer. Another steward told him "you'll get a different vote thoug~
when you tell them the alternative is to go on strike". Eventually
the officer summarised the options: to have another vote, or put i~
to a ballot without recommendation. This induced an allegation tha~
the officer was trying to change the stewards' minds. In response,
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the officer said that it was the chairman I s decision to take a
second vote. He went on to pose the quest ion of the chances of
success if they were to undertake industrial action. The committee
was reminded that 50% of catering workers were not in the union and,
furthermore, the stewards themselves would have to be the organisers
of the industrial action. One steward said at this point that the
wives would send their husbands back to work, and another said only
half the caterers on his platform would support a strike. More
discussion followed, until eventually it was agreed that the union
officer should contact the COTA chairman and ask his opinion as to
whether the companies would be prepared to move further.
After lunch, the officer told the committee that the COTA
chairman had been wsurprised and angryw. The officer had been
reminded that some of the companies had wanted to withdraw from the
negotiations at 3.5%. In short, there was nothing more on offer.
In light of these further developments, it was decided to have a
second vote. Eleven voted to recommend acceptance of the offer,
four were against, with one abstention. The union members in the
workforce were balloted (by post) and voted 178 to 70 in favour of
the offer.
Conclusions
Comments made by those interviewees heavily involved in the
industry in the late 1970s (cited in the previous chapter) indicate
that the operating companies were instrumental in the formation of
COTA, to the point of laying down the initial rates of pay. This
was done with the aim of ending the instability and uncertainty
which resulted from constant high labour turnover, due largely to
poor (and fluctuating) wage cates paid in a fiercely competitive
environment. In return, the operators stipulated that they would
not accept bids from catering companies which were not in COTA.
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The crisis within the Association was sparked off by an
operator accepting a bid known to be below the COTA rate. This was
clearly a cost-cutting exercise carried out as the oil price
plummeted, but took all observers by surprise nonetheless.
Furthermore the operators, through UKOOA, prolonged and exacerbated
the uncertainty by their refusal to issue a collective statement to
the effect that in future only bids based on the COTA rate would be
accepted. This clearly demonstrates the pragmatic approach of the
operating companies towards the conduct of industrial relations in
the North Sea, particularly given their objective,
"To encourage major contractors engaged in work for member
companies to ensure a reasonable degree of uniformity in terms
and conditions of employment",
cited in the EPC's terms of reference (see chapter 5).
In turn this refusal led to the decision in COTA not to sign
an agreement with the unions concerned, drawn up to put an end to
the controversy regarding the existence - or non-existence - of a
COTA rate. Since the arrangement has not been put in writing, and
is still a "gentlemen's agreement", the Association will continue to
face uncertainty. As revealed in the previous chapter, in the wake
of the acceptance of the Griffin bid, COTA members asked the
operating companies for guidance as to whether bids were to be based
on the COTA rate but received no such help. Hence the existence,
and application, of the COTA rate will continue to be a potential
source of instability. Underpinning the whole arrangement is the
practice of competitive tendering, by means of which the client
companies can control operating costs and industrial relations.
Finally, the fact that the operating companies were consulted
by both COTA (via the Contractors I Liaison Sub-Committee of UKOOA)
and the TGWU (informally) throughout the drawn out negotiations is
indicative of the central role played by the operators, and the
importance of the influence they exert in shaping the industrial
relations system.
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CHAPTER TEN
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AT INDUSTRY LEVEL
In chapter 5 the structure and the mechanics of the Iuoac were
described, as was the structure of the Liaison Panel of the EPC of
UKOOA. It is noticeable that industry level institutions and
relationships have been established in an industry generally
characterised by single employer arrangements, particularly at a
time when industry level collective bargaining nationally is in
decline. It raises the question whether any matters of substance
are dealt with within and between these institutions, and also what
role the trade unions might play in an industry in which so many
obstacles face them. The most effective means of evaluating these
issues was judged to be a close monitoring of the content and
conduct of the meetings in question. Therefore the purpose of this
chapter is to outline the modus operandi of Iuoac meetings and
meetings between the ruooc and the LP, and to try and capture the
flavour of both.
In total eight meetings of the IUOaC and LP were attended by
the author, one in 1985 and the remainder from September 1986
onwards on a quarterly basis. On all occasions the IUOOC held a
'pre-meeting' which was also attended. In addition, five more Iuoae
meetings were attended, taking place between December 1986 and May
1987. It is not the norm for meetings to take place with this
frequency; the Chinook disaster (1) of November 1986 gave rise to a
number of 'special' meetings. Four IUOOC meetings, three of which
were attended, dealt specifically with issues arising in the
aftermath of the disaster; one meeting dealt with the Chinook issue
and additional business, and the sixth, with business other than the
tragedy. The Chinook incident, insofar as it relates to the
industrial relations system, will be discussed separately later in
the chapter. The two Iuoac 'ordinary' meetings will be considered
first, then the pre-meetings, and finally the IUaaC - LP meetings.
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IUOOC MEETINGS
Observation of the IUOOC by attendance at its meetings
demonstrated the degree of fragmentation in the union movement, and
the fragile and expedient nature of inter-union alliances. Though
unified in reaction to a crisis such as the Chinook tragedy, at
other times it was clear that individual Committee members were
pursuing their own union's interests, and inevitably so. As will be
revealed later in this chapter, inter-union rivalry and the
associated problem of maintaining solidarity have combined to impede
the Committee's work.
Of the two IUOOC 'ordinary' meetings attended, one was
attended by six officers, the other by seven (total eligible is
12). At first sight this may appear low but pressure of work and
sheer distance from Aberdeen may explain this. Meetings were held
in the ASTMS office, as were the 'Chinook' meetings, this also being
the postal address for the Committee. Issues discussed during the
ordinary meetings were: minutes of the previous meeting; recognition
and recruitment; communication with the Civil Aviation Authority,
Oil Industry Advisory Committee and the Helicopter Operators Liaison
Group; a proposed visit to lobby the Shadow Energy Minister; access
to offshore platforms; proposals for changes in oil industry
taxation; implications of fiscal changes for North Sea employment;
helicopter safety matters; suspected incidents of breached
agreements; and the agenda for the forthcoming meeting with the
Liaison Panel.
Business was conducted by the Chairman, or an officer
nominated to the Chair in the event of his absence. Minutes were
taken by the Secretary of the Committee. Furthermore, time
constraints were reduced at these meetings in comparison with
pre-meetings, though the officers concerned invariaoly had other
commitments which they had to meet. With the exception of these
formalities, the atmosphere in the meeting was generally quite
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relaxed when discussing matters of common concern.
occasion, when discussing matters relating to
recruitment offshore, the inter-union rivalry
apparent.
However on one
recognition and
became clear ly
The EETPU official expressed concern (and there were murmurs
of agreement) regarding the high profile enjoyed by the ASTMS
offshore which, he claimed, was adversely affecting the efforts of
his union, and others, to recruit and retain members in the
industry. His argument rested on the suspicion that some EETPU
members offshore, employed by operators, were allowing their
membership to lapse in order to join the ASTMS, which had a higher
profile with their employer; the EETPU does not hold any recognition
agreements with operators.
One of the cr i ticisms levelled at the Secretary was that he
arranged dates for offshore visits which were convenient to himself
and hence he was more often than not one of the officers to go, such
visits being undertaken in pairs (2). As a result, the EETPU
officer continued, only the ASTMS showed any real likelihood of
increasing its membership and gaining recognition offshore. In
response the Secretary stated that any agreements relating to
operators' personnel offshore are held by a union in the name of the
Committee, and that the Bridlington rules applied. Furthermore he
emphasised that the oil companies have repeatedly made it clear that
they are prepared to deal with only one trade union official. A
second ASTMS official present (from the Southern sector) spoke in
support of his colleague, explaining that the priority of loyalties
for operators' personnel was company, then platform, then shift, and
therefore employees chose a union "wh i ch can accept them all and
represent them well ft • Also, he added, a good number of offshore
employees had left shore jobs seeking to escape demarcation and
associated practices.
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Predictably this fundamental issue remained unresolved at the
end of the meeting. At the next meeting, held almost eight weeks
later, the EETPU reported back to the Committee on two trips made to
an offshore platform with the ASTMS official. The officers revealed
they were confident of getting a majority in a recognition ballot
and were therefore about to submit a joint application to the
operator for recognition. This they did but were rejected outright
by the company concerned on the grounds that they were not aware of
any interest in union activity amongst the workforce.
Since then, however, the press has carried reports of a new
drive on the part of the EETPU to recruit offshore workers (3).
Whether this publicity was aimed at the oil companies or the other
unions is unclear, though the latter were not informed that the
articles were about to appear. It is certainly in line with the
agressive recruitment policies followed by the Electricians' union
in onshore industries and, if pursued, is likely to sharpen
inter-union competition in the offshore industry as it has
elsewhere. It also suggests that the EETPU's concern regarding the
IUaaC's methods of operation related more to the fact that the EETPU
perceived itself to be 'losing out' to the ASTMS, as opposed to any
inherent unfairness in the system.
More specifically, discussion of this issue revealed some
apparent discrepancies in the perceptions of different parties as to
the interpretation of access and recognition procedures (see
Appendices C and H). The recognition procedure laid down between
UKaaA and the Iuaac is, like any other, open to interpretation.
Apparently it is not necessary for all, or a majority of workers in
the Common Interest Group to be in the particular union requesting
recognition through the IUaaC. The agreement (recognition only)
between Star ail and ASTMS states:
"The object of this Agreement is to award exclusive
recognition to the Association so that it may represent its
members (and those of other Iuaac affiliated ~nions), who are
..•.•.•.• in the Common Interest Group •••••••• on an individual
basis ••••• "(emphasis added).
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Thus the ASTMS represents employees in the erG in other ruooe
affiliated unions.
The reluctance of the oil companies to deal with more than one
trade union official is one of the major reasons behind all requests
for offshore visits and claims for recognition being channelled
through the offices of the ruooc. The Secretary of the Committee
had held office for eight years and was re-elected at the time of
writing; the ruooc notepaper carries the ASTMS address. While this
provides advantages in terms of continuity, the profile of the ASTMS
is inevitably raised as its representative is the official channel
of communication between the trade union movement and the operating
companies.
The dissension evident in the ruooe was further indication of
the enduring obstacle posed by inter-union rivalry to the trade
union movement in Britain. When faced with outright opposition to
and rejection of mUlti-unionism by the operating companies, it was
inevitaole that several unions would seek to establish themselves in
the most favourable position. Though able to present a united front
to the oil industry and Government, internally the Committee is
sUbject to the same strains and rivalry as other inter-union
bodies. Hence it can be seen that the very structure of the ruooe,
which in turn is directly related to the structure of the wider
British trade union movement, presents obstacles to progress.
The second 'ordinary' ruooe meeting attended was very similar
to the 'pre-meetings' of the ruooe held immediately prior to
meetings with the Liaison Panel. The first item discussed was the
timing of the forthcoming meeting with the Panel, scheduled to take
place the week before the General Election of 11 June 1987. rt was
agreed that a request be made to UKOOA to change the meeting because
of the commitments on the part of the trade union officers in
election campaigns. This is another indication of the heavy and
diverse workload of the officers concerned.
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The minutes from the previous meeting were approved and a few
minor points arising were dealt with. The EETPU official then
informed the Committee that as a result of the success of offshore
visits to a platform belonging to a British operator he, and the
Secretary of the Committee who had accompanied him, were confident
that the IUOOC could get a majority in a recognition ballot amongst
the employees of the operator on the platform concerned. A joint
application for recognition was going to be submitted to the
operator. As will be seen, this application became one of several
to provide the IUOOC - Panel meetings with plenty to discuss.
The next item was an allegation by the EETPU officer that one
of the major operators had successfully circumvented the application
of the Southern Waters Agreement during a hook-up project. Two
other officers then went on to cite problems being experienced in
the contractor sector. In the first instance, an NUS officer had
heard that the employees of two specific contractors had had to pay
for their own survival training, medicals and working gear. This
met with the disapproval of the Committee as it was understood from
UKOOA that contractors were paid an increment in the contract price
to cover these items. Since this meeting was very much like an
Liaison Panel pre-meeting, it shall be included in the overall
assessment and conclusions arising from the pre-meetings.
IUOOC Pre-Meetings
IUOOC pre-meetings take place immediately prior to meeting
with the Panel; indeed the latter is almost a continuation of the
former. As stated earlier eight such meetings were attended, one in
1985, the remainder every quarter since September 1986 (Panel
IUOOC meetings had continued in the interim period).
Members from both teams arrived from 9.30am onwards at the
venue for the ruouc - panel meeting (a city centre hotel), sometimes
having coffee and an informal chat together in the lobby while
waiting for others to arrive. At lOam or shortly after the ruooe
and LP adjourned to separate rooms. The meeting with the Panel
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could not begin until the IUaae had completed its business, not
least because the ruaae discussed the items it wanted on the LP
agenda at this pre-meeting. Hence the agenda of the meeting about
to take place dominated discussions in the pre-meeting. To some
extent items were selected by going through the minutes of the
previous meeting. rf there was outstanding business not dealt with
since the last meeting it went on the list of items submitted to the
Panel. The trade union officers were then asked, usually by the
Committee Secretary, if there were any other items to be raised.
This tended to initiate a fairly lengthy discussion on a
variety of topics during which, for example, the committee was
updated on the progress of claims for recognition made to individual
operating companies (on one occasion a joint application by the
EETPU and ASTMS, on others by the ASTMS). The overall tone of the
meeting was fairly informal. ruaae members tended to drift in
throughout the meeting which generally lasted for about one and a
half hours. This practice effectively prolonged the proceedings as
incomers were related the 'story so far', and then put forward items
of their own. When the list of items was complete (usually five or
six headings) the ruaae Secretary took it along to the Panel. The
meeting of the two teams began approximately 15 minutes later.
Table 5 (overleaf) shows the issues raised at pre-meetings ~
the order in which they were raised on each occasion~ and the number
of times each was raised in total. There was no apparent
significance in the order in which items were raised. From the
table it can be seen that a number of issues were raised in half of
these meetings or more: recognition procedures (four) ~ progress of
recognition claims (six)~ the Griffin incident and its repercussions
(five) ~ contractors' practices in general (four); helicopter safety
(four) ~ and survival certificates for tuooc members (five). In
total, recognition related issues were discussed ten times, an
indication of their importance. This will be discussed in more
detail below.
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TABLE 5 ISSUES RAISED IN IUOOC rpRE-MEETINGS'
ISSUE & ORDER IN DATE
WHICH RAISED 6/85 9/86 12/86 3/87 7/87 9/87 12/87 3/88 Total
Access 1 5 2
Recognition procedure 3 7 5 2 4 I
I I ISafety matters 1 1 II
I 2
INomination of Iuaac 2 8 II
reps for OPITB i
Dates for offshore 3 1 I
visits II
Progress of recognition 4 2 2 1 3 3 6 IIclaims I
Griffin & repercussions 4 1 I 2 2 3 I 5 I
Contractors I I I I 4 4 I 5 5 4
Chinook after~ath I , 4 I 1 I I I I 2 iI
Offshore alternates 4 I I I , I,
Helicopter safety 3 2 4 4 4 iI
Fire cover 1 1 i
Minutes previous 3 1 1 3
meetings
Search and rescue 7 6 2 I
facili ties I
Proposed meeting with 9 7 2 I
Shadow Energy Minister
NUS request to change
I
8 1
date of meeting !i
Survival certs for 3 8 6
I
6 2 5
ruooc
i
Fiscal changes I 6 I 1
Future I 1 I , I
Idevelopments 5 1
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The implications and repercussions of the Griffin incident
were discussed at some length in the previous chapter and therefore
little is required to be said here, particularly as minimal
discussion arose from the issue in the pre-meetings, rather it was a
case of the officer concerned (TGWU) keeping the Committee
informed. The frequency with which contractors' practices were
raised belies the importance of the issue, as on every occasion a
catalogue of allegations was made by various officers relating to
the treatment of their members. Helicopter safety is an important
but highly technical issue and, in the main, the issue as discussed
at the pre-meeting bears little relation to this thesis other than
on the one occasion when it was pointed out that the offshore
workforce are not represented on any helicopter liaison groups, as
paying customers are under civil arrangements. The question of
Iuaac members (ie trade union officers) undergoing survival training
and medicals was the only issue to be initiated by the Panel. It
was raised several times largely because the Iuaac initially sought
to employ delaying tactics.
Recognition applications, it should be stressed, are not
recent phenomena. The procedure itself was drawn up in 1977 when
the industrial and economic climates were very different in both the
North Sea and Britain at large. An update on the progress of
recogni tion claims, inevitably slower than the Iuaac would like,
often widened into a discussion around the problems of gaining
recognition, most of which appeared to stem from differences in
interpretation of the Memorandum of Understanding entitled
•Recognition may be achieved I (see Appendix H). It was clear that
this was a source of considerable frustration for the Committee,
particularly those who had submitted claims. According to the
Memorandum, only unions which are in membership of the IUaaC can
apply for recognition and such application must be made by the
Committee on their behalf (clauses 1 and 3). Thereafter the
procedure becomes more vague. Clauses 4, 5 and 6 have proved to be
particularly important.
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Certain operating companies appear to have delayed progress
for a considerable time by failing to agree on the CIG as per clause
4. However clause 3 states that an ·application for recognition
would be made by the IUOOC ••••• on the basis of applying to a Common
Interest croup", As it stands, the procedure appears to say that
the IUOOC must make an application in relation to a specific CIG,
the said CIG then being agreed with the company concerned on receipt
of the application. Furthermore some companies have refused to have
a meeting with IUOOC representatives on the grounds that there has
not been any evidence of a desire for trade union recognition
expressed by the workforce through the normal channels. There have
also been instances where this obstacle has been overcome but the
company concerned, according to the IUOOC Secretary, refuses to
stipulate the criteria for conceding recognition, particularly the
level of membership which must be demonstrated. This problem was
eventually surmounted in the case of Star Oil by using the good
offices of ACAS.
Finally, the procedure refers to itself as ·the recommendation
of the Panel on behalf of UKOOA members with the understanding that
any member company is free to modify or amend any of the steps in
discussion between themselves and the IUOOC·. It would seem some
companies have done just that.
The conduct of certain contractors towards their employees was
a continuous cause of concern for the IUOOC, and rightly so.
However, a list of malpractices cited by the trade union officers
would serve little purpose here and therefore discussion shall be
restricted to some examples raised with the Panel.
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IUOOC - LIAISON PANEL Meetings
The Panel is composed of six members of the EPC, including the
chairman, who will also chair the Panel (see chapter 5). Though it
represents the EPC, the Panel cannot commit itself, the EPC, or
UKOOA in any way. The primary function of the Panel is to maintain
a continuous dialogue with the IUOOC. It is important to note that
no negotiation takes place. Even to suggest that the process was
'consul tat ion ' would be misleading. Attendance of these meetings
suggested that the IUOOC raises a number of issues, of which the
Panel takes note; the Panel Chairman, or perhaps another member,
will then say something along the lines of, "I can only speak for my
individual company, of course, but I'm surpr ised (or disappointed)
to hear that that is the case", or, "I totally sympathise with your
members' predicament, but shouldn't this be taken up with their
employer?". The Panel chairman is then likely to assure the Iuooe
that the matter will be raised at the next meeting of the EPC.
In describing and assessing the nature of the relationship
between the IUOOC and the Panel, it is useful to focus on four of
the issues raised at meetings: recognition procedures and the
progress of recognition claims; contractors' practices; Griffin and
its repercussions; and the Chinook aftermath.
In IUOOC pre-meetings, problems with progressing specific
recognition claims would usually widen out into a discussion on the
general problems surrounding recognition and the recognition
procedure. Conversely, in the IUOOC Panel meetings, issues
arising from the recognition procedure and its interpretation
eventually developed into the progress of claims in individual
companies in an effort by the IUOOC to illustrate the difficulties
facing them. This proved self-defeating for the lUOOC, as the Panel
reminded the officers that the joint body was not empowered to
discuss specific companies. Should it happen that a manager from
the 'offending' company was present, he would suggest that the
officer concerned should discuss the matter outside the forum,
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whereupon the said officer would exclaim "how can we? You refuse to
meet with us:" Such was the case at the meeting in July 1987. On
this occasion - as on others - the ruooc Chairman and some of his
colleagues handicapped themselves by citing specific operators as
offenders. rn September 1987 the Chairman challenged the companies,
saying that they were delighted to shout 'flexibility agreements'
from the rooftops when it suited them (eg in the case of the
Carrington refinery) so why would they not work with trades unions
offshore? There was no logic, he claimed, to which he was told that
the circumstances reflected the reality of the situation. The Panel
Chairman pointed out that the company needed to know what their
people wanted via, for example, the staff committee. Why should a
company start down the road of union recognition if they have no
evidence that this is required? The Chairman then reminded the
ruooc that the meeting could not formally discuss individual
companies as this was not within their remit. Uniformity amongst
UKOOA members with regard to trade union recognition was impossible
the unions were told.
The December 1987 meeting opened with the recognition issue.
The ruooc Secretary expressed his continued concern and wondered,
"why, when (they had) the Memorandum of Understanding, (they were)
still having such difficulty?" The response of the Panel was that
over the previous two to three years the ruooc had summarised their
complaints; it was acknowledged as an ongoing problem, but one which
UKOOA could not respond to collectively. This raised the question,
said the ruooc Secretary, of whether the Memorandum was worthless.
He pointed out that it had been written 10 years before, when the
ruaae was "light years away from making claims for recognition". He
warned the Panel that the Committee wou Ld be subm i t t i nq claims for
recognition and would be expecting a more positive response, which
they hoped UKOOA wou Ld encourage. On this occasion the discussion
was not a long one. The Panel Chairman thought that there was not
much point repeating arguments that had been made elsewhere. The
sub j ec t was closed when an ruooc member told the Panel that they
were seeking observance of the spirit of the Memorandum of
Understanding.
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The March 1988 discussion of this topic proved quite dramatic
in content if not in effect. At the IUOOC pre-meeting the IUOOC
Secretary explained he had written to three operators on the sUbject
of recognition, a continuation of the effort to get agreements in
these companies, as opposed to initial submissions. Only one
company had replied, expressing surprise at the 1UOOC's letter given
the favourable response from two IUOOC officers following an
offshore visit they made in November 1987. According to the
response, the officers had been impressed with employee relations in
the company, disappointed wi th the level of attendance at meetings
they held, and had enrolled only two new members. The IUOOC
Secretary had been in touch with the one of the officers concerned
since receiving the letter from the company and had been told that
the number of members enrolled exceeded 20. The other official to
make the visit was in attendance at this meeting and viewed the
description of the favourable comments he had made as "deliberate
nai vety" on the part of the company concerned. It was agreed that
the issue was not the favourable impressions, but the continued
refusal of the company to meet with the IUOOC and a statement to the
Panel was prepared to this effect, as a manager from the company
concerned was present.
During the Panel meeting, however, the matter was raised in a
somewhat heavy-handed fashion, the IUOOC Chairman launching, as he
did, straight into the grievance with the individual company thereby
diverting attention from discussion of the central recognition
issue. The IUOOC Secretary acknowledged that the Panel disliked
references to individual companies, and that the instance in
question was part of a wider issue. The Panel Chairman referred to
the constitution and summarised the issue as one of the IUOOC
seeking willingness on the part of individual operator s to have a
meeting on recognition if so requested. He went on to say that the
Memorandum is written in a way which presupposes individual
companies to interpret arrangements in their own way. At this point
frustration erupted into an act of symbolism as the IUOOC Secretary
slowly and deliberately tore up his copy of the Memorandum, with the
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words, "If the Memorandum is torn up these meetings become worthless
•••• you and I both know we wish to achieve recognition ••••We don't
submit frivolous claims." The IUOOC Chairman added to this
outburst, "If UKOOA thinks these meetings are useless then they
should come out and say so". In response the Panel Chairman again
stated that UKOOA has no authority with regard to an individual
company's management of human resources; its influence is restricted
to making recommendations. It was apparent that the Secretary I s
action caused surprise and consternation amongst some of the
officers present.
Another Panel member, long-serving and a former Chairman, told
the IUOOC in no uncertain terms that they had two options with
regard to the Memorandum: they could continue to have it and accept
that its effectiveness varies; or abandon it, as this is what would
happen if the Panel went to the EPC and stipulated a uniform
interpretation of the Memorandum. For a few moments it seemed that
the whole arrangement was about to collapse, but the situation was
defused by a trade union officer who suggested that the next time
this subject came up the meeting should be video taped, and played
back in future meetings, during which those present could adjourn to
the bar. More seriously, he said that the Memorandum depended on
the balance of power, which would change sooner or later. The
IUOOC, he continued, were asking for respect for the document, not
for a concession of recognition.
Contractors' Practices
The frequency with which contractors' practices were raised,
and the obvious importance attached to them illustrates the complex
inter-relationships at work in the industrial relations of the North
Sea. The EPC has another subcommittee, the Contractor I s Liaison
Group, 'which meets with representatives from offshore contractors.
Given the frequency with which items are raised at the Liaison Panel
relating to contractors I employees it is tempting to ask why the
three groups, the operators, contractors and IUOOC, do not sit down
together. Strictly speaking the trades unions have no real right to
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be represented at talks between the operators and contractors for
several reasons. Firstly, the national agreements pertaining to the
offshore industry apply only during hook-up, with the exception of
the SJIB electr ical post-construction agreement, and the OeSA, the
latter never having been applied. Secondly, the clients can quite
validly argue that issues raised with regard to these agreements are
not their (Le operators) business because they are not party to
them. Thirdly, and perhaps most important, the luooe and the Panel
(and presumably the Contractors' Liaison Group) are not entitled to
discuss individual operators. It is this last point which
continuously thwarts the IUOOe, particularly with regard to
recognition-related issues, as the IUOOe cannot legitimately ask the
Panel to use their good offices in relation to the progress of a
claim submitted to an individual operator. That is not to say that
individual companies were not cited (not to mention slated) by
certain luooe officers, with reference to access as well as
recognition issues.
Regardless of whether or not a collective agreement applies at
a given point in time, all parties concerned acknowledge a high
level of trade union membership amongst the contractors' workforce.
It follows from this that the employers, both client and contractor,
acknowledge the concern of full time trade union officers relating
to undesirable practices on the part of contractors towards their
employees (though the response of some employers suggested such
union attention was unwelcome to say the least).
Only one IUOOe Liaison Panel meeting (June 1985) was
attended before the dramatic oil price fall of 1986. However this
proved to be sufficient to illustrate a difference in atmosphere
between the two periods. Dur ing the former, an altogether more
relaxed atmosphere prevailed, certainly amongst the operators.
Following the price crash, the operators were understandably more
cautious and uncertain with the result that they appeared to speak
with less authority. From some of the discussions heard it would
seem that this was the case within their own companies, as well as
within the EPe. Given that these were personal impressions and not
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open to support from empirical evidence, it would be wrong to
overemphasise them, particularly as Table 6 (see overleaf) shows
that the content of the 1985 meeting did not differ radically from
others attended.
It is especially signif icant to note that contractor-related
issues appeared high on the agenda at the 1985 meeting. The IUOOC
on this occasion expressed concern over certain practices of the
contractors, particularly with regard to downmanning. The UKOOA
response was that it was a matter for the trade unions to take up
with individual contractors. An AEU official was reluctant to quote
specific instances because of possible repercussions for the
contractors, and also due to the fear on the part of the latter that
if the workforce was to take industrial action the client would go
in and dictate a resolution. In addition, another officer stated
reservations regarding the power some individuals enjoyed relating
to dismissals, ie the NRB syndrome. The Liaison Panel Chairman,
supported by other members, claimed to be ignorant of such incidents
in their individual companies. He added that he felt that
contractors quite often "hid behind" the operating companies, in
response to which the AEU official suggested that if they were truly
unaware of what was going on then information was being kept from
them. The Panel Chairman then reiterated the view that these were
matters between individual trade unions and contractors, to which
the IUOOC replied that, being the client companies, they were in a
position to exert influence. One IUOOC member suggested a simple
scenario: "are you saying that when you want a well drilled you say
you 'll pay a drilling company £x to drill the hole and just leave
them to get on with it?" To the incredulity of all others present
the Panel answered in the affirmative. This discussion demonstrates
that contractors' practices were giving cause for concern well
before the price fall took effect.
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TABLE 6 ISSUES RAISED AT IUOOC - LP MEETINGS
ISSUE &- ORDER IN OAT::
WHICH RAISED 6/85 9/86 12/86 3/87 7/87 9/87 12/87 3/88 rota:
Access to offshore 3 3 2 I ~i ris tall a t ; ens
Trade union recogni t i on I I , 3 I I 7 I ~ I 1 I 1 i -I
C'::1'trac~::'s practices I 1 , I I I 4 I ~ I 2 I 4 i -I
Catering (Grif:in) I I 1 I 1 I 6 I 3 I I I j ~
Helicopter safety/
I
2 2
I
It.3 I 1 I
.
I I
3
I
-
-
of:shore alternates
Alleged breaches of agt I I I 5 I I I ·-
C;,inooK a:'terr:1at~ I I 5 I 4&8 , I I I I -
, I I I I I I I
I
Tax changes 6 I .:~ I
I
,
Reduction in stancby 6 j ·I -
vessels II
i
I I I I I
j
~ornen of!snore and the 5
, -
extension of the SD Act
Medicals!survival cer'"~s" 4
, I
3 I 7 I I I -:or tu of::cials I
Vetting of employees 2
I I
·
-
.by contractor i
Extension of HASAWA I 4 I I I , ...
:l:-e cove:-, Aberceen
I I
5
I I I I I
,
-
Air;Jort
! I
Survival t:-aining 6 4
I I I I I I 2s"tandarcs I I I
I I I I I I I .:u~:..lre of oil indust:-y - I .; I i '"-
~!iscelI3~e'::'...:s I I 7 I I 2: :!a7 I I I III I,
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The next meeting attended at which contractors' employees were
discussed (other than with reference to the Griffin and Chinook
incidents) took place in July 1987. The Iuaac claimed that some of
their members were having to pay for their own survival training,
medicals and uniforms. A statement was requested from the Panel on
this matter, as the IUaaC was of the understanding that such items
were accounted for in the contract price and would therefore be paid
by the employer, recompensed by the client, the ASTMS officer having
pointed out that if these items were included in the tender price,
and employees were paying for their own, this was tantamount to
fraud. It was agreed by the Panel that such items were included in
the contract price and that specific examples would be useful. ane
way in which it was alleged that contractors were circumventing this
was by restricting recruitment to workers who possessed a valid
survival certificate (the survival course costs approximately £300
per person). The TGWU officer present blamed the spread of such
practices amongst contractors on the fierce competition between them
for work and urged the Panel to issue strong guidelines.
This sUbject appeared on the agenda of the next meeting
(September 1987), when the IUaaC responded to the Panel's request
for specific examples. The TGWU officer cited two catering
companies which were recovering the cost of survival training from
individuals leaving the company voluntarily during their notice
period. In another instance, travel warrants (covering costs
between the individual's home and the heliport in Aberdeen) were
being withdrawn from employees by the caterer. The Panel informed
the Iuaac that the issue had been discussed at the EPC, and
reassured them that the cost of survival training was included in
the terms of the contract. It was also revealed that the operators,
as clients, can conduct audits in the contractor companies which
should identify those contractors guilty of charging both the
operator and its employees. More generally, the TGWU officer stated
that there had been no such problem when contracts were issued on a
'cost plus' basis as the oil companies picked up the bill for
survival training. Now the squeeze was on, he continued, 'price
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pressure' was the result, and contractors were having to guess at
prices when bidding for work. His basic argument was that safety
and survival trainins costs should be outside the contract price and
therefore outside the competitive arena.
At the December 1987 meeting the subject was raised yet again,
when the EETPU official gave two specific examples to the luaae
pre-meeting, and it was the first of these that the officer wished
to be raised with the Panel. The meeting had opened with yet
another recognition debate, and then moved onto the contractor
issue. This would perhaps account for the almost belligerent manner
in which the Iuaae Chairman addressed the matter. He began by
saying that at the last meeting the issue of contractors' staff had
been discussed on a "fairly broad basis". Since then, he continued,
the Iuaac had received a "catalogue of crime •••• Every time we raise
this you say ••••• (that RGIT certificates are) part of the
contract". The EETPU official then outlined his grievance, after
first praising "those companies which are more progressive" ie
those companies which include the SJlB PCA(Electrical) rates in
their tender documents. The specific contractor causing concern was
not only making its employees pay for their own survival course, but
was paying 40p per hour below the agreed rate; did not pay its
employees during field breaks; did not pay holiday pay; and did not
give national insurance credits during leave periods. The workforce
were told they could 'sign on' during the two weeks onshore, but if
they collected their cards the company would be under no obligation
to take them back as they would effectively have severed their
employment contract. The EETPU official wanted the Panel to rectify
the situation and "make an example" of them. The Panel Chairman
pointed out that such practices on the part of contractors were
condemned by UKaaA a few years ago.
It was the TGvlU off icial who then took up the issue. Two of
the three instances raised at the last meeting had been resolved, he
said, but went on to say that "there (had) been no adjustment to the
system which puts pressure on the contractors ••••• We asked you last
time if it was possible to have at least some items outwith the area
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of competition, for example safety and medicals". The reply from
the Panel was that the matter had indeed been discussed at the EPC,
the general opinion being that while no individual operator would
wish such costs to fallon the employees, the operators did not
believe that they should all conform to one (bid) system. If the
IUOOC was getting specific complaints then the obvious recourse was
to make a complaint to the operator involved (which is outwith the
remit of the Panel meeting).
The TGWU officer again suggested that it would be quite
effective if operators laid down a standard. It appeared, he said,
that though those in the employee relations department paid lip
service to the concerns of the IUOOC, those in the contracts
department were more ruthless and turned a blind eye. As usual the
Panel Chairman could only speak for his own company, but he
nevertheless assured the IUOOC that though the employee relations
department did not have the final say, it did pay more than lip
service. At this the AEU off icer spoke out, reminding the Panel
that he did not "think there had been a rig built without getting a
trade union agreement first. There were no terminals built on a
free market basis. No one has tried to do pre-production work
without an agreement. Yet the moment production begins, you throw
away responsibility. You are the controlling body offshore ••••• As
long as you get the contract trouble free and within budget, I don't
see you taking steps to stabilise things. It is going to take
something ••••• of some cost to you •••• If the men get the ball back at
their feet. ••• • they'll kick hell out of you. It will be too late
then for reasonable action - they'll want retribution. God help us
when we get to that situation ••••• (Company x) have stopped bidding
for offshore work - they are fed up. If (Company Yl do this, where
will you be? •• [implying a shortage of skilled labourl •••••• The only
way to make up for the lower rates is to work more hours - men are
working 18-20 hours a day, and are working during their leave
period. Accidents will increase •••• the men you expect to be alert
will not be." His concern was reiterated by two other officers.
This officer was quoted at length because his contribution
summarised the nature and the depth of the IUOOC's concern.
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The next exchange was revealing. One of the Panel members
expressed sympathy for the predicament of the employees concerned.
He wondered why it was continuing to happen, going on to describe
the role of his company as that of a policeman, but also as not
perfect. His company did not have the resources to do extensive
screening, but that did not mean they were not committed to it, he
said. A list of specific examples from the Iuooe would be helpful,
it was agreed. Furthermore, this manager added that his company was
going to embark on more thorough screening of contractors. This
seems significant given the concern of the AEU officer in a previous
meeting that operating companies would dictate to contractors. It
might appear from the above that this was what the same official was
now looking for. It would be wrong to misconstrue this as a
volte-face on the part of the union official. The central issue for
the IUOOC is the pragmatism on the part of the operators: exercising
considerable influence, if not control, via the competitive bid
system, stipulating when trade union agreements can or cannot apply,
yet they can avoid accepting responsibility for any misdemeanours or
shortcomings which occur in the contract arena.
The AEU officer then asked the LP to look into the practice of
requesting labour on an ad hoc basis, eg asking for six welders and
then deciding only two are required. The remaining four welders
would be laid off without pay. In response he was told that the
operators are led to understand that contractors have a pool of
manpower on whom to draw on a flexible basis. He was quickly
informed that the contractors may have a pool of manpower, but do
not have men sitting at home on pay. The Panel Chairman then
acknowledged that while he was aware of a move towards a flexible
workforce, he '....as not fully aware of how it works. This was a
remarkable admiss ion and, if widely applicable, would suggest that
the development of such a workforce in the industry was an
inevitable, unforeseen result of competitive tendering, as opposed
to a strategic policy decision by the oil majors.
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At the March 1988 meeting, the EETPU officer again referred to
the contractor who had not been paying leave pay and so on. He was
grateful, he said, that the contractor had given his workforce an
increase of 40p per hour, bringing them up to the SJIB rate.
However, he pointed out that though the operator concerned believed
the contractor to be paying national insurance contributions during
leave periods, the officer had payslips in his possession which
clearly showed the contrary. Again the Panel took his comments on
board. The fact that in the three months between meetings an
important movement had been made (though the contractor had stressed
there was no connection with the Iuooe - Panel discussion) is an
illustration of the value to the Iuooe of continuous dialogue with
UKOOA, even if for much of the time the meetings seem to be simply a
ritual. Another such illustration was the way in which the Griffin
incident was contained, to a large degree as a result of talks
between the IUOOe and Panel.
The Griffin Incident
As descr ibed in the previous chapter, this incident took the
industry by surprise and, by threatening the continued existence of
eOTA, threatened to bring back the uncertainty and instability to
that sector which eOTA's creation had sought to remove. In the wake
of the event some dismissed the possibility of industrial action by
trade union members and the break up of eOTA as 'sabre rattling'.
However at the time these were undoubtedly very real possibilities,
causing considerable concern to many companies in the industry.
Throughout the Griffin incident and the ensuing wage wrangle the
value of the ruooe - Panel dialogue to both parties became clear.
The Griffin bid was accepted by the operator concerned in June
1986. The matter was therefore top of the agenda for the ruooe at
the meeting with the Panel in September of that year. The
appropriate officer (TGWU) outlined the severity of the situation.
As a result of the reduced rates, and naving to pay tneir own travel
and uniforms, some catering workers '.... ere earning little more than
they would on state benefits, he argued, and therefore they were
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questioning the value of going offshore, particularly if they had a
family. Furthermore, he continued, the 'two on - two off' rota was
under threat (there had been persistent rumours of a move back to
'one on - three off', to cut costs). The officer informed the Panel
that he had called a shop stewards meeting, and intended to ask them
to canvass the members for strike action. He regretted that he
could see no other option, but said he would gladly listen to
suggestions.
The Panel Chairman, a manager who sat on the Panel throughout
the fieldwork, revealed that the matter had been aired at the UKOOA
Council, but the body felt unable to give an industry-wide
commitment to COTA: this was a reflection of the various views
within UKOOA. Obviously, he continued, they were concerned about
maintaining orderly industrial relations offshore, but they could
give no commitment. He asked about the remit of the forthcoming
shop stewards' meeting. In reply he was told that it was to
generate support for action, and put the wheels in motion to
organise a ballot (which, he stressed, did not derive from
legislation, he had always worked this way). The officer also made
clear that he was aware of, and accepted, the difficulties in
organising action.
Another officer interjected at this point, stressing that
"everyone knows the operators control contractors' rates, despite
public denials to the contrary." Perhaps significantly, there was
no such denial on this occasion.
Another Panel member suggested "letting the situation ride",
but this was rejected by the union officer. "Snowballs gain
momentum", he said, and "if reduced rates become the norm, even the
most responsible operators will find it difficult if not impossible
to justify to their own people paying COTA rates and therefore
markedly higher catering bills." At this, a third officer assured
the Panel that his union would be "uncharacteristically sympathetic"
to the TGWU, because of the potential threat to agreements held by
his own union if the COTA agreement was successfully crushed.
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A manager from the operating company which had accepted the
Griffin bid was present and he addressed the meeting at this point.
wAs a result of this issue UKOOA, and other companies, are totally
divided because the industry is in crisis. We have paid very high
salaries in the past when times were good, and there is still a
large differential between rates in oil and industry elsewhere in
Gr ampian. The company I s income has halved in the las t 18
months •••• We wish we could find a solution •••••• strikes are not the
answer and I don't think (the TGHU officer) thinks so either. w
The officer who had initially intervened again spoke up, with
the comment, wThe crisis has developed in the last 12 months. Where
were you in the last five years when we wanted protection in the
form of agreements?ft The TGWU officer explained that "the caterers
are being asked to shoulder a burden which isn't theirs - it would
be easier to swallow if the oil companies made some cuts in tbeir
own staff wages. ft The second officer queried the possibility of
getting catering workers involved in the two hook-ups taking place.
This was clearly aimed at emphasising the impact of the meeting when
the Panel reported back to the EPC, as representatives from the two
companies which would be hit were present. The TGWU officer replied
that the union could not sustain action taking some members in and
leaving others out unless action was undertaken in very limited
circumstances, for example, if only one or two companies were
accepting non-COTA bids. The discussion was concluded by the Panel
Chairman who told the lUOOC that he would be reporting the
discussion back to the Director General of UKOOA.
At the lUOOC pre-meeting in December 1986, the TGWU officer
was able to inform the Committee that preparations had been made for
a strike ballot, but three days before it was due to take place the
Panel Chairman had contacted him to say that the next catering
contract out to tender had gone according to COTA arrangements. The
following month was due to see the negotiations between cOTA and the
TG\'W which had been postponed from july 1936. A six month wage
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freeze had been accepted due to the uncertainty prevalent in the
industry because of both the price fall and Griffin. The Committee
was informed that the workers were looking for a 3% increase - but
the employers were seeking an 18 month wage freeze, as described in
chapter 9.
Hence the Panel Chairman was able to open the meeting with the
statement he was ·pleased that sense had prevailed and that it
(appeared) the heat had been taken out ot the situation". The
officer concerned replied that it was stable at the moment, though
he was hoping for a change of heart on the part of the offending
operator. He then went on to inform the Panel, as he had the
Committee in its pre-meeting, that the catering workers intended to
pursue a wage claim of 3% in January and that the catering companies
had been advised of this. "In add i t i ori'", he told the meeting, "we
have managed to agree savings with the companies which are small but
significant". Thus the December meeting was simply an update of the
situation as far as the Griffin/COTA issue was concerned. By the
March 1987 meeting, however, events had taken a new turn.
The off icer told the Panel that the worker s had failed to
agree an increase with the cater ing companies but stressed that he
was not implying that industrial action was imminent in pursuit of a
3% claim. The employers had been asked to agree to referral of the
matter to arbitration, but this was problematic as the caterers had
no guarantee that the clients would absorb any increase. Therefore
the officer requested that the matter be raised at the EPC, in the
interest of harmonious industrial relations. Arbitration would be
binding, but if no consensus was forthcoming from the operators,
then it was unlikely the caterers would agree to go to arbitration.
In this event, the options open to the union would be narrow. He
asked the Panel if there was anything it could do, and his request
was acknowledged.
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At the meeting in July 1987, the TGWU officer raised the
matter again with the specific intent of encouraging some input from
the Panel into a forthcoming meeting between UKOOA' s Contractor's
Liaison Group and COTA to be held in August. The IUOOC was informed
that the catering workers were claiming a 6% increase, given that
the last award had been made in July 1985. Such was the submission
to the Panel, the officer asking the Panel outright to have an input
to the Contractors Liaison Group - COTA meeting.
The July meeting was the last attended at which catering
workers were discussed in this fashion. A tactical decision was
taken at the September pre-meeting not to introduce the topic at the
Panel meeting. It was thought that this would be more effective as
it would keep the operators wondering as to the state of play.
The Chinook Tragedy
On the afternoon of Thursday November 6th 1986 a Chinook
helicopter, car rying oil workers from the platform on which they
worked, plunged into the sea killing 45 men two minutes before it
was due to land. One oil worker and the pilot survived. The
helicopter was under contract to Star Oil, the operator which has
agreements with the ASTMS covering five platforms, Lnc Lud i nq that
from which the Chinook was returning. Only nine of those on board
(47) were employed by Star, the remainder, by contractors. The
aftermath of the tragedy clearly demonstrates the firm grip which
this operator had over industrial relations.
The ruooc held a special meeting on the 21st November to
discuss the accident; this meeting was not attended as part of the
fieldwork. Six union officers attended, as did a representative of
Star Oil, though from the minute of the meeting circulated by the
Secretary it appears he did not address the meeting. The BALPA
representative (himself an employee of the company which owned the
Chinook, and a Chinook pilot) gave a report on the cause of the
accident, and an explanation of how it was believed the technical
fault occurred. The general conclusion of the Committee was that
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further investigation should and would be carried out before
officials made any recommendation to their members as to whether or
not they should fly in Chinooks if and when they returned to
service. It was agreed the matter would be discussed further at a
meeting scheduled to take place immediately after the Panel meeting
of December 1986.
At this Panel meeting, the ruooc asked whether UKOOA had made
any decisions or talked to the CAA regarding helicopter safety in
the wake of the disaster. The Panel Chairman was not aware of any
such movement, but reminded the Committee that in the last year
UKOOA had allocated £500,000 for helicopter research, a figure
matched by the CAA. The ruooc Chairman brought the discussion round
to the Chinook incident, referring to the intense media interest and
speculation. An ASTMS officer outlined the position the trade union
officers found themselves in, saying they would have to adopt one of
three lines to members if Chinooks were reintroduced: "fly in them;
don't fly; or it's up to you but we will support your decision".
At the special ruaac meeting held later, which it was possible
to attend, the Committee heard evidence from two invited experts.
However, the Committee still felt unable to reach a firm conclusion,
requiring more evidence before deciding on a course of action. rt
transpired that virtually all of the officers had been contacted by
members asking for advice as to whether or not they should agree to
fly in Chinooks, or what support the unions could and would give
them if they refused. This was particular ly applicable to
contractors' employees who formed the bulk of ruoac membership, and
who could be 'NRB'd' without reason and without notice. The usual
end result of an NRB was dismissal or redundancy. Given that all
this was taking place before Star's announcement that the Chinooks
would be grounded pending analysis for three to six months
(7/12/86), the officers showed a good deal of restraint and
responsibility in a situation which they could have exploited.
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The above gives an impression of the mechanics and atmosphere
of the meetings, but the special meeting of the Iuaac in December
1986 and the IUaaC - Panel meeting of March 1987 were particularly
revealing.
Star's decision to ground the three remaining Chinooks took
the immediate pressure off the Committee, it was agreed at the
special meeting (December 1986). The unions made use of the
opportunity to assess their position. The Chairman acknowledged
that the unions did not have much strength to do anything in support
of a member who refused to fly in a Chinook. It was generally
agreed that although there was a past history of complaints about
the Chinook regarding cramped conditions, noise, number of exits
etc, and in spite of continued feeling amongst of~shore workers that
they would prefer not to have to fly in Chinooks in future, most -
if not all - of those working on Star platforms would fly in it,
however reluctantly, if it was reintroduced. The Chairman
summarised their position when he said that everyone would have to
say they would not fly in a Chinook for a protest to be effective.
The question was asked what the unions could do to support an
individual who refused to fly in a Chinook, and was thereafter
disciplined by Star or his employer. The ASTMS officer, custodian
of the recognition agreements with Star, replied that as Star
refused to deal collectively, it would have 500 individual
disciplinary cases to deal with which the officer would string out.
He recognised that it was different for members who were employed by
contractors. Though it was a high level, emotive, and public issue,
to refuse to fly would be a technical breach of contract, and
therefore he stressed the importance of solidarity amongst the
workforce. This officer later referred to a pub Li c statement made
by Star to the effect that the company would not discuss Chinook
safety with the ASTMS or any other trade union, and restated his
belief that it was an industrial relations matter. He was supported
by another officer, who claimed that Star's moratorium on the
Chinook was the result of an industrial relations situation which
they could not handle.
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The remainder of the meeting revolved around the decision to
try and gain ruooc representation on the Helicopter Operators'
Liaison Group, a CAA committee on which UKOOA and BALPA were already
represented. Again the Committee did not come to a firm conclusion,
though the discussion showed perception and concern. A statement
was released to the press:
"The recent decision taken by (Star Oil) to delay the
reintroduction of the Chinook helicopters into the North Sea
operations for a period of three to six months has allowed the
ruooc more time to further examine all aspects of the incident
and what advice it may subsequently wish to give to trade
union members working offshore."
rt would be wrong to construe this as indecision or 'fence sitting'
on the part of the ruooc. Comments made during the discussion
revealed considerable insight, a high degree of background work
between meetings, and - perhaps most significant - a solid grasp of
the realities of the situation. To act differently may have
jeopardised the interests of their members, and destabilise further
an already delicate industrial relations climate.
It so happened that the ruooc - Panel meeting of March 1987
was the first to be chaired by the incoming Panel Chairman, an
employee relations manager from Star Oil, London. The Chinook
matter was the fourth item raised at this meeting, following on from
a more general item on helicopter safety.
Star Oil (represented by the LP Chairman) declined outright to
meet with the ruooc and reminded the Committee that the meeting was
not at liberty to discuss individual companies. The Committee
Secretary argued that it was an issue which went above individual
trade unions and it could go above individual companies if others
consider using the Chinook. (rt was known that a second operator
had a contract about to take effect to use Chinook helicopters.) A
second officer pointed out that this was "not a case of a recognised
union being denied appropriate facilities. Quite properly it is the
concern of the ruooc which has been very careful and done its utmost
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to be completely objective R• The central question for the IUOOC, he
explained, was whether the Chinook helicopter was significantly less
safe than others, ie to a degree which would justify removing it or
recommending that their members do not fly in it. Thus it would be
of great help if the IUOOC could get information from the operators
regarding their intentions, and what further safety checks were
being carried out.
The Panel Chairman replied that when a decision had been made
it would be communicated and explained by Star to all those affected
through its domestic machinery. The electricians' representative
reminded the Chairman that only nine people on the Chinook had been
employed by Star; all others were contractors employees, whose
dependents and colleagues would not be helped by the domestic
consultation machinery stressed by Star.
At this point it was agreed to move on to the next item on the
agenda and return to the Chinook matter later. It became apparent
that the IUOOC took this to mean later in the same meeting, though
it could be suggested (albeit not proven) that the Panel - and in
particular its Chairman - thought it meant a later date. In the
interim, the IUOOC requested copies of the operators' submission to
the Parliamentary Subcommittee gathering evidence on the effect of
the oil price fall; the TGWU officer brought the meeting up to date
with developments in the catering sector I and then the Committee
Secretary passed on a request from a researcher for access to
accident records. This generated into a lengthy and inconclusive
discussion around the wider issue of access to the oil companies by
researchers. Finally attention was reverted back to the Chinook
matter, to the irritation of the Star manager.
He pointed out that it was not a UKOOA matter and that the
IUOOC had no rights. Furthermore he stressed that no individual
union had a right to be involved as the ASTMS agreements
specifically exclude rights on safety matters. The TGWU officer
pointed out that he had relevant recognition agreements pertaining
to contractors' employees: where was his access? He was told, Rwith
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their employer". Another Committee member asked why Star could not
just agree to an informal meeting? The meeting was told that over
the past 30 months the unions had "done a deal" with Star at their
gas terminal, and that in the previous six months they had been
"wooed by Star taken to every fancy hotel in Aberdeen". He
addressed the Panel directly, asking, "are we persona non grata
unless you want our help?" Another Panel member attempted to defuse
the situation by acknowledging the wider question posed with regard
to other operators using the Chinook, and it was clear that there
was no wish on the part of the Panel to continue the discussion
further.
The manner in which this issue was handled clearly
demonstrates the relative strength and position of the parties
around the table. Within the IUaaC, it was in the handling of this
highly sensitive issue that the Committee was collectively most
impressive. It acted responsibly, objectively and reasonably. Yet
the operator concerned had no hesitation and no difficulty in
keeping them out of the matter completely. Not even the recognised
union, ASTMS, could gain access to the deliberations of the operator
concerned, and the official was publicly reminded (if not rebuked)
that he had signed a representation agreement specifically excluding
safety matters. Whilst it would not be valid to generalise from the
conduct of this one operator, it is reasonable to suggest that if
the company with which the trade union movement has had most success
can virtually ignore the individual union and the Committee as a
whole, then the Iuaac has a very long road ahead to fulf il its
aspirations of organising the core labour force in the North Sea.
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Summary and Assessment
Though it might appear that ruooc - Panel meetings are largely
a ritual, going through the motions of consultation, there were
times when its true value became apparent. For instance, the
Gr iff in incident and the period of uncertainty which followed it
served to illustrate the real value of maintaining a dialogue
between the ruooe and UKOOA, as represented by the Panel. There is
no doubt that communication between the two bodies at this time
played a part in containing the crisis.
From the ruaac meetings attended it could be seen that the
collective performance of the Committee differed markedly according
to the nature of the issue in question. There appeared to be a
clear divide between the manner in which certain issues were
handled. The difference rested on whether things could be described
as 'fire fighting' or 'strategic'. The former type of issue, by
definition, requires immediate attention and action; the latter is
more long term. 'Fire fighting' involves reaction by the Committee,
'strategy' requires them to be proactive. The Griffin and Chinook
incidents are 'fire fighting' issues, as are contractor-related
items. Recognition and the recognition procedure are matters of
strategy. rt has to be said that the ruooc handled 'fire fighting'
issues far more competently than strategic ones, albeit to varied
effect. Their conduct in the Chinook matter was particularly
impressive, as previously stated. Perhaps this is not altogether
surprising given that such issues form a large part of their normal
workload.
Furthermore, the raising of certain contractor practices did,
on occasion, result in the remedy of a situation detrimental to
employees, as discussed above. On other occasions the ruooc were
dismissed and told to take the matter up with the contractor
concerned. This sometimes caused frustration on the part of certain
trade union officers, understandably. However the major problem for
the Committee was gaining recognition. The similarity of agenda in
the meetings attended points to the limited (some might say lack of)
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progress made by the ruooe over the last three years. Ln spite of
the fact that the IUOOe, in particular the ASTMS, has claimed
substantial growth in membership amongst employees of the operators,
the UKOOA members (with the exception of Star) have successfully
witheld recognition.
It was in the handling of this matter that the shortcomings
of, and difficulties facing, the ruooe were most apparent.
Undoubtedly their task was difficult but this is all the more reasor.
for the Committee to make the best use of avenues open to then'.•
Whatever their limitations the Liaison Panel meetings are the only
formal, direct line of communication to the oil companies
collectively. By raising matters with the Panel the rUGoe can bring
them to the attention of UKOOA as a whole. Hence it seemed strange,
given the potential value of these meetings, that the Committee was
so poorly prepared. To expect anything of great value to come fro~
a meeting for which the agenda was sUbmitted only minutes before is
naive, not to say unprofessional. When approaching wage
negotiations the individual union officers do not submit the c La i r.
on the morning that the negotiations open: instead this is done so~e
time in advance to allow management to prepare a response. Prio:-
submission of the agenda is particularly relevant in light of the
fact that the Panel cannot speak for the oil companies eithe:-
individually or collectively. Thus if the ruooc want a response
from the Panel it is necessary to submit the matter to the Panel
prior to an EPe meeting held before the ruooe and Panel are due to
meet.
Secondly, holding an rUGac meeting on the morning of the Pane:
meeting restricts unnecessarily the time available for the latter.
Some managers on the Panel were London-based, and some of the
officers themselves were based some distance from Aberdeen (es
Inverness, Norwich) and therefore had trains or planes to catch.
The officers themselves have heavy workloads which may require the~
to attend a meeting or undertake a journey after the meeting. To C~
effective the Committee must make maximum use of the time available,
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and this cannot be done by taking an hour and a half to two hours to
decide what to talk about with the PaneL Some of the matters
raised in pre-meetings had absolutely nothing to do with the Panel -
for instance the question of arranging a visit to lobby the Shadow
energy spokesman, and election of office bearers.
Thirdly, the lack of preparation reduces the effectiveness of
the case the Committee is able to present, particularly with regard
to recognition problems. The Committee is well aware that the Panel
is not at liberty to discuss specific companies, yet they
persistently attempt to do so. Not only is this a futile exercise,
it makes the Committee look unprofessional and, more important,
damages its credibility.
Furthermore it was sometimes the case that some of the union
officers would go over and over the same ground without making any
fresh points. Again this happened in connection with the
recognition issue, but also with regard to contractors. This could
perhaps be due to the fact that each officer is used to a
considerable degree of autonomy, and to being his own spokesman.
Whatever the reason, it wastes valuable time.
Because the Iuaac members had not properly prepared themselves
for the meeting, the items on the agenda were not listed in order of
priority, nor responses prepared. To some extent it seemed the
Committee threw an idea across the table to see what happened, and
was then disappointed with the result. The most glaring example of
the failure to establish priorities occurred at the March 1987 Panel
meeting when the best part of half an hour was spent discussing the
access given by operating companies to academic researchers (this
item did not refer to the author's presence). This was a waste of
valuable time given that the meeting was due to return to the
Chinook issue. It also suggests a lack of discipline in the
Committee. Shop stewards are warned against getting bogged down in
trivialities (such as the canteen) in their training on negotiating
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practice as this diverts attention from more serious issues. This
is exactly what happened at the March meeting. The Panel were
probably quite happy to spend time on the research issue (initiated
and sustained by the IUaaC) a 'tea and toilets' matter, albeit an
intellectual one.
The intense frustration generated by the continued failure to
overcome the opposition is understandable. The trade union officers
are trying to do a difficult job (particularly in the present
economic and legislative climate) in organising a workforce which
already enjoys superb terms and conditions.
The Panel is made up of highly trained professional managers,
well aware of the relative positions of the two parties. It was
therefore unwise to suggest once, let alone several times, that the
Panel meetings were futile and the Committee should therefore
withdraw from them. Some hawkish companies may yet call their bluff
and, whatever their inadequacies, these meetings are the only door
open to the unions. If they slam it shut they could hold their
progress up for years. The dramatic tearing up of the Memorandum of
Understanding may prove to be an expensive gesture the Committee can
ill afford. The Commi ttee 's limited progress cannot be credi ted
solely to the intransigence of the operating companies: they must
look at the effectiveness of the ruaac and put their own house in
order. The Panel is not simply holding toe unions at bay, the
Committee restricts its own effectiveness.
ane consequence of the lack of Iuaac coordination between
Panel meetings is that everything is prolonged: cor respondence is
slower going out; the Secretary, carrying a heavy workload, is
forced to decide which matters should take priority, inevitably a
subjective decision; and there is no doubt that certain things get
put aside indefinitely. For example, at the Panel meeting of
December 1986, the Secretary of the IUaaC said that problems had
arisen over the years from the loose wording of the guidelines
(Memorandum of Understanding) and therefore the Committee intended
to review them. The subject was never mentioned again.
219
As it stands the Committee's problems are to some extent self
perpetuating; some of the officers question the value of the
meetings with the LP, if not the value of the Committee itself,
given its limited progress, and this perhaps also contributes to the
relat i vely low attendance. However, if the Commit tee was better
organised and prepared, it could be more effective. But it won't
become more effective until it becomes better organised.
The shortcomings of the ruooc are only one of the factors
identified as contributing to the difficulties of the union movement
in organising the employees of the major oil companies. In the past
the usual explanation given for this has been the physical and
logistical difficulties of organising a scattered workforce. In the
next chapter this factor, and others, will be discussed.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
OBSTACLES TO OFFSHORE TRADE UNION ORGANISATION
·The role of the unions will grow in importance, particularly
with respect to their policies towards manning and
demarcation. So far in the North Sea story the unions have
been remarkably quiet: it is unrealistic to suppose that, once
production rather than exploration and development has become
the main North Sea activity, the unions will not assume a much
more influential role than at present. So far the companies
have been only too happy to see the unions kept at a distance,
as indeed has been the government. This situation will not
last much longer.· (1)
The pattern of industrial relations described in this thesis
suggests that it was in fact Arnold who was "unrea l i st Lc" in his
forecasts of 1978, as the companies have indeed kept the unions at a
distance, unless it suited their purposes to do otherwise. In this
chapter a number of factors will be identified as contributing to
the successful continuation of the operators' policy of pragmatism
towards trade union involvement and recognition.
The usual explanation given is the geographical isolation of
the offshore workforce, and the fact that the workforce is scattered
when onshore. For example, the 1987 Oil and Gas Update, produced by
Grampian Regional Council, estimated that in 1987 only 32% of
offshore workers lived in the Grampian Region (2), in spite of the
fact that the operating companies have tried to encourage their
offshore employees to move to the Aberdeen area, and contractors
seeking to reduce their travel costs have sought to recruit
Aberdeen-based personnel, with the result that many obtained an
Aberdeen address, at least fo r postal purposes. Undoubtedly the
location of the workforce offshore, and its subsequent dispersement
during leave periods creates difficulties for the trade unions in
recruiting and retaining members. Trade union officers cannot stand
at the factory gate, for instance.
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Maintaining the lines of communication is dif f i cuI t: branch
meetings are impossible offshore, and almost impossible onshore,
given the geographical spread of the membership and their apathy.
Having spent a fortnight away from family and friends, attendance at
union meetings usually ranks low on their list of priorities. In
addition, these communication difficulties make it very difficult to
organise and co-ordinate support from the membership in pursuit of a
particular line of action. For example, Buchan wrote of the
catering workers' strike of 1979:
"The reason for the ultimate failure of the trade union action
sterns directly from the problems connected with organising and
representing an offshore workforce. The trade unions were
hampered by problems of co-ordination of effort and
communication of intent." (3)
Similarly, efforts by the EETPU and AEU to organise a strike in 1986
as part of a campaign to obtain a post construction agreement were
abandoned, largely because by the time a strike ballot was organised
(in compliance with legislation) the oil price had plummeted and
there was great uncertainty in the industry.
However, the geographical isolation of the workforce is too
simple an explanation. In similar circumstances the NUS manages ~o
maintain contact with its (dwindling) membership without the
facility of visiting vessels at sea by helicopter. With sufficient
will and commitment on the part of union hierarchies, for example
investment in a computerised register of members working offshore,
something could perhaps have been done towards reducing the problem
posed by a scattered workforce.
The 1980s have been a traumatic time for the trade union
movement in Britain as a whole. Union density has fallen from a
peak of 55% in 1979 to 43% in 1985 and continues to fall. Between
1979 and 1986 total union membership fell by almost three million
(22.3%). There is no doubt that legislation passed by successive
Conservative governments since 1979 has made it more difficult for
unions to undertake, and mobilise support for, industrial action of
any kind. Hence when the electricians and engineering unions
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attempted to undertake a strike in 1986, their attempt to ballot the
workforce, as required by legislation, was hindered by the refusal
of contractors to supply names of those in their employment. This
assistance was vital if everyone entitled to vote was to receive a
ballot paper, since the loss and gain of contracts by firms results
in constant movements by workers between employers, movements with
which the District Officers were not kept up to date. Furthermore
the legislation in respect of secondary action effectively prohibits
mobilisation of workers not employed by the employer in the dispute
(unless they are employed by a customer, supplier or associated
employer of the employer concerned) as immunities in respect of
claims for damages will be lost in these circumstances.
As well as drastic membership loss resulting from a rapid
increase in unemployment, and the constraints imposed by
legislation, the union movement has been affected by significant
changes in the pattern of work. Firstly, the effects of the
recession have not been spread evenly across all industrial sectors,
and those industries which have been worst hit are in the main to be
found in the traditional trade union heartland. On the other hand,
the two areas considered to have most growth potential with regard
to employment - the service and high technology sectors - have a
much higher incidence of non-unionism.
Secondly, there have been significant demographic changes in
the pattern of employment. Between 1980 and 1985 1. 5 million male
jobs were lost, compared with 300,000 female jobs. Since mid 1983,
there has actually been an increase in female employment. However,
this has been almost totally in part-time employment, and mainly in
jobs which are difficult for trade unions to organise effectively
and efficiently, eg in supermarkets, hotels, and in the 'hi-tech'
sector where the incidence of non-unionism is high. In addition,
the number of self-employed has risen considerably, almost 400,000
since mid 1983, all potential union members. (5)
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Thirdly, it has been argued (6) that new companies,
particularly in the I hi-tech I industries, have sought a new labour
force often young, often women, and without trade union
experience. The nature of the work in the expanding hi-tech sector
referred to earlier also has implications for the trade union
movement: people tend to work on their own, as opposed to on a
production line, the latter being more likely to induce
collecti v i sm , These jobs also pay relatively well, provide high
levels of job satisfaction, and the individual emphasis is often
enhanced by pay systems which reward individual achievement.
There have been changes in the labour force itself. Home
ownership is common and increasing among the membership of even the
most militant unions, and for large sections of the labour force
there is no longer an automatic identification with the traditional
socialist ideals which some trade union leaders still espouse and
pursue. This was borne out in the 1983 General Election, when even
a quarter of the unemployed voted Eor the Conservatives.
Yet all of the above are problems of the 1980s. The feature
which requires explanation is the failure of the unions to organise
effectively the offshore industry prior to becoming beset with the
crises of the eighties. Despite the relative buoyancy of the oil
industry there is no doubt that the prospect of joining a lengthy
dole queue induces compliance with management I s wishes on the part
of the workforce.
With regard to those employed by the operating companies,
there are several contributory factors. The interviewees themselves
cited a Wteam W or WfamilyW spirit created amongst the workforce on
an offshore installation which negated the need for any collective
organisation. Furthermore, some interviewees said many of the
workforce, certainly initially, had been recruited from the armed
services as it was believed that they and their families would
adjust more easily to the offshore work cycle. Having been in the
armed forces, these individuals had no experience of, and little
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propensity to join, trade unions. Others, interviewees claimed,
applied for offshore work in a bid to escape restrictive practices
at their place of work, and therefore had a negative attitude to
trade unions.
There is little doubt that the remuneration package enjoyed by
the employees of operators pre-empts trade union recruitment. A
survey carried out by an officer from the EE~PU (7) gave figures of
between £20,200 and £23, 000 (including offshore allowance) for an
"hypothetical operator-technician". This being the case it is
understandable that the unions have experienced some difficulty in
recruiting members from the operators' employees, given that they
could not hope to improve the terms and conditions. However the
survey highlighted "issues affect ing job securi ty" as "the primary
reason for joining and staying in a union for such workers" (8).
This will be discussed further below.
The previous chapter outlined claims from the IUOOC that they
had enjoyed some degree of success in recruiting a significant
proportion of the workforce in several companies, and had submitted
claims for recognition, which they had been pursuing at length.
Under previous legislation "there existed statutory machinery
whereby an independent union could seek to compel an employer to
grant it recognition through an application to ACAS"(9). This
provision in the Employment Protection Act 1975 was repealed in
1980, and therefore this avenue was closed to the trade union
movement, though the ASTMS did make use of ACAS' s good offices to
obtain the recognition agreements with Star Oil in 1985. The fact
that no such assistance was sought prior to 1980 suggests that the
IUOOC and its constituent unions had not achieved a significant
proportion of membership at that time.
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Union recruitment plans have fared better amongst workers in
the contract sectors. As discussed in chapter 4, the AEU, EETPU and
GMB successfully pressed for an agreement covering hook-up work (the
OCA) and the EETPU have a post construction agreement. However,
application of the OCA is restricted to work carried out in the
installation's final position, and ends at the stipulation of the
operator, who is not a signatory to the agreement. Similarly the
latter agreement only applies to companies in the contractors'
associations. Despite persistent pressure the unions have been
unsuccessful in their attempts to achieve an agreement covering
non-electrical post-construction (ie maintenance) work.
A key element in the control of the the industrial relations
system as enjoyed by the operating companies is the practice of
competitive tendering. This has a number of implications for
industrial relations. Firstly, many workers have insecure
employment as they face being laid off if their employer loses a
contract, or at best are then at the mercy of the incoming
contractor. This is likely to reduce their propensity to challenge
management. Hence it is against their interests to agitate or
organise on behalf of a union. As one union officer put it, a few
years ago he had 60 shop stewards offshore, at the time of interview
(1985) he had four. This was partly due to a reduction in activity
as the industry's expansion reached a plateau, but also stemmed from
a fear on the part of the individuals concerned that they might be
"Not Required Back" (NRBed) or even put on a blacklist. Although
protected by law against dismissal for trade union activities, in
reality an individual is extremely vulnerable as the operators
retain the right to remove an individual from an installation, or
refuse to have an individual on board.
Secondly, the competitive tendering system in labour intensive
sectors discourages employers from entering into and retaining
collective agreements as they are perceived as handicapping the
firm's ability to compete. Hence unless all the firms in the market
agree to abide by a set wage rate (eg COTA), and this action is
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sanctioned by the operators, collective agreements are highly
unlikely to be made, and even if made, are unlikely to be applied.
The OCSA, for example, was not sanctioned and has never been used.
Thirdly, the operating companies 'vet' prospective contractors
(though to varying degrees) and this process includes an examination
of the industrial relations record of the contractor concerned.
The above factors are formidable obstacles for the union
movement to overcome, but the fact remains that there additional
difficulties stemming from the union movement itself. One of the
most significant was the multi union aspect, which gave rise to
inter-union rivalry. As a result, the unions concerned expended
time and energy fighting amongst themselves in the competition to
recruit operators' employees. This has been sharpened by the
stipulation in the Memorandum of Understanding (Recognition may be
Achieved) that "application for recognition would be made by the
IUOOC on behalf of one or more member unions on the basis of
applying to a Common Interest Group" (clause 3).
Observation of the ruooc both internally and in its dealings
with the Liaison Panel of UKOOA's EPC revealed a relative lack of
strategic thinking on the IUOOC I S part. For instance, though the
Committee agreed that at least some of the problems they were
experiencing in gaining recognition stemmed from loose wording of
the !'1emorandum, and that it should be redrafted, nothing was done
about it. Similarly, instead of making co-ordinated plans to step
up recruitment to achieve recognition, it appeared that the
Committee tended to go over the same issues again and again in
meetings, particularly with the Panel. Conversely, the Committee
proved to be most effective in a crisis as discussed in the previous
chapter. This is partly due to the reactive as opposed to proactive
nature of the union movement, but also to the heavy and diverse
workload borne by the individual officers. Offshore visits, for
example, take two working days from an officer's week, and it is in
any case difficult for officers to ~aintain a presence offshore as
228
visits are arranged at the operators discretion. Furthermore, none
of the officers' posts are confined to the oil industry; all are
required to service a membership which is scattered over a large
geographical area, and which is industrially diverse.
The problem of inter-union rivalry is not confined to the
IUOOC. It is one which has been cited as adversely effecting
British industrial relations, and has been one of the factors behind
the legislative reform of the industrial relations system by the
Conservative administrations since 1980. It inhibits the
effectiveness of the trade union movement at a micro and macro
level. For example the TUC has been absorbed for some time now in a
review of trade union strategy and structure which in theory is
commendable but in practice has centred around division in the
movement relating to the conduct of the EETPU, ostensibly with
regard to their collection of 'new style' or 'strike free I
agreements. In addition inter-union rivalry damages the movement IS
public image quite badly, as was seen in the Ford Dundee venture.
The situation is exacerbated nationally by the retention of autonomy
by individual unions and the limited authority of the TUC, and
locally, by the lack of authority of the IUOOC over its constituents.
Rivalry is fostered by the structure of the IUOOC, as touched
on in the previous chapter. The fact that the Secretary had held
office for about eight years inevitably put his union at an
advantage, but the Committee benefits from the continuity. With the
benefit of hindsight, it would seem sensible to suggest that the
movement's interests would have been better served if either a new
union had been established for the offshore workforce or, more
realistically, funding provided by the Tue or IUOOC constituent
unions to employ a Secretary from outside and set up premises,
preferably near the heliport. Furthermore, a paid, full time
officer of the Committee could organise and run the business of the
IUOOC more efficiently and therefore more effectively, simply
because that would be his or her only area of responsibility. Hence
projects such as the redrafting of the "Memorandum of Understanding,
Recognition may be Achieved", could be followed through.
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The loose wording of the Memorandum has been a handicap to the
Committee since it is wide open to a variety of interpretations.
The Secretary of the Committee expressed surprise that the Committee
(which included himself) had accepted the Memorandum as it stands.
Perhaps the Committee at the time (1977) had been complacent, to
some extent understandably. The government of the day was not
hostile to trade union aspirations. The union movement was
undergoing a period of sustained growth, and enjoyed considerable
influence in Whitehall. In 1976, the IUOOC submitted a Ten Point
.Charter (10) to the Energy Minister, Tony Benn (see overleaf). As a
result, the IUOOC were invited to send representatives, as were the
TUC, UKOOA and senior management from several operators, to meet
with the Minister. However, the eventual outcome was far less
radical than the Charter; it was in fact the Memorandum on Access.
According to campbell (11) the Charter was not even discussed with
the Secretary of State. This would appear to be a quite remarkable
oversight on the part of the union movement, not to mention a loss
of opportunity. It would be misleading, however, to overstate the
commonality of interest between the unions and the government.
Arnold wrote,
wcuriously, a Labour Government which is often ready enough to
press union matters in other respects has kept remarkably
quiet about union participation in anything to do with oil.
The government needed the oil to flow too urgently to
contemplate any union complications and to the end of 1977 had
had very few of them •••.•••••••••••••• (12)
The unions ••••• tend to blame the government for not exerting
greater pressure upon the oil companies. The government,
whatever the Labour Party's ties with the trade union movement
may be, has been more interested in getting the oil flowing
fast and so has not wanted to promote more clashes with the
companies than necessary.W(l3)
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TEN POINT CHARTER
1. That all companies engaged in the offshore oil industry in
exploration, extraction and production recognise the right of the
IUOOC to recruit, represent and to negotiate terms and conditions of
employment for all employees falling within their sphere of
influence.
of access for
discussions
2. The right
installations for
representatives.
Trade Union officials to
with their members and
visit
elected
3. The application of a single Code of Health and Safety which
will cover all aspects of the offshore operations i.e. the
incorporation of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.
4. The setting up of a National Board (Offshore Development)
which would deal with wages and conditions and regulations of all
personnel working offshore. The Board will be representative of the
workers and the management of the various enterprises.
5. Inherent to the establishment of the Board would be that all
personnel would become members of the appropriate trade union.
6. The Board will work in close relationship with all relevant
Government departments to ensure that the industry was answerable to
Parliament.
7. The establishment of an agreed conciliation procedure which
would speedily resolve issues of dispute.
8. The acceptance by all employers of the check-off system of
dealing with trade union subscriptions.
9. That all future licences be issued conditional on the rights
of employees being represented by the IUOOC.
10. That it should be a further condition of licence that standby
vessels, supply ships, survey ships and barges irrespective of flag
should conform to British manning and safety standards.
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As the rate of expansion slowed dramatically in the early to
mid eighties and contractors' personnel particularly those in
hook-up work - were facing a relative shortage of work and pressure
on their level of earnings, certainly in comparison with those of
five years previously, one might have expected the unions to have
had more success. The harsh reality of the situation is that the
operators will not sanction a post construction agreement and
individual contractors will not enter a collective agreement as they
believe it inhibits their ability to successfully compete with their
peers. The letter shown in Appendix E demonstrates this. The date
is particularly significant (1982); it demonstrates that the
problems experienced by contractors (and their employees) existed at
least three and a half years before the pr ice collapse of 1986.
This lends further weight to the argument that the price fall had at
most a catalytic or exaggerating impact, as opposed to a causal
effect, on the industrial relations system.
Prospects for Change
There are a number of factors to take into consideration when
assessing the prospects for change in trade union fortunes. As
things stand at the moment, it would seem imperative that a
government of a considerably different hue would need to be elected
for trade union organisation to progress offshore, as legislative
support, particularly along the lines of the statutory recognition
procedure, appears essential for the unions to make headway.
Similarly reform of the legislation relating to secondary industrial
action would allow the Iuaac unions to mobilise the better organised
sectors in the industry more easily, eg the dockers, construction
workers and supply boat crews. It is virtually certain this will
not be attained in the next four years and, in the light of present
circumstances in the opposition parties, is perhaps unlikely for
some time after that.
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At the grass roots level, fears of job security, redundancy
or, in the wake of the Piper Alpha and Ocean Odyssey disasters,
safety may stimulate the growth of interest in union membership
amongst operators' personnel as fields are seen to approach the end
of their economic life. There is no doubt that the price crash of
1986 and the pessimistic forecasts which followed sent shock waves
through the offshore staff, bringing with them the realisation that
perhaps they did not have a job for life. Indeed one trade union
off icial believes unionisation to be inevitable, but realistically
points out that this will be when the fields are running dry, and
the union will have little bargaining strength. As he put it, the
unions "will be left to pick up the pieces".
The above are long term speculations, but there is something
more immediate which may have repercussions in the oil industry, and
many others. That is the expulsion of the EETPU from the Tue.
Since the IUOOe is technically a Tue sub-committee, the electricians
found themselves expelled from that too, until the Tue Secretary
General intervened. Indeed, the EETPU was not permitted to attend
the special meetings of the IUOOe called to discuss the Piper
disaster. Nationally the EETPU have been seen to be eagerly
pursuing an aggressive recruitment policy, and the local officer's
articles in the press (14), which took oil companies and other
unions by surprise, suggest - indeed the Financial Times states,
"inter-union competition may be set to sharpen soon with a new
recruitment push among ••••• employees by the EETPU••• ".
Given that the Bridlington rules only apply between Tue affiliates,
harsher competition seems certain.
This scenario suggests several possibilities. These events
may stir the Iuooe into a more cohesive and more effective group,
though in light of the other obstacles facing the Committee,
individually and collectively, this is perhaps difficult to
envisage. Admittedly there has been one Iuoae meeting which was not
a Panel pre-meeting since the fieldwork ended and another was
scheduled at the time of writing, though this timetable was
superseded following the Piper disaster. Ironically these were
initiated by the EETPU.
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Secondly - and this is speculation - there is the possibility
that some operators, with an eye to the future and apprehensive as
to what the rundown of fields might result in for industrial
relations, might grasp the opportunity to concede recognition to
what they perceive as a WtameW union, perhaps opting for the single
union, no strike deals which have ultimately led to the EETPU's
expulsion from the TUC. Certainly this course of action would avoid
piecemeal unionisation, and multi unionisation at that. This way
the employers could select the union of their choice (probably
without a beauty contest). The EETPU absorbed the Professional
Divers' Association in 1988, and any eventual merger with the AEU
will make a single union solution more feasible.
A third factor to bear in mind is that the refusal on the part
of the other IUOOC unions to work with the EETPU may have been
perceived by some hawkish management as confirming their view of
British trade unions as disruptive and embroiled in squabbles
amongst themselves of which an employer has no wish to be part. If
this was the case, the appeal of the EETPU' s package will perhaps
grow.
Much more certain is that the Piper tragedy of 6th July 1988
will have repercussions in the industrial relations of the
industry. It is probable that concern amongst the workforce
regarding safety in the industry will grow, and there seems to be a
strong possibility that the unions' role in this area could become
increasingly significant. Admittedly the operator concerned in the
Chinook disaster successfully evaded involving the ASTMS (which it
recognised) but given the magnitude of the Piper tragedy, it is
unlikely that would be repeated. Furthermore, it is unlikely that
the operator involved, which has longstanding relationships with
several unions, would seek to follow such a path. The disaster has
demonstrated horrifically the potential danger of offshore work, and
workers and their families may seek a form of insurance in trade
union activity. The fact that within nine days of the tragedy two
helicopters '."ere put down on the sea, and the drilling rig Ocean
Odyssey exploded only a few weeks later, will exacerbate fears.
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It must be said, however, that the exclusion of the EETPU from Iuooe
discussions on the Piper matter generated bad publicity, as the
officer concerned was able to play to the gallery of reporters
waiting outside.
One element which may precipitate union organisation, and
particularly a post construction agreement, is the shortage of
certain skills, mainly construction related, which has been forecast
in the next few years. It is anticipated that a significant upsurge
in construction work onshore will attract people away from offshore
work, by offering longer term prospects, stable wage rates, and a
more orthodox industr ial relations environment, not to mention a
working environment which is perceived to be considerably less
hazardous. Indeed, at least one operator has already expressed
concern regarding the difficulty in attracting and retaining people
with appropriate skills (via contractors). The operators may find,
as they have done in the past, that they will have to consider
collective agreements to bring order and stability. It should be
borne in mind that large numbers of skilled personnel will be
required during the decommissioning and removal of offshore
installations.
All in all there seems little doubt that trade union interest
and membership amongst operators' employees is growing. However in
these companies a policy of resistance is being successfully pursued
and it is likely that this will continue to be the case for the
foreseeable future. The most fruitful period for offshore unions
otherwise is likely to be when fields are nearing the end of their
economic life and workers feel threatened by redundancy. By then,
however, the workforce, unionised or not, will be bargaining from a
position of weakness; a case of too little too late.
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CHAPTER TWELVE
CONCLUSIONS
The main purpose of the thesis was to discover how industrial
relations are managed in a turbulent and fragmented industry. It
was hoped that a study of the management of labour in these extreme
circumstances might contribute to the broader understanding of
industrial relations policy making. Therefore the study was
extended beyond the conventional confines of the relationship
between employer and employee, to include an examination of the
relationship between clients (operators) and contractors.
In a relatively short period of time an industrial relations
system of some complexity has developed. At both industry and
company level a number of factors have been identified which exert
influence on this. With regard to the operating companies,
collective bargaining has developed at industry level in the form of
regular, formal meetings between the Liaison Panel of the Employment
Practices Committee (EPC) of the UK Offshore Operators Association
(UKOOA), and the Inter Union Offshore Oil Committee (IUOOC), which
is complemented by the representation of both parties on the
Offshore Petroleum Industry Training Board (OPITB). However UKOOA
cannot bind its constituents, and each company retains autonomy in
and responsibility for industrial relations.
At the level of the individual company, peers exercise
influence and control over each other by means of their commercial
alliances, which are formed to spread the enormous financial risks
involved in the exploration for and production of oil and gas. The
operating companies are paternal and sophisticated in their attitude
to their own employees in the sense that emphasis is placed on
"looking after" employees; remuneration schemes are generous, merit
based, and include benefits such as non-contributory pension
schemes, share options, and free (or highly subsidised) canteen
facilities. In addition, consultative machinery is well established
and developed. In 1984, one of the parent companies even went as
far as making the cover of the company report a "tribute" to its
employees.
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The recruitment and remuneration policies of the operators
reduce the propensity of operators' employees to become organised
collectively, though this is not the sole reason behind them.
Ex-service personnel, the preferred recruits for the operators, at
least initially, have no experience of trade unions. This, together
with the generous remuneration and benefits package, left the unions
with a difficult task.
As regards contractors and trade unions, however, the attitude
of the operators can be described as pragmatic, if not ambivalent.
The operators speak collectively (but without commitment) through
the Contractors Liaison Subcommittee of UKOOA, while simultaneously
pursuing individual relationships with relevant contractors. The
case study of the catering sector, developed in chapter 9, together
with the data in chapters 7 and 8, demonstrate that the operating
companies are indeed active in monitoring and influencing
contractors' industrial relations, albeit to varying degrees. The
ability of the operators to stipulate when trade union agreements
will or will not apply demonstrates that the operators effectively
shape the system. The system itself can be viewed as a subtle web
of inter-relationships and influences, which is constantly dynamic
in that its appearance, and the principal actors, change according
to the stage of development in a field.
A central feature of this dynamic system is the spreading or
delegation of responsibility for industrial relations which
parallels the spread of financial risk. This is achieved by
maintaining a high level of use of contractors, and periodic
encouragement, when expedient, of contractors' associations, trade
union involvement and collective agreements. These features are
complemented by the overall development of a two tier workforce in
the industry (operator and contractor) described in more depth in
chapter 3. This surrender of responsibility is not accompanied by
surrender of control however, as. was demonstrated by the contractor
interviewe~s' responses and attendance at meetings between the ruooc
and the EPC's Liaison Panel.
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The experiences of the contractors examined differed markedly
from those of the operators. The confines of the client-contractor
relationship pose specific problems for service companies
concerned. Firstly, the act of bidding requires considerable
managerial and financial resources, particularly in the construction
and hook up sector. Money lost in preparation of an unsuccessful
tender must be recouped from future work, thereby incurring
additional costs. Secondly the allocation of work by regular
competitive tendering has resulted in a harsh commercial
environment, as the pace of North Sea development has slowed in the
1980s. This has led to a number of significant effects in
industrial relations, including cuts in real wage levels, and
removal of concessions such as travel payments, and survival
training for contractors' employees (though still a requirement for
offshore work, recruitment advertisements state it is essential for
applicants to hold them).
Thirdly, conventional employment patterns cannot accommodate
the requirement on contractors for numerical flexibility as they
"man-up" or "de-man" on winning or losing contracts. Hence the
widespread use of employment agency licences and recruitment
campaigns in the press, in addition to the employees enjoying
differing contracts of employment, and differing pay rates and
benefits.
Fourthly, though nominally responsible for their own industrial
relations, and therefore their relationship with trade unions, in
reality the contractors are considerably constrained. Though
technically free to enter collective agreements, this freedom is
curtailed by the knowledge that unless the application of an
agreement is sanctioned by the client or operating companies, the
contractor will not win work. The most significant agreement in the
North Sea, the Offshore Construction Agreement (OCA), ceases to
apply when the operator so stipulates; the operator is not a
signatory. The OCA' s 'sister I agreement, the Offshore Construction
Services Agreement (OCSA), was not sanctioned by the operating
companies, and has never been used; this is testimony to the
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dominance of the client companies and their wishes in the industrial
relations system. Industrial relations in contracting companies are
constantly monitored by the operators, albeit to varying degrees,
and the clients can conduct audits when they so wish.
In the boom period of the 1970s, the vagaries of the system
were less apparent as there was more than enough work to go round,
and wage rates were sustained. However, as the pace of development
slowed at the turn of the decade, and the number of companies
bidding for work grew, the commercial climate changed dramatically.
As previously stated (chapter 4) for contractors, fortunes had
changed some considerable time before the price collapse of 1986.
Yet despite the apparent success of this line of policy, there
have been signs that overall strategic thinking has not been as
imaginative or all-embracing as circumstances suggest. For example,
the downturn in the industry's fortunes in 1986 illustrated that at
least one company was unprepared for redundancies and, more widely,
that the EPC had no contingency plans for such an event. As a
result, UKOOA' s line can be viewed as inconsistent; pursuing an
interventionist policy one minute (eg in establishing the Catering
Offshore Trade Association, COTA) and sitting on the fence the next
(eg refusing to say to COTA that only COTA bids would be accepted).
Furthermore, the potentially damaging implications of the two tier
workforce, and extensive use of contract labour have only been
addressed as they have made themselves apparent. In particular this
concern relates to problems experienced in recruiting and retaining
a contractor workforce with the skills and levels of competence
required and, in the longer term, to a reduction in training,
resulting in an ageing workforce.
The operators' approach is short term and pragmatic. When
expedient trade union involvement and collective bargaining is
sanctioned, indeed encouraged, to impose stability in potentially
volatile and disruptive circumstances, though it must be borne in
mind that the operating companies themselves on the whole actively
resist a trade union presence in their own companies, and are not
party to any offshore negotiating agreements in the Northern sector.
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The operators' stance on unionisation is perhaps better
understood by looking at British industrial relations in a wider
context. The boom period of the oil industry in the North Sea
coincided with the period when British trade unionism was at its
zenith in terms of both numbers and influence; the movement was
believed by many to have been instrumental in bringing down Heath's
government in 1974; Britain had experienced power cuts and a three
day week; and some believed that Jack Jones, leader of the TGWU, was
more powerful than the Prime Minister. Dominance of the industry by
American companies is another important factor; and their experience
of trade unionism is very different, and in some ways far less
political, than that of the UK. Indeed, one interviewee cited the
risk of being used as a political weapon by the unions as a reason
for resisting unionisation. Another explained that in the USA,
trade unions had been tarnished by the links between the Teamsters
Union and organised crime.
The problems encountered by the trade unions in organising the
oil industry workforce were discussed at length in the previous
chapter. Geographical isolation of the workforce is the usual
explanation given, but there are others equally pertinent. To begin
with, the workforce is fragmented, the most obvious division being
between operators and service companies. However, the workforce is
also very heterogeneous, and this accentuates the fragmentation
observed amongst the trade unions themselves. Inter-union rivalry,
a prominent feature in the British trade union movement, diverts
energies and attention from the task in hand. This was observed
during attendance at Iuaae meetings. Furthermore, the Iuaae is
hampered by its apparent lack of effective coordination prior to and
between its meetings with the Liaison Panel. This in turn is linked
to internal, organisational problems, some of which extend beyond
the confines of the oil industry. For example, falling membership
amongst trade unions in the 1980 I S has placed greater emphasis on
the recruitment role of full time officers. The failure of the
individual unions, and the TUe, to allocate sufficient resources to
Iuaae activities has also hampered their work. Setting up a new
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union to recruit oil industry workers or pooling resources to employ
a full time Secretary to the Committee would have decreased the
rivalry difficulties, as well as maximising the effectiveness of
trade union efforts.
The trade unions' achievements should be acknowledged. The
difficulties caused by falling membership have been mentioned.
Legislation perceived as hostile to trade unions has necessarily
made them more defensive, as well as limiting their ability to
undertake industrial action. The key factors regarding the oil
industry however, are the competitive bid system and the recruitment
and remuneration policies of the operating companies. The
competitive bid system effectively shapes the industrial relations
system, certainly as far as contractors and their employees are
concerned. The client companies encourage or ignore trade union
involvement and collective agreements according to their interests.
Hence, to achieve stability the operators accepted, indeed
encouraged, the formation of COTA, but when the downturn came, UKOOA
would not make the commitment to accept bids from COTA members only,
thereby inducing instability and uncertainty, though the catering
sector appears to be in equilibrium once more. This instance
further highlights the role of management in the operating companies
in giving recognition. However, in a time of crisis (eg the Chinook
incident) the IUOOC demonstrated its ability to make a concerted
approach, and to act quickly and effectively.
In short, the research revealed the existence of collective
bargaining in the industry, on an informal basis, functioning less
through collective agreements than through constant lobbying.
The industry has been described in terms of core and
periphery, but closer examination has led to the conclusion that the
naive core-periphery model is not sufficiently sophisticated to
describe and explain adequately the pattern of employment
relationships and influences found. The model does not acknowledge
or accommodate the 'waterfall' effect of the core-periphery pattern,
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by which is meant the development by the contractors of a similar
pattern, which is itself directly attributable to the allocation of
work by means of competitive tendering. In effect, contractors'
employees may simultaneously be part of the client's and the
contractor's periphery.
Pollert's contribution to the core-periphery debate raises a
valid point by suggesting that the core-periphery pattern owes more
to employers' desire for control, rather than flexibility (1).
Ahlstrand's work (a study of the influential Fawley productivi ty
agreements 20 years on) links together two industrial relations
strategies of Fawley management; the increased use of contractor
labour (which can be thought of as movement towards a core-periphery
pattern) and the long term withdrawal of union organisation from the
site. There is a further similarity between this research and
Ahlstrand's work. He writes:
ftFawley management's control of contractor industrial
relations actually includes the 'joint' devising of wage
negotiation strategies. The extent to which control is
exerted by Fawley management is evidenced by the fact that it
will actually intervene in the hiring and firing of the
industrial relations personnel of the contracting companies.
In more than one instance Esso was instrumental in terminating
the employment of a contractor industrial relations
manager. ft(2)
Hence it would appear that an increased use of contractor labour,
and intervention in the industrial relations of contractors are not
confined to the exploration and production industry; they are key
components in a strategy pursued by MNC' s directed at maximising
control and devolving responsibility, while simultaneously retaining
the conventional benefits in terms of efficiency and economy of
engaging outside contractors.
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In conclusion, the research has confirmed the view of many
authors that the employer plays a predominant role in shaping the
industrial relations system. However the system revealed in this
study was not based on a straightforward employer and employee
relationship. Instead, the research dealt with an industry where
internal organisation is dominated by external markets, in a highly
interconnected network of dependency between firms, placing labour
in a weak position. Yet despite this, and contrary to popular
belief, labour is organised perhaps surprisingly well, albeit that
organisation is concentrated in particular sectors. More
significant is the revelation that much of the union organisation
certainly in the contractor sectors - has resulted largely from the
need of the operating companies to accept collect ive bargai.ning to
bring stability to the industry. The clients therefore maintain an
ongoing, institutionalised relationship with trade unions and
respond to their lobbying. Thus the management of labour in this
turbulent, high risk industry is achieved by spreading risk and
responsibility, while simultaneously exerting influence over the
environment within which contractors must operate.
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APPENDIX A
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR THE OPERATING COMPANIES
A series of structured interviews
participating operating companies, covering
following headings:
1) Company Structure
2) Industrial Relations Policies
3) Union Recognition
was held
questions
in
under
the
the
4) Industrial Relations and Subcontractors
5) Consultative Arrangements and Grievance Procedures
6) Remuneration
7) Structure of the Labour Force
8) Fringe Benefits - BUPA, pensions, school fees etc.
9) Training Policy
10) Job Flexibility and Job Evaluation Schemes
11) The Relative Importance of North Sea Operations to the
Group as a whole.
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APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR CONTRACTOR COMPANIES
Structured interviews in the sample group of contractor
companies covered questions under the following headings:
1) Preparation of a bid
2) Length of contracts
3) Monitoring of industrial relations by operators
4) Workforce profile
5) Trade Union Recognition
6) Commercial Environment
AP?SUO:X C
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON TRADE UNION ACCESS TO OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS
"The Government is extending employment legislation to
offshore areas in order to contribute to s e cu r e industrial
rela t i on s between employers and workers. This legislatior:
includes the recog:1ition provisions of t~e
Protection Act 1975.
Access of union of=icials for union recr'...li~men1: purposes
to workers offshore does, however, preser:t pa r t i cu La r
It is the agreed inten1:ion of Gover::men1:,
the opera1:ors, and the trade '...l:1ions, tha1: all reasonable
aC1:ion should be taken to facili1:ate access. The operators
(the members of the UKODA) have, therefore, individually
agreed that: they and the sub-contractors working for then
will take appropriat:e action to ensure that: trade union
officials, on request, are granted reasonable access for
recr'...litment purposes to all their offshore installations.
It is not possible to lay down exact details of conditions
of access. These mus c depend on operat:ional circumstances
and the number o f requests made by unions. However, the
Advisory, Concilia1:ion and Arbi1:ration ',.;ill be
available 1:0 assist employers and unions faced wlth any
partic~lar difficultiss. '1
16Mayl98S
Mr
ABERDEEN
Dear Mr
I refer to your recent application and subsequent interview for the post of Heat
Treatment Technician within this Company and write to confirm the appointment
commencing on 11 May 1988.
The appointment is made on a temporary basis. The contract may be renewed or
extended for a further period by mutual agreement. Any employment with a previous
employer including does not count as part of your
period of continuous employment with this Company.
,
You should refer all matters relating to your welfare or appointment to c
Heat Treatment Co-ordinator.
Your rate of pay for the work will be £3.S0 per hour for all hours worked, signed, agreed
and paid for by our Client. fa.. 40 hour week Monday to Friday of ~ hours per day is
presently in operation. Any hours worked over and above 40 hours per week will be paid
at times one and one third basic rate irrespective of the day or time of day the overtime
hours are worked.
~'hilst working offshore you will be paid at the rate of £S.OO per hour for all hours
worked, signed, agreed and paid for by the Client from check in on outward journey to
check in on returning to heliport.
No payment will be made for leave or for travelling.
Salaries are payable monthly in arrears to a bank account nominated by yourself but
payment is dependent on the prompt submission to your Departmental Co-ordinator of
timesheets supported by signed worksheets. In practice this means that hours worked eg
in March will be paid at the end of April. Only hours signed for by the client will be paid
and it is important that you obtain ~he necessary signatures before leaving the site.
Whilst the Company will endeavour to give as much notice of termination of employment
as possible, this contract does not provide for periods of notice and your acceptance of
same is conditional upon you waiving your rights to notice in accordance with the
Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978.
·.2..
The Company will supply you with bed and breakfast accommodation only if required.
Expenses where appropriate should be submitted on an official Company expense claim
form together with appropriate receipts and forwarded to your Departmental Co-
ordinator for authorisation prior to payment. Expense Claims will not be accepted unless
supported by receipts.
Annual and public holidays are not provided for under this agreement. Additionally the
Company provides no pension rights.
If you are unavoidably absent due to sickness, you must notify your Departmental Co-
ordinator as soon as possible but not later than mid-day on the first day of absence.
Sickness causing an absence from work of not more than 7 days should be evidenced by a
Company Self Certification Form which is available from your Departmental Co-
ordinator or the Personnel Department. Absences of eight or more days require a
Doctors Medical Statement in addition to the Self Certification Form. No payment other
than Statutory Sick Pay, if appropriate, will be made by the Company during periods of
sickness.
Any extension of the Contract for a period in excess of .52 weeks is conditional upon you
waiving your rights to notice and to claim unfair dismissal at the end of the term in
accordance with the Employment Protection Consolidation Act 1978 as amended by the
Employment Act 1980.
Similarly in the event of the Contract continuing for over 104 weeks it is understood that
your right to claim redundancy payment on expiry will also be waived.
It is a condition of employment that employees causing damage or loss to Company
vehicles or equipment through negligence may be held liable for the first £ 100 of repair
or replacement costs.
It is a condition of employment that whilst you are working for any Company within the
. or thereafter you shall not make use of or disclose to
any third party any information or knowledge gained during the course of your
employment relating to the Company's records, methods of operation, proprietary
equipment, research projects and plant or equipment under development.
The foregoing also applies in respect of such information or knowledge gained from other
Companies or individuals with whom ' has business or
commercial associations.
Failure to comply with the above provisions will be regarded as gross misconduct and
may render employees liable to instant dismissal and or legal action.
The Company has prepared Grievance/Disciplinary Procedures and copies are available
for inspection from your Departmental Co-ordinator or Personnel Department. Your
Departmental Co-ordinator or his acting deputy has the authority to take disciplinary
action against you, if appropriate.
••3••
You are required to conform to all safety regulations in force within your work location
and must wear appropriate protective clothing as and when required. The Company will
provide suitable protective clothing if requested but its cost will be to your own account
and will subsequently be deducted from your salary.
In accordance with the Health & Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, I enclose herewith for
your perusal a copy of the Company's Statement of Safety Policy.
In order that various administrative matters may be concluded as quickly as possible it
would be appreciated if you would complete and or forward the following documents to
the Personnel Department on taking up your appointment.
i) Acceptance of Employment (Enclosed)
ii) New Employee Information Form (Enclosed)
iii) Passport Details Form (Enclosed)
iv) Income Tax Form P45
v) All certificates, diplomas or approvals
vi) Driving Licence (if appropriate)
vii) Transfer Record (Radiation Workers only)
viii) Current Medical Certificate (Offshore Workers only)
Original documents such as certificates, driving licences etc will be copied and returned
to you.
Plea~e acknowledge receipt of this letter signifying your acceptance of the foregoing
appomtment on the terms stated and confirming that you commenced duties on 11 May
198&.
Finally, may I take this opportunity of welcoming you to the Company. I hope you will
find the post both interesting and rewarding.
Yours sincerely
Administration Manager
~~i
APPE~DIX E
8th February, 1982
Full-time Official
Dear [Iir.
MAINTENANCE AGREEMENT (MA).
I am writing to formally advise you that, after due discussion
within the Company, it has been decided that the Company does no~
wish to re-negotiate terms and conditions of employment unde~ the
above agreement. With effect from 1st May, 1982 the Company will
cease to operate the MA conditions of employment.
It is considered that the ~emunera~ion and conditions of service in
this agreement are restric~ing the ability of the Company to
negotiate new contracts in the extremely competitive environment
brought about by the current national recession.
However, the Company are prepared to submit to you, for information,
terms and conditions of employment for maintenance type work offshore,
which it wishes to apply with effect from 1st May, 1982 and I would be
pleased to discuss with you a suitable date and time in the near
future, when we may get together to discuss the implications of this
decision.
Yours since~ely,
AP?:::-lD IX •
OCA!84!17
THE CONSTITUTION FOR THE OFFSHORE CONTRACTORS' COUNCIL
AND ITS SUBSIDIARY COMMITTEES
1 • N;'':·lE
The Council shall be ~no·wn as the Of:snore Contrac~~rs' Counci~ and ~s
established by the 3 Constit:lent Associations na;:-.ely the Electri::al
Contractors of Scotland, the Electrical Corrt r a c t o r s and the Oil and
Chemical Plant Constructors Associations.
2. ME~!BERSHIP
i) The Council shall comprise:
a) Three members nominated by the :::lectrical Con t r act.o r s '
As soc i a t i on of whom one shall be ~:::e Direc~:Jr of ~::e
Association.
b) Three members nominated by the :::lec~::ical Corrt.zac t.o r s I
Association of Scotland of ~hom one shall be the Jirectcr
of the Association.
c) Six members nominated by the Oil
Constructors' Association of ~hom
Director of the Association.
and Chemical Plant
one shall be the
ii)
iii)
d) 'Iwo members nomi.na t.ed by the three above As soc i a t i cna
jointly.
Members of the Council, other than the Directors of the three
nominating Associations, shall be directors of their companies
or similar senior executives ~ith authority to ma~e poli::y
decisions and t o cornrni t the Lndus t.rv in the field of offshc~e
work.
Members shall be nor::1ally nominated or :::e-nc::1inated annually in
July.
3. OF THE cornc::..
T~e ter~ Offshore Cont=ac~~~g covers all fcr~s ~f C::shore and ::1shc=e
E~gineering Cons~=uc~~on ~VO~~ h2~ea:~er refer=e~ to as af:shc=e
Ccn:::::acti:1g.
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4. PURPOSES OF THE COUNCIL
The purposes of the Council shall be:-
i) To promote the concept of an offshore contracting industry.
ii) To maintain a liaison wit~ t~e industry's c!.ients, TrCCOA, and
any o t.he r r e Lavant; bodies, e.:::;. OSO, and to bring to r ne i r
attention any matters of concern to t~e offshore concrac~~rs.
iii) To approve policies for the negociations of agreements with t~e
trade unions or amendments thereto.
committees.
To oversee t~e of the manage::lent and other
v) To consider any other matter concerning offshore contracting.
vi) The members of the Council wi Ll, be expected to keep their
r espect i ve As soc i a t i.ons .in f ormed O~ develol=:ne::t.s and t::J ~~[1SU===
that t~e council does not sU9por~ policies ~hich are ~8nt=a~y =0
the policies of the constituent associations.
5. C8cIDUCT OF COUNCIL BUSI:JESS
i) The Council shall elect annually from amongst its membersn~p a
Chai~an and a Vice-Chai~an at the first meeting following the
annual nomination or re-nomination in accordance with clause 2
(iii), but excluding the Directors of the Constituent
Associations.
ii) The Chairman, or in his absence,
preside at meetings and shall have a
of a tie.
the Vice-Chai~an, shall
casting vote in the event
iii) The Council shall have
contracting, save only
nominating As soc i a t i orrs
pr:'or a9praval.
responsibility in the field of offshore
that it may not commit the respective
to f i naric i a I ~xpendi t ure 'Hi t.hout; their
Lv ) (10 substitutes ·.vill be allowed; in the event, however, of the
unavoidable absence of a norni na t.ed r e p r e s ent.a c i ve t~e relevant
cons t i t aent; associ.ation may appo i.n t; an a Lte r na t i ve ~e:n.::e:" i:1
accordance wit:-:' Sec~ian 2 (ii).
v) ':'~e Cou:1cil shall. conduct; its own cus i.rie s s as i:. sees ..:.; .. anc
vi) ~t leas~ ~~ree ~ee~~~9s of t~e Council shal: be ~eld an~ual:! ~f
whic~ ~~O shal: be i~ :ondon and one in Edinburgh. Addi:ional
meetings or al~ernate 'fenues may, however, be agreed.
vii) A quo r um shal2. ':Je 3 of whom at least 4 shall represent t:-:'e
Electrical Associations and 4, t~e O.C.P.C.A.
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6. THE OFFSHORE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
i) The Offshore Management Committee shall comprise:-
a) Four members
Council, who
Council.
appointed
need not
by the Offshore Contractors'
necessarily by members of ~~e
Five members elec-ted
of:shore cont=ac~~rs on
Cornmi, ttee of whom one
b) by postal ballot from among ".:::e
t~e C::shore Cont=ac~orsr Ge~e=al
sha':':' be t:-:e Chai_~an of ,,::--at
Committ.ee.
c) Three officials, bei~g
nominating Association.
cr..e :rcm e3.C~.. constit:..:e:1t
d) There shall be at least 4 2lectrical and .\ :-'ec'vclr'.j.cal
Contractor representatives on t::e ~anagement COTmictee at
all times.
~embers shall be nominated or re-nominated annually in July.
ii) T~e purposes of t:-Je :1anagement Cornrni. ~eee shall !::e:-
a) To negotiate and administer any collective agreements
there may be with the trade unions.
b) To maintain liaison with the 2mployer Practices Co~~ittee
of UKCOA and with individual client companies.
c) To consider any other
contracting industry
recommendations to the
matters relevant to the of f srio r e
and if appropriate to rnax e
Offshore Contractors' Council.
iii) The ~anagement Committee shall conduct its business in the same
manner as the Offshore Contractors' Council as set out in
paragraphs 5 (i), 5 (ii) and 5 (v) of t~is Constitution.
i v ) The :1anagement Cornrni t t.e e shal::' appo i nt; :i ::egot:'ati::g Pane::' ~o
negotiate with the trade unions.
v) The ~anagement Committee shall :-Jave
additional representatives as required.
vi) :4eetings of the :1anage!Tlent Cornrai, ttee shall ::e held as and ·....n e n
required.
vii) A quorurn shall be 6 ,.vhora at leas:: 3 s:1al2.
Slec~rical ~ssocia~iG~s ~nd 3, ~~e G.:.?:.~.
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7. OFFSHORE CONTRACTORS' GENERAL COMMITTEE
i) Member companies in accordance with the rules of their
appropriate constituent associations shall be eligible to be
included on the list of designated offshore contractors. This
list will be revised annually on the 30t~ June in each year.
Additional contractors ~ay join the list if they so ~ish during
the course of the year, but '",ill only have vo t i.nq rights in
accordance wi, th pa.raq r apns 0 (i) (b) if the,;' are on t::'e list on
the 30th June.
ii) All contractors on the designated list may, if t::'ey so ~ish, opt
to join t::'e Offshore Contractors' General Co~ittee, or one of
its area sub-committees. This Co~~ittee will meet generally on
a monthly basis and may appoint sub-cc~ittees or wor~ing
parties to consider special problems or to cover specified
regional areas.
iii) The purposes of the General Co~~ittee shall ze:-
a) To monitor development in offshore contracting as they
occur in conjunction ',vith t::e :1anage;..ent Committee.
b) To maintain a liaison with individuals within the client
companies especially in the Aberdeen area or in any other
location for which an area sub-committee is established.
c) To consider proposals for the negotiation of agreements
with the trade unions or amend~ents thereto and to submit
these through the ~anagernent Committee to the Council.
d) To consider any other matters relevant to offshore
contracting and if appropriate to make reco~'l1endations
through the Management Committee to the Council.
e) The Offshore Contractors' General Con'l1ittee shall conduct
its business in the same manner as the Offshore
Contractors Council as set out in paragraphs 5 (il,
5 (ii) and S (7) of t~is cans~itut~cn.
8. FI~IANC:AL ARRANGE~ENTS
i l The cost of establishing and runr.ing the above arrangerner.ts
shall be borne as follows:-
a) T~e cast ~f ,r~vidi~g ~ sec=etary t8 servi=e t~e Council,
t he ~'~anage~e~t Commi -:~ee and t~e Ger:eral COITl!7l.i t tee shall
8e b o r n a 8';' ::::e three c on s t i t.uen t; Associacians
col':'ec:::i'le':',;, "vno ',vi':'':' aC:-2e among ::hemsel'les ::0',0{ t h i s
ex;;endi ture is to ~e funded. These costs will cover
salary, salary on-costs, transpor~ and hotel
accommoda t i.on out; of London and o t h e r ancillary costs.
They wi Ll, not cover rent and associated costs of the
res;;ective premises of the Associations.
QCA!84!17
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b) The constituent Associations
money, which shall be agreed
costs associated with meetings
shall provide a sum
between them to cover
with the trade unions.
of
the
c) The costs of meetings of the General Committee and any of
the sub-committees shall, as :ar as these are above the
no rma L expend i ture of the consti t uen t As soc.i.a t i ons , be
f'Jne.ed by the listed designated o::soore contractors.
d) The costs of any ae.::i tional s t.a f f , consultants, social
gathering or ot~er s;ecial ex~enditure will ~e f~~cec by
t~e appropriate asscc~ation as recuired.
ii) Company representati;es attending ~eetings ~ill bear their own
costs as far as t.zan s po r t; and any overnight: accommodation are
concerned. Such cost:s in respect of the Directors of the
constituent Associations shall be borne by the Association
concerned.
iii.) A se9a=ate bank ac=ou~t sha:: be ~ai~t3i~ed ~~ caver '~-~~Q and
expendit~r2 i~vo:'led in these ar=ange~en~s.
iv) The accounts in .::-esoect of these a.::-.::-angement:s shall be
maintainee. by the Oil and Chemical ?lant Construct:ors I
Association and shall, after audit, be submitted annually to the
Councils of the three constit~en~ Asscci~tions and ~~ t~e
Offshore Council for approval.
9. ALTERAT!ONS TO THE CONSTIT~T!ON
i) Any alteration to this cor-sci tution
Offshore Council and the Councils
Associacions before implementation.
shall be approved by the
of the three constituent
ii) Any constituent Association ~hich ~ishes to withd.::-aw from these
arrangements shall give six rnorrt hs I notice in writing to the
other constit'Jent Associations.
10. LE:G;;L ?ROVIS::NS
i) The ~e~~ers of the Council and any servants of the const:it~ent
rissociations shall at all times be indemnified out of the :'Jnds
of the Associations against all loss, costs and charges. which
they may incur or be put to by reason or i~ consequence of any
ac~, mat~er or thing done or pe~itted by t~em i~ or about the
bona fide execution 8£ t~e duties of their of~ice; and aac~ of
t.hern s ha l l. ::e c~a=:;e3.b2.e cn l.y w i, t.~ as rnucr; money as :;'e ~ay
,~c~ual:f =eceive and shal: ~ot be answerable or ac~ountable ~~=
:'053 un Le s s suer; _::;S3 3::2.. __ '::e 3L:.s:'.3.i:;.eC: :.::r::ugj his ....;::..: ....:2..
:ault Qr ~e?lec~.
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ii)
iii. )
No member of the Council shall be liable for any other member of
the Council, or for joining in any receipt or other act for
conformity; or for any loss or expense happening to the
Associations through the insufficiency or deficiency of any
security in or upon which any of the funds of the Associations
shall be invested, or for any loss or damage arising from the
bankruptcy or insolvency or wrongful act of any person with whom
all moneys, securities or effects, shall be deposited, or for
any loss, damage or misfortune whatsoever which shall happen i~
the execution of the duties of his office or in relati8n
thereto, unless the same shall happen through his own fraud,
neg~ect or wilful default.
Any act done or performed ~y the Councilor any committee
thereof, or by any person acting as a ~ember of the Councilor
such commit':.ee, or by any servant, officer or trustee of t:--'e
constituent Associations acting on the authority of the Council
shall, no tw.i t.h s t and i nq that it be af t e rwards d i.s c.ov e r ed t::at
there was some defect in the appointment of any such person or
member of the Councilor committee thereof so acting, or that
any of them were disqualified, be as valid as if any such person
had been duly appointed and was duly qualified.
No ~ember of the Councilor of any of the committees shall publish to a
third pazt y any confidential Lnforrna t i.on provided in the course of
discussions and every member shall indemni ':.y and kee p ha.rml.es s ':.he
Offshore Council, its commit':.ees, the constituent Associations and any
of their officers, sezvant.s or agents, and all other members against
any action or proceedings arising from unauthorised disclosure.
12. DISSOLUT:CN
These arrangements may be
respective Councils of the
that not less than six clear
intention.
d i s so l ved by resolution approved by the
three constituent Associations, provided
months' notice shall be given of any such
APPROVED BY the Council of the ~lectrical Contractors' Association,
SSCA nouse, 34 Palace Court, London ~2 4HY on the ~levent:--'
day of July 1984.
Scotland, 23 ::er:'ot ~o'.v, Ed i nbu r ch ::::: 6::::'; on t:--'e ~levent;;, iay 0:
Sept.ember l?84 .
.~D BY t;;,e :ouncil of the Oil and Chemical Plant Const~uctor3'
Associat:'on, Suites 41/48 ~ent House, 87 Regent Street, London N1R on
t;;,e ~Nent.ieth day 0f July 1984.
CGNSTITUTION OF THE INTER-UNION.OFFSHORE OIL COMMITTEE AS AMENDED
1. Aims and Objectives
To co-ordinate the recruitment and organisation of employees
engaged in the offshore oil and gas industry and thereafter to
seek recognition. Follo~ing upon the establishment of
recognition rights the unions ~ith membership amongst employees
of the oil companies concerned ~ill assume all responsibility
for collective bargaining.
2. Unions in Full Membershio
ASTMS
EEPTU
NUS
Associate Membershio
BALPA
AUE'..J
MNAOA
REOU
AUE\-J (CEU)
AUE'.~ (TASS)
Boilermakers Society
TG\~ U -
3. Voting in Committee ~ill be on the basis of one vote per union.
4. A Chairman and Secretary ~ill be elected from the full membersMi~
for a term of t~o years and ~ill be eligible for re-election.
The Chairman and Secretary ~ill have one vote in accordance ~it~
their membership position.
5. Meetings of the IUOOC ~ill be held quarterly.
determined. Further meetings may be convened
of the Chairman and Secretary follo~ing upon a
any member union.
Venue to be
at the discretion
request from
6. Quorum
Quorum to be any four full members at normal quarterly meetings.
Sub-committees (as may be necessary) to be Chairman and Secretary
and such other Committee members a~ is considered necessary.
7. Summary of business and decisions taken to be circulated prior
t~ normal quarter~y meetings.
8. rUDDC.costs to be shared equally by the constituent member
unions' .
.'\ CR/ Ei·\c G
2~th Februarv, 1982
A?P::::Ii)"::( :-'1
MEMORANDUM Or UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UKOOA AND THE Iuooe
-----------------------------------------------------------
. .
Recoanition Mav Be Achieved
1. Unions seeking recognition must be in membership of the IUOOe
at the time of application. It is expected that the IUOae will
inform the Liaison Panel, and any individual Company affected, of a
current union in membership of the IUOOe that subsequently leaves
the IUOOe.
z. Union(s) seeking recognition shoul~ do so by advising the IUOOe
of their intention and request the IUOOe to make such application for
recognition on their behalf.
3. An application for recogntion ~ould be made bv the IUOOC on
behalf of one or more me~ber unions on the basis of applying to a
Common Interest Group.
4. On receipt of such an application, the Company concerned would
then write to the IUOOC to discuss and mutually agree the Common
Interest Group under consideration.
5. After a Common Interest Group is determined, significant
membership sho~ld be demonstrated through the agency of a mutually
acceptable third party.
6. Thereafter, the development of discussions, including consultati=~
with employees which could lead to representational agreement bet~een
member unions of the IUaaC and Employers should proceed along lines t~c
reflect the situation that prevails at that particular point in time
and take into account the needs and wishes of all the parties involves.
7. It being accepted that a balloting of employees would constitute
part of the procedure before a negotiating agreement ~ould be enterec
into.
NOTE
If, during the course of the above discussion, the luoac wish to make
an offshore visit, the procedure outlined in the minutes dated 18th
January would be followed.
"It was agreed that prior to any visit there should be a discussi=:-
between IUaae and the Company concerned to work out and agree
together what arrangement should be made and what facilities
could be offered."
It is understood that the aboue is the recommendation of the Panel on
behalf of UKOOA members with the understanding that any member compan~
is free to modify or amend any of the steps in discussion betcreen
themselves and the IUOOC.
The follo~ing definition was proposed and accepted:
"Representational agreement confers to the IUOOC the right to
reoresent its memoers crithin the terms of the agreement. Thi3
would normally cover disciplinary procedures ano grievances
I:Jhic:l '",auld form part of such an agreement."
13th June, 1977
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